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The Iranian revolution of 1979 is widely acknowledged as an event of world-
historic significance with great empirical and theoretical implications. After 
almost four decades, there are still wide disagreements on its causes and 
consequences. The endurance and increasing power and influence of its most 
important institution, the state of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the face of 
open internal and external coercion and violence is a political success story. 
But, declining per capita national income, continued dependence on oil 
revenues, and inefficient public finance and tax structure, all indicate an 
opposite direction economically. This thesis is an analysis of post-1979 
revolution of the Iranian political economy, critically engaging the conceptual 
framework developed in North et al. (2009). The framework, a theoretical 
conceptualization of dynamic institutional change, focused on violence, beliefs, 
institutions and social orders, allows for investigation of the contextual and 
historical factors influencing and shaping post-revolution institutional changes 
in Iran. This study highlights not only the importance of endogenous 
institutional framework underlying political and economic developments, but 
also the critical role of exogenous factors, underplayed by the conceptual 
framework. It is an attempt to demonstrate that institutional frameworks viewed 
as cultural heritage are the outcomes of historical interplay of internal 
institutional frameworks and external environment in an uncertain non-ergodic 
world. Not only their origins, changes, and persistence are shaped and 
influenced by beliefs and ideas, but also their performances shape, change and 




ABSTRACT                   2 
CONTENTS                3  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT                4  
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION              6  
INTRODUCTION                                                                                      7 
1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY            29 
2 HOW INSTITUTIONS AFFECT DEVELOPMENT: A CASE 
 STUDY OF IRAN                                                                             86 
3 THE STATE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN                118         
3.1. Origin 
3.2. Evolution and Development of the Dominant Coalition  
3.3. Conclusion: Islamic or Republic? 
4 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IRAN                                                173 
5 CONCLUSION                                               182 













This thesis has been completed with the generous and continued support of 
many people. I would like to thank all of them although, for different reasons, I 
cannot name all of them. First and foremost is my supervisor, Dr Louise Haagh, 
who supported my work with excellent advice, feedbacks and patience. Next is 
Dr Rob Aitken, acting as my second supervisor and a member of the advisory 
panel, who read and commented on my work at different stages. I should also 
thank Dr Tim Stanton member of the initial thesis advisory panel for his kind 
moral and professional support. Last but not the least, I wish to thank Dr Liam 
Clegg who provided me with valuable comments and advice in the last stage of 
my work. Some staff of the department of Politics provided me with valuable 
assistance at different stages of my work, particularly Liz O’Brien, to whom I 
wish to express my gratitude. 
Many people in Iran have helped me to finish this work. Seven individuals, all 
current or ex officials of the Iranian government, agreed to be interviewed for 
this work though subject to being anonymous and without being recoded. All I 
can say is that they were all involved in planning and implementing economic 
and financial affairs of the government at the highest levels. I wish to thank all 
of them even without identifying them. Some members of my family and 
friends provided me with valuable non-academic support that allowed me to 
finish my work. 
The period of my work, I should acknowledge, was one of the most difficult 
periods of our family life for my wife and children. They supported me kindly, 
patiently and generously. I could not have maintained my resolve and stability 
5 
 
without their exceptional individual and collective support and encouragement. 



















AUTHOR’S DECLARATION  
I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole 
author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this or any 
other university. All sources, except the interviewees of my fieldwork, are 
acknowledged as References. As I was not authorized to identify the sources of 
data collected as part of my fieldwork in interviews with seven current and ex 
officials of the Iranian government in the course of my work, I have used them 
rarely and only as additional supporting evidences. They are placed in 
“quotation marks” followed by the word interview in parenthesis (interview). It 
should, however, be noted that the quotations from these sources are translations 

















The stark contrast of the political and economic conditions in Iran before and 
after its revolution of 1979 is a serious academic puzzle yet to be studied. The 
historical picture shows a regime with powerful military, security and 
intelligence apparatus supported by at least two decades of unprecedented 
economic growth funded by surging oil prices completely disintegrating in the 
face of rising popular opposition in the course of a year (1978-79). It was 
replaced by a regime, led by a senior Shi’ite clergy and claiming to be an 
Islamic Republic, that in the last four decades has risen to the status of a 
genuine regional political and military power despite constantly fluctuating and 
generally declining economic conditions, falling cheap oil prices, an eight year 
war and continued open and implicit external violence and coercion.  
The rise of religious and revolutionary movements, an eight year conventional 
war, armed conflicts, the use of chemical weapons for the first time after the 
WW1, the second oil shock, renewed attention to development of nuclear and 
renewable energies, new proxy wars and extensive social, political and 
economic changes across the Middle East and North Africa are just some direct 
and indirect consequences of and reactions to this event supporting the 
importance of this research. An understanding of post 1979 Islamic Republic of 
Iran political economy would help to understand potential trajectory of future 
events both in Iran and many societies of the Middle East. Furthermore, 
participation of different groups of people from all walks of life in the 
revolution process and post revolution developments (e.g. the Iran-Iraq war, 
repeated and frequent elections) displays a different logic of collective action 
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from that of a pure economic explanation of human behaviour as posed by the 
Homo Economicus assumption of the neoclassical economics and the “free 
rider” dilemma. An understanding of this can contribute to developing theories 
of politics and economics more reflective of human behaviour in the real world.         
This thesis is a case study of post-1979 revolution of the Iranian political 
economy, critically engaging the conceptual framework developed in North et 
al. (2009). The framework, a theoretical conceptualization of dynamic 
institutional change, focusing on (reduction of) violence, beliefs, institutions 
and social orders, allows for investigation of the contextual and historical 
factors influencing and shaping post-1979 revolution institutional changes in 
Iran. This study highlights not only the importance of endogenous institutional 
framework underlying political and economic developments, but also the 
critical role of exogenous factors, underplayed in the conceptual framework. 
Applying a reformed model of rent distribution pattern among the powerful 
elites with violence capacity in the two existing Social Orders typology of the 
conceptual framework to Iran, this research attempts to show that the post-1979 
revolution political economy in Iran has been a process of renegotiating the 
pattern of rent distribution between old and new internal and external members 
of the dominant ruling coalition in the country. Considering the unstable 
external intellectual, political and economic environment of the country due to 
factors paving the victory of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the 
Revolution’s deep strategic, political and economic implications for the Middle 
East and across the world, the political economy of Iran will remain an unstable 
fluctuating project till settlement of the larger environmental issues. In other 
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words the Islamic Republic of Iran will remain a “work in progress” until such 
time that active claimants and contenders of the rent share in Iran either come to 
an agreement with shares larger than the potential benefits ripped from 
violence/coercion or alternatively one or more group overwhelms the others.     
As the conceptual framework is built on rejecting the behavioural assumption of 
individual wealth maximization of the static neoclassical economics and instead 
adopting a concept and definition of political economy in the classical tradition 
in which “institutions and organizations matter” and economic organization 
depends on more fundamental social and political institutions and organization 
an understanding of the concepts used and developed in the framework is geared 
to an understanding of the meaning and sense of the terms used, including the 
very term of political economy, in this tradition. Therefore, before starting an 
overview of the methodology used in this research a quick review of the 
tradition is necessary. 
Political Economy, broadly speaking, is the study of the relationship between 
politics and economics. Depending on how politics and economics are defined, 
and if and how they are related, different sets of propositions are generated. 
Thus the nature and scope of the discipline since its inception has been a matter 
of contention leading to different schools of thought or ideologies (King, 1948) 
(Gilpin and Gilpin, 1987, p. 25) (Schumpeter, 2006, pp. 19-20).  
For Adam Smith, political economy was “a branch of the science of a statesman 
or legislator” with two distinctive objectives “to provide a plentiful revenue or 
subsistence for the people”, and “to supply the state or commonwealth with a 
revenue sufficient for the public services. It proposes to enrich both the people 
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and the sovereign” (Smith, 1776a, p. 375). The great object of political 
economy of every country, Smith suggests, “is to increase the riches and power 
of that country” (Smith, 1776a, p. 333). 
By attributing a “certain” universal “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange 
one thing for another to a self-interested human nature who “only for the sake of 
profit employs a capital in the support of industry” (Smith, 1776a, pp. 12, 400), 
Smith conveys an image of the economic order organized around voluntary and 
free exchange of goods at their market exchangeable value. This egoist pursuit 
of individual interests is then aggregated at the higher level of society by an 
“invisible hand” (Smith, 1776a, p. 400) in perfect harmony with the Newtonian 
laws of nature, and the idea of “natural order” (Geertz, 1973, p. 34) and “natural 
liberty” (Buchanan, 1976) (Campbell, 1977) of the French Physiocrats, i.e. “to 
do what one likes with his property” (Viner, 1927) (Neill, 1949, p. 538). The 
“Physiocrats optimistically believed they have discovered a science and a 
method which would usher in the perfect society within a relatively short time” 
(Neill, 1949, p. 542). That “science and method” was political economy (Higgs, 
1897, p. 3).  
Smith (1776b) argued that in this world of natural economic order, all systems 
of “preference or restraints” are counter-productive and self-defeating, leading 
to establishment of the “obvious and simple system of natural liberty”, which 
“discharges the sovereign from . . . the duty of superintending the industry of 
private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the 
interest of the society” (p.180). Being discharged from intervening in economic 
activities of individuals by the system of natural liberty, the sovereign will have 
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only three duties to attend: “protecting the society from the violence and 
invasion of other independent societies”; “protecting, as far as possible, every 
member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member 
of it”, or “ establishing an exact administration of justice”; and, “erecting and 
maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions which it can 
never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals” 
(p.181). In this way politics and economics in the political economy of Adam 
Smith are separated. The only remaining connection is transfer of part of the 
economic revenue (surplus) to the sovereign to cover its expenses for the proper 
performance of its duties. Thus, for Adam Smith and his followers a minimal 
state with limited duties of provision of public security and administration of 
justice allowing the system of natural liberty to do its economic work is the 
system of political economy that would lead to increasing the wealth of nations. 
He is quoted as saying “Little else is required to carry a state to the highest 
degree of affluence from the lowest barbarism but peace, easy taxes, and a 
tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural 
course of things” (Rae, 1895, p. 62). But, human interventions and institutions 
had diverted the natural course of things.   
Within this broad context of “natural progress of opulence” Smith (1776a, pp. 
336-340) argued human institutions occasioned considerable variations in the 
progress of opulence in different ages and nations. “Had human institutions 
never disturbed the natural course of things, the progressive wealth and increase 
of the towns would, in every political society, be consequential, and in 
proportion to the improvement and cultivation of the territory or country”, 
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because according to the natural course of things “the greater part of the capital 
of every growing society is, first, directed to agriculture, afterwards to 
manufactures, and last of all to foreign commerce”. But this natural course of 
things “has, in all the modern states of Europe, been in many respects entirely 
inverted”. Rather than being driven by improvements in agriculture, 
“manufactures and foreign commerce together have given birth to the principal 
improvements in agriculture”.  
In other words the increasingly rising opulence and wealth of the modern 
European states was the outcome of an “unnatural and retrograde order” which 
the surviving “manners and customs”, introduced by their original government, 
imposed on them (Smith, 1776a, p. 340). The central argument advanced is that 
“capital accumulation” as the heart of the “modern system of commerce” 
established in some European states and particularly in England and Great 
Britain is the unintended and “unnatural” system of political economy 
established by the specific “manners and customs” of Europe, different from the 
“natural order of things” in the agricultural system of political economy (Smith, 
1776a, p. 375) in Asia and other parts of the world where agriculture is the 
driving force of economy. In the former, a larger proportion of the annual 
produce of land and labour of the country, “the real wealth and revenue of all its 
inhabitants” is allocated to replenishing and adding to “capital” while in the 
latter the greater parts are consumed as revenue. “Where capital predominates, 
industry prevails; where revenue, idleness” (Smith, 1776a, p. 301). Different 
“manners and customs”, or what some refer to as “institutions” (Immergut, 
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2011) (North, 1991) (Hodgson, 2006), are the main explanatory variable (s) of 
divergent progression of opulence or the wealth of nations.  
But this progressive self-sustaining individual interest-centered economic order 
subsequently referred to as “market economy”, and its associated benign 
collective security and individual rights protector political organization was 
soon contested and in some cases fundamentally contradicted amidst great 
political and economic transformations during and after the American and 
French Revolutions in late 18
th
 century.  
Godwin (1812) disputed the benign nature of the government and claimed man 
seeks happiness rather than interest, and government rather than suppressing 
injustice and violence “embody and perpetuate it”. Evaluating institutions 
established for perpetuation of certain mode of thinking, or condition of 
existence as “pernicious”, he declared an extreme unequal distribution of 
property “adverse to the most desirable state of man”. For him it was the 
“improvement of reason” which “we should look for the improvement of our 
social condition” (pp. XIV-XVI).  
Thomas Robert Malthus, “the first Professor of Political Economy in Britain” 
(Hodgson, 2004), while generally defended Smith’s (and the French 
economists’) assumption of the “generous system of perfect liberty” (Malthus, 
1798, ftn, pp. 287-288) criticized Smith for failing “to take notice of those 
instances, where the wealth of a society may increase (according to his 
definition of wealth) without having any tendency to increase the comforts of 
the labouring part of it” (Malthus, 1798, pp. 304-310). In other words the 
“automatic” distribution of the benefits (profit) of economic activities to all 
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participants, or what is now referred to as “trickle-down theory” (Aghion and 
Bolton, 1997) (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015, pp. 4, 7), came under question. His 
“population trap” hypothesis (Malthus, 1798, Ch. II, pp. 106-107 ftn.) seems to 
have been a defence of Smith’s commerce based progress of opulence against 
the early Physiocrats and their British advocates who viewed land and 
agriculture as the real source of wealth (Higgs, 1897, pp. 26-34) (Meek, 1951) 
(Spence, 1808) (Spence, 1807). Furthermore, by describing “the rules which 
ought to guide the political economists in the definition and use of their terms” 
Malthus (1826) attempted to refine the scope and subject of the new discipline 
and reduce “differences of opinion among political economists” resulting from 
“different meanings in which the same terms have been used by different 
writers” (Malthus, 1826, Preface). The definition he offered for “sources of 
wealth” reflected both the state of the discipline and the major transformation 
the British economy was undergoing at the time. He identified “land, labour, 
and capital” as the sources of wealth, but added the explanation that “the two 
original sources are land and labour; but the aid which labour receives from 
capital is applied so very early, and is so very necessary in the production of 
wealth, that it may be considered as a third source” (Malthus, 1826, pp. 235-
236). 
Taking up the same definition of the source of wealth, David Ricardo suggested 
that the principal problem in political economy is “to determine the laws which 
regulate” the distribution of “all produce of earth among three classes of the 
community; namely the proprietor of the land, the owner of the stock or capital 
necessary for its cultivation, and the labourers by whose industry it is 
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cultivated” (Ricardo, 1817, Preface). In other words the major task of political 
economy was reduced to a search for laws of dividing the annual production of 
society as rents, profit and wages between the three classes of society. However 
as he believed the weight of each factor changed in different “stages of society”, 
the proportions accrued to each class should also change (Ricardo, 1817, p. III). 
This definition reduced the process of wealth creation to a purely economic 
activity of production and division of its products between the three classes 
involved, excluding the initial distribution of wealth. It not only designated 
capital as one source of wealth, but the one to which “profit” or the added value 
in the course of production accrued. In his system of political economy capital 
replaced labour both as the source of value, as Smith suggested (Smith, 1776a, 
p. 294), and as the source of appropriation of property according to Locke 
(1722, p. 166). Capital became the central criterion of wealth, the increase and 
decrease of which respectively reflected the progression and regression of 
opulence. Therefore, he advised, government should avoid taxing capital since it 
leads to the destruction of the economy and country (Ricardo, 1817, pp. 187-
188). 
Ricardo also formulated a theory of “comparative advantage” which became the 
theoretical drive and justification for a “specialized division of labour” and “free 
trade” in international trade. Countries were encouraged to concentrate on 
production of commodities in which they had economic “advantage” and import 
goods and commodities in which they lacked such advantage from other 
countries (Ricardo, 1817, pp. 156-162). The obvious implication was that 
countries with “advantage” in agriculture should focus on producing the 
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agricultural (raw) products for export and import manufactured goods from the 
very limited number of “industrialized” ones with the relevant “comparative 
advantage” (Martyn, 1977, p. 105).  
In the height of the Industrial Revolution (1780-1840) in Britain and a number 
of other European countries (Komlos, 2000) (Wrigley, 1972) (Mokyr, 1999) by 
mid nineteenth century
1
, the establishment of the new industrial centers and 
implementation of new industrial and labour relations and the associated social 
and political unrests (Archer, 2000), the system of classical political economy 
came under attack. Rather than a system of political economy, Karl Marx 
offered a critique of the system of political economy. In the works published by 
Marx and his colleague, Frederick Engels, not only the fundamental 
assumptions and methodology of the prominent political economists were 
challenged, but many other disciplines, including sociology, anthropology and a 
materialist philosophy of history, were brought into the discussion to present a 
                                                          
1
 The controversy about the nature of this event, suitability of its name and its exact 
dates of beginning and end is ignored here. The relevant issue here is that it was 
considered the process by which sustained and even increasing rate of economic 
growth could be achieved and thus to escape from the “Malthusian population trap”. 
However, the position assumed here in regard to its implementation and planning is 
that the former (the original Revolution) was abrupt but the latter (its replica) gradual. 
A large part of the answers to the questions raised in this controversy relates to the 
activities of the East India Company across the world and particularly in Indian 
subcontinent, China, Persia and Ottoman Empire. It is worth noting that the company 
directly ruled parts of India between the last quarter of eighteenth century and 1858 
when the rule was transferred to the Crown. Many of the classical political economists 
were directly or indirectly associated with this company and its policies.    
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comprehensive theory of social, political and economic development driven by 
the forces of history. 
The assumption of an abstract individual was questioned and instead man was 
assumed as a social being, a zoon politikon, constituted in social relations 
reflecting the stage of the historical development of his society (Marx and 
Engels, 1998, pp. 1-2). Instead of natural order or self-regulating social 
harmony there was conflict of interests and class domination (Marx and Engels, 
1998, pp. 51-53), but the economists attempted, “in an underhand way”, to 
present the social relations of the product of history as “immutable natural laws 
of society” (Marx and Engels, 1998, p. 4). Politics and the state were all 
superstructure erected on the structure of economic relations (Marx, 1904, p. 11) 
perpetuated by law (Marx and Engels, 1998, p. 14) to preserve the interests of 
the ruling class and in the case of the industrial society, the bourgeoisie (Marx 
and Engels, 1948, p. 11). Economy, rather than being an organization of 
production, distribution, exchange and consumption, has to start with the issue 
of distribution of the means of production and hence the issue of property (Marx 
and Engels, 1998, pp. 11-13) which divides the society into different classes 
struggling against each other. While confirming and agreeing with the earlier 
political economists that the industrial “capitalist society” was an advance in the 
historical social progression they disagreed with them as to its perpetuity. The 
liberal individualist political economist considered the capitalist system the 
highest stage of development in economic organization, but Marx and Engels 
predicted that there will be yet another stage of social development which will 
bring the working class to power, through a revolution, that would abolish 
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private property and would lead human society to its initial status of a classless 
society (Marx and Engels, 1998, p. 60). For Marx political economy was the 
“system of bourgeois economy” (Marx, 1904, p. 9) of a more industrially 
developed society that “only shows, to the less developed the image of its own 
future” (Marx, 1906, p. 13). 
Writing not long after Marx, Jevons (1878) wrote “ Political Economy treats of 
the wealth of nations; it inquires into the causes which make one nation more 
rich and prosperous than another” (p. 7). As a sign of the impact of the Marxian 
challenges and the extensive socioeconomic transformation perhaps moving 
towards directions that Marx had predicted, he was not only using the term 
“science” in different combinations to refer to Political Economy (pp. 11, 20), 
but also attempted to explain the “science of wealth” introducing new changes. 
By defining wealth as “what is transferable, limited in supply and useful” he 
substituted “useful” for the “long phrase” of “productive of pleasure and 
preventive of pain” in Nassau Senior’s definition of wealth (p. 13) followed by 
a chapter on utility (pp. 17-24) signaling the coming of neoclassical Economics. 
Included in his book were a chapter on “Trades-Unions” (p. 61), and separate 
sections on “The Regulation of Hours” (p. 63) and “The Raising of Wages” (p. 
64). Soon after the changes introduced by Jevons, Alfred Marshall (1930 
[1890]) simply by dropping the term “Political” made the title of his book 
Principles of Economics formalizing the birth of neoclassical Economics 
(Marshall and Harrison, 1963) (Skousen, 2007, pp. 112-115) with the claim of 
being a science using methods close or similar to physical or biological 
sciences. As the two opposing sides of the political economy debate shared and 
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promoted this claim of scientificity and use of scientific methods, from there on 
until almost the third quarter of 20
th
 century, Political Economy as an academic 
discipline and research methodology almost disappeared.  
Methodologically, the major differentiating assumptions were an abstract 
unidimensional wealth/utility maximizing Man (Homo Economicus) and a short 
term stationary world leading to the usual ending clause of “other things being 
equal” (Cetris Paribus) (Marshall, 1930 [1890], 366-369). To apply economic 
analysis to a dynamic real world in which the sociopolitical environment of 
economic activities and operations keep changing the non-economic 
environmental elements, including the institutional and organizational 
framework within which the economy operates, should be incorporated into the 
analysis. “The study of long term movements must shift the onus inquiriendi to 
long-term changes in the parameters themselves” (Postan, 1982, pp. 11-12) and 
“in the long run everything, even the natural environment, is subject to change 
and . . .the parameters themselves are variable” (Cameron, 1982, p. 31). The 
domination and prevalence of “scientific” economic explanation of social and 
political phenomena went to such an extent that even the end of ideology was 
declared (Bell, 2001 [1960]).  
The main problem however with the ideology free behavior was that although a 
wealth or utility maximizing Man assumption could explain the problem of 
“free ride” it was impotent in explaining many other human behavior either as 
an individual or in large groups despite no direct economic benefits (e.g. voting, 
large group protests, fighting in wars, etc.). While the dominance of that 
neoclassical economic explanation in Social Science is referred to as the 
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“economic turn” (Levi, 2000), the subsequent reaction to and questioning of this 
border crossing of the natural sciences assumptions and methodology into social 
science is dubbed the “cultural turn” (Chaney, 1994) (Nash, 2001). The biggest 
challenges academically were posed in the Philosophy and History of Science 
focusing on the problem of “induction” and the “verifiability” of scientific 
theory settling on the new Popperian “falsifiability” condition (Caldwell, 2003 
[1982]). Although the methodological debate has been fierce, the neoclassical 
Economics has survived and even in some aspects has reenergized by adopting 
some of the changes, including incorporating institutional and organizational 
factors in economic analysis. One outcome of the methodological debate in 
Economics, however, has been the revival of Political Economy. The discipline 
the subject of which had been the wealth of nation and the state or in more 
recent academic parlance “economic growth” and its sustainability as 
“economic development”, survived under the name of Development Economics 
or Studies and became the study of “the economic structure and behavior of 
poor (or less developed) countries” (Chenery and Srinivasan, 1988, p. xi). From 
the 1980s it began to reemerge under its original or new names like Positive 
Political Economy (Alt and Shepsle, 1990), New Political Economy (Gamble, 
1995) (Besley, 2007) (Lindenberg, 1985) (Leys, 1996a) (Payne, 2006), New 
Institutional Economics and New Institutionalism (Yeager, 1999) (Chang, 2002) 
(Chang, 2007) (North, 2001) (North, 1990) (North, 2005) (North et al., 2009) 
and Political Economy (Basu, 2000) (Nurmi, 2006) (Palan, 2000) (Stubbs and 
Underhill, 1994) (Frieden and Lake, 2003) (Gilpin, 2001) (Frieden and Martin, 
2003) with different extent of relaxation and/or revisions in the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics. Retaining the Homo Economicus assumption of 
21 
 
neoclassical economics by definition means economics is the explanatory factor 
in political economy and a theory of social change. It is only by relaxing the 
assumption of an abstract Economic Man and giving a different definition of 
him and his behaviour that a different Political Economy could be defined and 
formulated. The Conceptual Framework employed in this thesis is an attempt in 
that direction.   
The conceptual framework developed in North et al. (2009), hereafter referred 
to as the NWW
2
 Framework, is an attempt to develop a dynamic theory of 
social change in a non ergodic world in the absence of an integrated political 
economy theory. This is partly in response to the failure of the dominant 
development theory of the mainstream static neoclassical economic theory, i.e. 
the modernization theory, in many developing and ex-Soviet countries including 
Iran. It is an attempt to bring in and endogenize non-economic factors in 
explaining political and economic changes and development. Considering 
certain similarities, it could reasonably be regarded as an update, or a new 
version, of modernization theory and particularly its dominant American 
version of Walt Whitman Rostow’s stages of economic growth theory (Rostow, 
1956) (Rostow, 1959) (Rostow, 1960) (North, 1958) (North, 1982) in the long 
run. As a framework for analyzing social change it has the potential to be 
applied in case studies of political and economic change and development. In 
this thesis it is applied to explain political and economic changes in post 1979 
                                                          
2
 It is derived from the first letters of the surnames of the three authors, i.e. Douglass C. 
North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 
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revolution Iran in the context of its long run political and economic changes and 
development.   
In explaining political and economic change across time and place the NWW 
Framework suggests that political and economic organizations are 
interdependent parts of larger social order and the way societies reduce the risk 
of violence defines what it calls the Social Order. On the basis of Social Orders 
typology three types of societies have existed in human history. The initial 
defunct hunter-gatherer society in which humans lived in small groups and 
interacted on the basis of personal knowledge of each other violence was the 
dominant means of resolving disputes between groups. The other two types of 
existing societies with different Social Orders are the Limited Access Order 
(LAO) and Open Access Order (OAO) corresponding to developing and 
developed societies. In both distribution of rent, defined in the classical political 
economy sense and not as unproductive activities a’ la Rent Seeking literature, is 
the mechanism for the reduction of violence but through different institutional 
and organizational arrangements that shape and constrain human interactions 
including political and economic behaviour.  
In the Open Access Order rent is distributed through competition by open 
access of individuals and groups to form organizations. Violence is reduced 
through double balance of corresponding distribution of violence potential 
between economic and political organizations. Higher living standards and 
economic development in this type of society is the outcome of less violence 
over longer periods of time even with lower rate of economic growth. In other 
words economic change and growth is the outcome of long periods of social and 
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political stability resulting from the institutional and organizational framework 
in these societies.  
In Limited Access Order societies or the “natural states”, that corresponds to all 
other existing societies other the ones in the former group, political system 
manipulates the economic system to create rents in order to reduce violence and 
maintain social and political order. In these societies distribution of rent is 
limited only to powerful members of the dominant coalition with violence 
capacity. Peace persists only to the point that rent accrued from peace is greater 
than rent accrued from violence. In other words non-members of the dominant 
coalition do not have access to elite reserved institutions and organizations 
without developing a violence capacity sufficiently large to claim access to 
those institutions and organisations and a share in the distribution of rent. 
Therefore, more incidence of violence occur in this type of societies that not 
only destroys the economic growth gained in the previous period of peace, but 
also could drive the society back to a state and point below its starting point in 
the last period. In other words, there is no guarantee of “progress” in the social 
change in these societies. They can move forward and backward along a 
continuum of change from a “failed’ to “basic” to “mature” natural state.  
Based on the above typology institutional and organizational framework of 
societies becomes the major factor explaining differences in social change and 
economic performance. National and per capita income or Gross Domestic 
Products (GDP) loses its position as the measure of economic development and 
rich oil exporting countries with highest per capita income in the world become 
members of the Limited Access Order. 
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  The thesis presents a critical engagement with the NWW framework. Two 
main engagements are offered. First, it is suggested that NWW framework 
presents a vision of institutional development that over-emphasises endogenous 
factors. Whereas the NWW framework presents Open Access Order (OAO) and 
Limited Access Order (LAO) as discrete modes of political economies, my 
suggestion is that the two are inextricably linked. The analysis of development 
in Iran suggests that OAOs’ historic and contemporary exploitation of LAOs 
has served to embed negative, conflicting and contradictory institutional 
structures within LAOs.  
Second, contrary to what North et al. (2009) propose, the thesis aims to show 
that the prevalence of longer periods of violence does not necessarily stem from 
endogenous culture or religion. While culture and religion have played 
significant roles in shaping individual and collective behaviour, the post-
revolutionary behaviour of the Iranian state has in important respects been 
driven by rent creation
3
as opposed to rent-seeking literature originating from 
“free ride” literature (Olson, 1965) (Olson, 1982), Rational and Public Choice 
literature like Buchanan et al. (1980), Krueger (1974), Tullock (2005) and other 
strands of literature such as Mahdavy (1970), Beblawi (1987), and Beblawi and 
Luciani (1987) to reduce the risk of external violence. The NWW Framework 
defines rent as “a return to an economic asset that exceeds the return the asset 
can receive in its best alternative use” (North et al., 2009, p. 19). This allows a 
different interpretation and analysis of the political economic organization, 
                                                          
3
 For example in a market where the price of unskilled labour is (or expected to earn) 
10 unit of currency per hour, her or his employment for 12 unit an hour receives 2 units 
of rent.    
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institutions and relations in different societies, including developing countries 
and particularly those rich with natural resources. 
It is argued in this thesis that contextual detail matters; in particular, the 
accumulated impact of major historic events have shaped post-revolutionary 
trajectories. The specificities of the Iranian revolution seem to render the case as 
a response to a common problem sui generis (Lal and Myint, 1998, p. 259) in 
the sense that it is not imitated. The exclusively urban support from across many 
social classes for a religiously-led revolutionary movement helps to render the 
case unique. It is this complexity and the multi variable nature of the 
development dynamics in Iran that makes NWW Framework fit for its analysis. 
In addition, as the NWW Framework is only a conceptual framework, a work in 
progress to be complemented by much theoretical groundwork and future 
research, the case study of Iran, selected as one of the “most-fit” case for the 
cultural institutional view of the conceptual framework, could contribute to its 
development or revision. By such a contribution, this thesis not only contributes 
to better understanding of the nature of development in Iran, but also contributes 
to increasing the stock of knowledge for addressing the problem of 
underdevelopment that is going far beyond national boundaries with grave 
consequences for global security, stability and prosperity. 
The main question posed in my thesis is to explain how the sweeping 
institutional changes after the Iranian revolution of 1979 have affected 
economic growth and development in Iran. The broad question is specifically 




1. What are the sources of rents, who are the beneficiaries, and how are 
they distributed? 
2. What are the rent-related violence generating/promoting institutions in 
Islamic Republic of Iran? 
3. Are there necessary causal relations between country specific belief 
system or culture and rent-related violence generating/promoting 
institutions in Iran? 
I shall attempt to address the above questions on the basis of the above long run 
political economy approach using the methodology of institutionalism 
developed in the NWW Conceptual Framework and a reformed model adding 
the role and influence of transnational organizations, networks and players in 
the national institutional framework and its external environment. It shall be 
argued that despite extensive changes in the formal political and economic 
organizations of Iran, the basic informal institutions forming the motivation 
structure of major economic and political actors (except for a short period of 
time immediately prior and after the revolution) remain basically unchanged. 
The extensive changes in the formal framework reflect the changes in the 
number of players and their relative powers. 
The general line of argument is that the Iranian revolution of 1979 and formal 
institutional changes were the outcome of the changes in the relative powers of 
the internal and external members of the dominant coalition in Iran following 
repeated external violence and coercion culminating in the 1953 joint British-
US coup against a democratically elected government in Iran. The 1953 
intervention discredited the foreign members of the dominant coalition, eroded 
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the legitimacy of the re-imposed government and destroyed the potential power 
of local allies of the foreign members. The change in the relative powers in the 
foreign alliance within the dominant coalition of Iran after the coup and 
particularly from 1960s, the rise of new political forces in Europe and the USA 
challenging the power of the establishment and opening new spaces for Iranian 
opposition, all contributed to the victory of the Iranian Revolution. From there 
on a process of renegotiating the rent distribution among the old and new 
claimants from the oil and gas reserves of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) second largest oil exporting country, the main 
sources of rent in Iran, began. With the lifting of the pre revolution security 
cover of Iran from its Western allies, violence and coercion became the major 
channel of distributing and absorbing the oil and gas rents. In the absence of any 
law enforcer in the international arena it is the relative power of the players and 
the alliances that they form determines the nature of final settlement of the 
process yet to come.  
Overall, in answering the research questions through the thesis, Chapter One 
outlines methodology and research design; Chapter Two provides a broad 
introduction to the Iranian case and a historical overview of post-revolutionary 
economic and political developments; Chapter Three presents a historical 
analysis of the origin and development of the modern Iranian state with Shi’ite 
branch of Islam as the state religion. The composition of the ruling coalition 
from its origin up to the present is analysed in order to understand the possible 
political and/or economic factors shaping and influencing its changes over time; 
Chapter Four sums up the political economic performance of post-revolutionary 
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Iran on the basis of preceding historical and empirical analysis attempting to 
signpost possible directions on the basis of its findings; and finally Chapter Five 
integrates and concludes research findings and compares them with the basic 
assumptions of the NWW conceptual model for further theoretical refinement 



















Conceptual Framework & Methodology 
Introduction 
Commenting on some scholarly works analyzing Iranian Revolution based on 
Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions (Skocpol, 1979) and some others 
attempting to theorize Third World Revolutions, Tilly suggests an approach for 
explaining political processes. He argues that regularities despite being very 
broad in political life, do not appear as recurrent structures and processes at a 
large scale. Instead, “they consist of recurrent causes which in different 
circumstances and sequences compound into highly variable but nonetheless 
explicable effects” (Tilly, 1995, p. 1601) and therefore a good theory focuses on 
accounting for their variation instead of similarities. Note should be taken that 
the causes of major events might also produce some other side phenomena, that 
time, place and sequence strongly influence unfolding of the processes and give 
them undeniable historical character, and that events and processes are local 
manifestations of fluxes extending far beyond their perimeters. He further 
argues that as social world does not conform to neatly recurrent structure and 
processes we need to have programs, both on ontological and epistemological 
levels, to converge in “historically embedded search for deep causes operating 
in variable combinations, circumstances, and sequences with consequently 
variable outcomes”(Tilly, 1995, p. 1062). 
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Tilly’s argument is based on Stinchcombe’s definition of “concepts” that 
“capture aspects of the facts for a theory” and “are the lexicon that the grammar 
of theory turns into general sentences about the world”. “The argument” for 
Stinchcomb is that “the power and fruitfulness of these sentences is determined 
by the realism and exactness of the lexicon of concepts, and not by the 
theoretical grammar”(Tilly, 1995, p. 1062). Obviously this argument provides 
the epistemological ground to generate knowledge, while Tilly’s emphasis on 
the ontological aspects of the work concerns the nature and limitations of the 
knowledge sought. 
This brief introduction is intended to explain the methodology I am going to use 
for this research which is based on the general approach of the importance and 
influence of institutions, both formal and informal, on economic and 
sociopolitical processes and outcome. It is the approach in which development 
is no more seen as just a process of capital accumulation or technological 
advances in production. The fact that Iran’s high economic growth in the 60s 
and 70s was terminated by a popular social revolution in the final years of 70s is 
a testimony of unsustainability of economic growth just on the basis of capital 
accumulation or incorporating new technologies in production. Organizational 
and institutional set up and changes are needed to make such growth 
sustainable. The NWW Conceptual Framework, focusing on belief systems, 
institutional arrangement, organization, the state and individual and collective 
experience (individual and socially transmitted learning processes), and a 
feedback system correcting the belief systems and the institutional framework 
provides a greater understanding of the processes of economic and political 
changes over time and hence a workable framework in understanding the 
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dynamics of social change that does not necessarily lead to “social progress” in 
the long run. 
The NWW Conceptual Framework 
In answering what factors and processes influence the wealth of nations, 
different strands of institutional approaches have emphasized different factors. 
The older generation of institutionalists generally highlighted the roles of formal 
institutions, state, history and culture, while new generation, inspired by 
institutional economics emphasize the role of market, market mechanisms, 
transaction costs, deregulation, liberalization, rule of law, fiscal discipline and 
transparency, and secure property rights.  
Despite the fact that there is no consensus on the definition and the origins or 
persistence and change of “institution”, there is a widespread agreement in 
development economics that ‘institutions matter” (Hodgson, 2006) (North, 
1991) (Sachs, 2003) (Bardhan, 2005) (Lowndes, 1996). In political science, 
rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism are the widely practiced approaches (Evans, 2004) (Greif, 1998) 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996) (Immergut, 2006) (Peters, 1999) (Schmidt, 2014) 
(Thelen, 1999). The first two groups of practitioners may view the political 
actor as generic individuals, but the last views political action as the outcome of 
group interactions in search of collective group power, identity or influence 
(Dobbin, 1994, Meyer and Scott, 1983, Orru et al., 1991).  
The rational choice advocates see institutions as arenas in which the generic 
individuals with given preferences endeavor to maximize their individual 
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interests and preferences, but the historical institutionalists would see the 
current institutions as products of past conflicts, policies and institutions that 
influence political behavior (Skocpol, 1979)  (Tilly et al., 1985)  (Knight, 1992). 
That is to say that Rational Choice theory is more focused on the micro level of 
explaining individual human choices on the basis of exogenous preferences 
within institutions that mainly provide information and shape expectations of 
the political actors and the historical institutionalism concentrates more on the 
macro level of the influence of institutional framework or structures on human 
behavior. While sociological and historical institutionalisms could be defined as 
comparative by nature, rational choice presents a snapshot view of generic 
individuals making choices within an institutional context at certain points in 
time, thus making a claim to universal generalizability of such actions 
(Weingast and Marshall, 1986, North and Weingast, 1989, Williamson, 1998, 
Przeworski, 1991).  
For the historical institutionalism (and comparative institutionalists in general) 
new rules, that is institutions, emerge from past conflicts and structures over the 
distribution of power and benefits and thus is more context specific and 
inductive with less theoretical groundwork. Rational choice approach is widely 
criticized for its failure to generate a plausible explanation for the origins, 
persistence or changes of the institutional contexts which is broadly defined in 
functional terms of maximizing political actor’s preference and interest based 
mainly on deductive methodology. Such a functional explanation might 
plausibly justify the persistence of institutions, but it certainly lacks the vigor of 
explaining their origins.  In other words, the two main questions that the 
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advocates of rational choice theory need to address are how institutions 
originate, change and persist and why political actors are assumed as self-
interested maximizing agents when there are numerous contrary cases of social 
and political actions (e.g. drivers stopping at red light when there are no other 
cars around being the most simple example to volunteers risking their lives to 
defend a country or a population for no obvious material gains).  
To address some of such shortcomings, North et al. (2009) have developed a 
conceptual framework in which they have tried to explain the behavior of 
political actors and institutional evolution and adaptation in terms of human 
endeavor to deal with the ubiquitous threat of violence. Announcing economic 
development the result of longer periods of peace or the absence of violence, 
and economic institutions (e.g. property rights and other social rules discussed 
in economics) as “derivatives of political institutions” (North, 2009, p. 27), they 
acknowledge the inability of neoclassical economics in investigating the 
operations of institutions like market and economy “over time” and thereby 
challenging the universality of economic generalization. Their conceptual 
framework also incorporates some elements of historical and sociological 
institutionalism (e.g. the importance of history, context specificity of 
institutional development, the importance of ideas and belief system, culture, 
and social construction of human knowledge and understanding, path 
dependence and historical processes) indicating a more conciliatory and eclectic 
approach in exploring the causes of development. 
The conceptual framework developed by  North et al. (2009) (hereinafter also 
referred to as NWW or Limited Access Order/Open Access Order, LAO/OAO, 
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framework) is based on the problem of how societies deal with the problem of 
violence. Obviously no meaningful development (economic, social and 
political) is possible with the presence of violence.  
A brief review of the Iranian history shows that the chances for development in 
a society experiencing two social revolutions, three foreign engineered or 
assisted coups, four long term foreign occupations, and numerous social 
movements and revolts in eight decades of the 20
th
 century would not be very 
much. In the past three decades following the Iranian Revolution, the country 
faced a foreign military aggression in the first year (lasted 8 years), an armed 
revolt in the second, and numerous political assassinations (two presidents 
targeted, one killed, one injured, a prime minister and over 100 MPs killed in 
various terrorist explosions).  
Political feud has been a lingering feature ever since the revolution; the last of 
which has been widespread protest and civil unrest in large cities and urban 
areas in 2009 led by the opposition headed by the almost 10 year prime minister 
and two times (8 years) speaker of the Iranian parliament (the Majlis). A long 
shot view of the country’s history and geography reveals that the past 5 
centuries has been dominated by violence punctuated by short periods of peace. 
The sheer shrinking of the physical extent of the country compared to its map in 
1500 confirms its violent history in the course of past five centuries. Such a 
violent history provides sufficient justification to agree with North et al. (2009) 
in considering short periods of peace or long periods of violence as the main 
cause of underdevelopment or underperformance of Iranian economy and 
attempting to identify the cause (s) of such violence and violent history. 
Furthermore, the establishment of Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the 8 year 
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Iran-Iraq war, the suppression of political opposition in post war period, 
widespread opposition and public demonstration and violent clashes following 
the presidential election of 2009 and now the widespread speculation of an 
impending external military aggression against Iranian nuclear installations and 
subsequent (or perhaps inevitable) direct and indirect involvement of some of 
regional and extra-regional powers similar to that of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, makes such an study even more imperative.  
The public threats of individual or collective military action against Iran with 
the stock phrase of “all options on the table” by various civil and military 
officials of all ranks along with widespread presentation of Iran in the Western 
media as a “rogue”, “evil”, “theocratic”, “authoritarian”, etc., country “in the 
process of building a nuclear bomb” has created such a situation that “Bomb 
Iran” has become at least a widely known song. The underlying message 
initially was that Iran is a “violent country” but at later stages and in more 
recent years a cultural and/or religious overtone linking the claimed “violent 
nature” of the regime to its cultural and religious foundations is also added. 
Research on Iran, except the period immediately before and after its Revolution 
of 1979, has been mainly limited to Iran and the Middle East area experts and 
foreign policy oriented or related institutions in Western countries. The main 
development theoretical frameworks within which development in Iran has been 
analyzed are: different versions of modernization theory (Arjomand, 1989, 
Boroujerdi, 2003, Eisenstadt, 2011, Inglehart and Welzel, 2009, Inglehart and 
Welzel, 2010, Jahanbegloo, 2004). Generally they advance a claim of victory of 
modernization over tradition or the other way round. Dependency theory 





 century, the development was limited both in form and content 
due to its dependence on external forces before embarking on a modernizing 
development model depending on oil after 1914; Rentier state arguments 
(Mahdavy, 1970) (Skocpol, 1982) (Shambayati, 1994) designate the Iranian 
state as an authoritarian state due to its heavy reliance on extraction of revenue 
or rent from oil exports and thus its freedom from reliance on taxation and less 
popular representation. Applying paradigm shift Najmabadi (1987) tries to 
explain the Iranian Revolution as paradigm shift from modernization to that of a 
moral order; identity politics (Farhi, 2005) emphasizing the search of Iranians 
for a national identity in the context of their dualistic pre Islamic Persian and 
Islamic identities; state-civil society conflict, pseudo modernism, arbitrary rule, 
short society and historical problem of political legitimacy and succession 
emphasizes the short lived periods of change and continuity of Iranian society 
due to various geographical, economic, political and historical reasons 
(Katouzian, 2003a, Katouzian, 1997, Katouzian, 1981, Katouzian, 2004a, 
Katouzian, 2003b).  
In recent years, however, in line with political developments in Iran, 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and its socialist bloc and the consequent 
decline in attraction of Marxist approaches and the greater dominance of new 
liberal market centered views in theories of development the greater thrust of 
the research is directed towards the role of culture, religion and institutions. 
This shift has led to valuable policy oriented research rather than basic 
fundamental theoretical works. Akhavi‐Pour and Azodanloo (1998) argues that 
political decision making is based on maximization of economic interests 
(rational choice theory); Moaddel and Azadarmaki (2002) in a survey of public 
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worldviews in Egypt, Iran and Jordan finds that the variation in nature of 
political regimes in these countries is an important determinant of the variation 
of worldview of the public in these countries; Mibagheri (2003) finds the two 
institutions of monarchy and Shi’ism responsible for most of developments in 
Iran; Alamdari (2005) argues that Iran in the second decade after her revolution 
has made a transition from religious populism to that of a cliental regime; and 
finally Kar (2010) regards the clash between conservative and reformist clergy 
the heart of the struggle that post-revolutionary Iran has been facing.  
What can be concluded from all these works and many others is that, no 
analysis of the current political system or behavior of Iran is possible without 
taking into account its revolution of 1979 and its claim of being an Islamic 
government. The occurrence of the revolution following or perhaps as a 
consequence of five decades of industrialization, urbanization, state sponsored 
education and other social services or, as some of the above works argue, 
“modernization”  in itself posed serious questions to the viability of explaining 
Iranian development with modernization theory (Arjomand, 2002) (Cronin, 
2001).  
Modernization was expected to bring economic growth and socio political 
institutions that would make it sustainable: democracy being its masterpiece. 
Therefore the advocates of this theory either should consider the current Islamic 
government as a democratic political system or the least should accept that there 
is no necessary contradiction between such government and democracy. 
Considering the existence and practice of certain exclusionary institutions in the 
Iranian political system, justification of the former would be very difficult, if 
not impossible, and the possibility of the latter claim would need much further 
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research to substantiate. The least one could say is that in Iran the expected 
victory of modernization in the battle between modernization and tradition (or 
culture for some), not only did not materialize, the establishment of a 
“religious” government with the claim of exclusive right to rule for the religious 
authority (the clerics) dealt a serious blow to the theory itself.   
A similar problem is raised with world system theory. While the theory might 
partially explain the dependence of Iran economy (and politics) as a periphery 
on the core system in the short period between the end of WW2 and the 
revolution of 1979, the popular revolution with participation of different groups 
of people with different social and economic class base, does question the basic 
class conflict assumption of the world system theory. Furthermore, the nature of 
the government subsequently established, is far from the socialist government 
anticipated to replace the world capitalist system, unless, the advocates of the 
system are prepared to strip the theory from all its material basis and include 
culture and religion as a major force in the development of an alternative to the 
current prevailing system. That would also require further research both in the 
nature of culture, religion (particularly Islam) and a substantial revision in the 
alternative system replacing world capitalist system. Nevertheless, the theory is 
partially capable of explaining the kind of economic and inevitably the political 
relations developed between Iran, as a periphery, and the major Western 
powers, as the core, from the beginning of 1501 (the year of establishment of 
Safavid dynasty and proclamation of Shiite Islam as the state religion for the 
first time in the history of the country). In fact, no comprehensive explanation of 
development in Iran is possible without taking into account this early buildup of 
global economic and political relations between the “Western” powers (Britain, 
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Russia, France, Germany, and the USA) and Iran which has worked throughout 
Iranian history since as a, if not the, major influence on events in Iran.  
The same problem could be identified with dependency theory. While it 
partially is capable of explaining development in Iran (Foran, 1989), the multi 
class nature of opposition to the political regime before the revolution and the 
“religious’ or “cultural” feature of the revolution and the role (or lack) of 
peasantry in the revolution and its active role in supporting the post revolution 
state forced advocates of the theory to revise many aspects of the theory and 
even come up with a new theory of social revolution ((Foran, 2009, Foran, 
1997, Foran, 1992). Both dependency theory and world system theory face the 
same problem that forced Skocpol (1982) to revise her analysis of world 
revolutions after the Iranian Revolution by saying  “. . . this remarkable 
revolution also forces me to deepen my understanding of the possible role of 
idea systems and cultural understandings in the shaping of political action” 
(p.268) and add later that  
. . . the Islamic Republic of Iran have proven once again that 
social revolutions are less about class struggles or 
"modernization" than about state building and the forging of 
newly assertive national identities in a modern world that 
remains culturally pluralistic even as it inexorably becomes 
economically more interdependent. (Skocpol, 1988, p.167) 
The problem that an analysis of Iran, with dependent economic and political 
systems on foreign powers before the revolution and still a dependent economy 
with wide multiclass public participation in its public affairs after the 
revolution, poses is that theories based solely on dichotomous oppositions of 
either agency or structure, either economy or culture, either external or internal 
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forces cannot wholly explain pre and post-revolutionary developments in Iran. 
This explains the failure and the forced revisions of all existing development 
theories when it comes to analyzing Iran. To explain the development in Iran, 
and perhaps and hopefully many other cases, there is a need to develop a theory 
which can strike a balance between these assumedly opposing concepts: a 
theory in which agency and structure, culture and economy, and external and 
internal forces influence and shape political action. The conceptual framework 
developed by North et al. (2009) in which the problem of development is 
viewed as creation and sustenance of organizations, institutions, and beliefs 
with the aim of controlling violence (and explicitly linking culture to generation 
of violence through institutions) seems to be a suitable candidate for a case 
study of Iran under existing circumstances.  
The NWW framework’s emphasis on the “uniqueness” of each society’s 
evolution and the need for specific understanding of the “cultural heritage” of 
that particular society (North et al., 2009, p. 271) has the potential of taking care 
of the factors emphasized by Skocpol and Foran. The Rentier nature of all 
natural states (North et al., 2009, pp. 18-21, 140-42), that is developing 
countries, provides “a new approach to the “logic of collective action,” one that 
turns both Olson  (1965, 1982) and public-choice theorists studying rent-seeking 
(Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock, 1980) on their heads” and takes into account 
the rentier nature of the Iranian state both before and after the revolution. It has 
also the potential to incorporate the dependence of Iranian economy and politics 
on external forces either in the form of a member or the dominant member of 
ruling coalition.  
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The NWW framework’s central theme of violence has the potential both to 
explain the repeated occurrence of violence in the Iranian history and numerous 
cases of forced acceptance of unfavorable external terms and conditions by the 
Iranians. The very concept of “violence’ is broader than “war making” as a 
means of state or nation building and has greater potential in explaining both 
wars and sociopolitical movements and unrests that have shaped the Iranian 
history. It also solves the problem that Iran was not involved in any external 
wars for almost a century before the war with Iraq in the 1980s. The emphasis 
of the NWW framework on the importance of history and the rejection of the 
validity of economic theories in explaining development creates the space for 
the historical evolvement of various political and economic structures and a 
bridge with historical institutionalism and employing context specific case 
studies. While the framework includes many advantages that make it a suitable 
conceptual framework to study the post-revolutionary Iran and attempt an 
assessment of the country’s development in terms of its organizations, 
institutions and belief system, it also suffers serious limitations and 
shortcomings that need to be explained and critiqued. The main problems that 
need to be emphasized at this stage and shall be dealt with in greater details in 
subsequent sections are: 
1.  It treats the development process an almost internal process linked 
exclusively to each society’s culture and system of beliefs. That ignores 
the historical movements of ideas, beliefs, knowledge, and the cultural 
interactions between different societies. It also ignores the historical fact 
that in not so long ago, many of the current nations-states were different 
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parts of the same society or an empire sharing more or less the same 
culture and many formal and informal institutions;  
2. The attribution of development to institutions and organizations 
generated by culture and system of beliefs, should have an overarching 
theoretical support in explaining the occurrence and sustenance of 
development in societies with apparently different cultures from those of 
the “Western” developed countries, e.g. Japan and some East Asian 
societies. Such a theory should also have the ability of explaining 
different levels of achievement in development in societies with similar 
culture or system of beliefs, e.g. North and South Korea. It should also 
be able to explain the cause (s) of the change in culture and belief system 
as the cause of different levels of development in the same society over 
different periods of time, e.g. China;   
3. While it emphasizes the importance of history and emphasizes the role 
of organizations like East India Co. and Russia Co. in promoting open 
access institutions in the now developed countries (North et al., 2009, p. 
168), it totally ignores the role of the same organizations (and celebrated 
liberal enlightened intellectuals) in the process of colonization and 
creating and promoting limited access institutions and order in many of 
the now developing countries (Maddison, 2006) (Harris, 1964) (Calder, 
1987, pp. 1-37). Origination of totally contradictory institutions (e.g. 
justice and oppressions, liberties and suppression, open access order and 
limited access order) from the same individuals, institutions and 
organizations in different geographical areas would make it very 
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difficult to defend the assumed one to one causal relationship between 
the belief system culture and institutions;  
4. Treating violence as the outcome of institutions created and promoted by 
culture or system of beliefs completely eliminates or ignores the 
violence imposed by the external forces. This not only contradicts 
numerous historical cases of foreign aggression, but also blurs the 
concept of self-defense as an almost universal recognized legal and 
legitimate right;  
To contextualize the above potentials and critique requires an explanation of the 
framework itself and then its shortcomings in order to define the scope, design 
and methodology of the current research. 
Limited Access Orders versus Open Access Orders 
On the assumption that how societies deal with violence explains economic and 
political development North and others start to construct a conceptual 
framework “to provide a new institutional explanation for why patterns of 
political economy have persisted for centuries”(North et al., 2010, p.2). 
Therefore, in considering the interaction of economic and political behavior, the 
problem of violence for them is the point of entry in investigating how societies 
are organized (North et al., 2010, p.3).  
The very basic idea in LA/OA Orders framework is that “societies limit 
violence through the manipulation of economic interests by the political system 
in order to create rents so that powerful groups and individuals find it in their 
interest to refrain from using violence”. This method of organization of violence 
is described as “a social order” and of “Limited Access Order” type (North et 
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al., 2010, p.3). The logic is that leaders of armed and dangerous groups, who 
would not disarm in fear of destruction by other groups, would agree to divide 
economic factors (land, labor and capital) and opportunities among themselves 
and undertake to enforce each other’s privileged access to resources which 
would generate rents. If the value of the rents earned under peace is greater than 
the earning under conflict, then, peace shall prevail and violence will be 
avoided, because each leader can genuinely believe that the others will not fight. 
An important feature of such an agreement, it is believed, to be the ability of 
leaders to call on each other for assistance in disciplining and organizing 
members of their own groups. Figure 1 is a graphical presentation of the model 
between any 2 groups. 
 
 
                                                                                Figure 1        Inter Group Leaders Agreement 
 
Source:(North et al., 2010) 
 
Therefore, the main incentive in upholding the peace is the rents which would 
be lost if cooperation fails and violence ensues. And it is the rents resulting from 
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the privileged access to resources that enable the leaders to control and organize 
members of their respective client groups in order to sustain peace; however, 
‘better” organizational productivity results from their ability to rely on each 
other for external support. The coalition of the leaders in this conceptual 
framework is called the dominant coalition which provides third party 
enforcement for each member organization. “The vertical organizations might 
be organized as political parties, ethnic groups, patron-client networks, or crime 
families” (North et al., 2010, p.6). In this sense, obviously, members of each 
client groups are not only individuals, but also client organizations. That turns 
the dominant coalition into an organization of organizations. In a functioning 
limited access society, therefore, the dominant coalition includes economic, 
political, religious, and educational leaders (elites) “whose privileged positions 
create rents that ensure their cooperation with the dominant coalition and create 
the organizations through which the goods and services produced could be 
mobilized and redistributed”(North et al., 2010, p.6).Thus, rents is the glue for 
keeping the coalition together. “The creation and structuring of rents is the heart 
of the logic of limited access” (North et al., 2010, p.7). Definition of rent in this 
framework is then an important feature which the authors emphasize to have a 
“classical” meaning, i.e. the net difference between total benefits and total costs. 
In this sense it should be differentiated from its more negative recent meaning in 
the context of “rent seeking” which is considered a directly unproductive 
activity. In other words “rent” in NWW framework denotes a ‘ubiquitous 
characteristic of human behavior” that “could benefit society” (North et al., 
2010, p. 8).  
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The LA/OA framework while accepts that individual members of the dominant 
coalition would maximize rents, rejects the idea that the coalition as a social 
organization would maximize rents per se. Thus the second and more 
substantive distinctive feature of rent in this framework is that as rent is the 
difference between total benefits and “opportunity costs”, it makes behavior 
predictable. Therefore, rent in itself is not an absolute measure of behavior but 
depends on alternatives (opportunities) available. The implications then in this 
sense are that horizontally, rents in the coalition is tied to violence and vertically 
it is tied to third party enforcement capability which results from the 
cooperation of members of the coalition. The rents creation structure then on its 
basic level is tied to either violence or cooperation and other forms of rents 
creation (not related to violence or cooperation) in the coalition becomes 
redundant and unsustainable.  
The structural problem that may arise in this framework is the conflict between 
the short term rent maximization efforts of individual members of coalition and 
the long term sustainability of rent creation structure within the coalition. In the 
face of a crisis in the Limited Access Order, it is the individual elite rents that 
tend to be eliminated
4
 and replaced by rents that would promote violence 
prevention or coalition members’ cooperation. But the implications of granting 
new rents are not predictable for the society as a whole. This would then lead to 
the conclusion that the power of rents in Limited Access societies in explaining 
why they do not improve over time, is in serious doubt. Therefore, based on the 
above assumptions and definitions the Limited Access Order can be described 
                                                          
4
 North et al., (2010) state “there is evidence for this in every one of the case studies”. 
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as an order which, by limiting individual access to form organizations of various 
natures to engage in social activities, creates rents for members of dominant 
coalition. The rents form the incentive structure of the members of the coalition 
to control their client organizations and constrain violence on the one hand and 
to provide third party enforcement for member organizations of the coalition 
which as a result of exclusive privileges and rents continue to hold the 
agreements with their respective leaders on the other. In sum, “limiting access 
to enforcement by the coalition creates rents and shapes the interests of the 
players in the coalition” (North et al., 2010, p. 11). 
In contrast to Limited Access Order, Open Access Order (OAO) enables its 
citizens to form various organizations for engaging in different types of 
activities except the use of violence. “Violence is an activity reserved for 
government organizations” which are “constrained from using violence against 
citizens except in specific circumstances”(North et al., 2010, p. 11). In OAOs 
official organizations of violence are controlled by political processes open to 
competition sustained by economic competition secured by open access to 
organizations in the private sector. The contrast in the two orders then lies in, 
not the competition itself, but the background against which the competition is 
conducted. While in OAOs, competition is governed by political processes 
sustained by economic competition, in LAOs, the competition is conducted 
against the background of threat of force and occasionally the actual use of 
force. This implies that the organizational arrangements in LAOs are completely 
different from those in OAOs and the former societies have not been able to 
achieve the Weberian status of government monopolizing the legitimate use of 
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force and at the same time limiting government by political and economic 
competition. “As a result, institutional arrangements in these (LAO) societies 
must channel competition in a way that controls violence as well as promotes 
socially valuable processes like production and distribution”(North et al., 2010, 
p. 12). The possibility of civil war among coalition organizations, therefore, 
reflects the fundamental difference between the LAO organizations and interest 
groups in OAOs. What is important here to note is that Limited Access Orders, 
though not fully successful in eliminating violence, are not degenerated or 
corrupt forms of OAOs. They are a different type of societies “with their own 
consistent and historically successful way of organizing human interaction”. 
North and others believe “unless we understand the internal dynamics of 
Limited Access Orders, we are unlikely to come to grips with the problems of 
development” (North et al., 2010, p. 12). Considering the different natures of 
the two orders, the problem of development for North and others then reflects 
itself in two different questions:  
1. How the transition is made from LAO to OAO? 
2. How the LAO develops despite remaining a limited access order? 
Implicit in the first question is that OAO is a higher level of social, political and 
economic development and the whole effort for “development” is about the 
transition from LAO status to OAO which North and others consider being the 
“traditional problem of development”. On the same line of approach then the 
second question could be interpreted as the question dealing with the dynamics 
of being “underdeveloped” or “developing”. Classifying almost all current low 
and middle per capita income countries (175 countries and about % 85 of world 
population) in the LAO group and the more industrialized “developed” 
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countries (25 with about %15 of world population) in the OAO group makes 
that assumption explicit (North et al., 2009, p. xii).  
To understand the internal dynamics of LAOs they have studied 9 countries 
which clearly display four commonalities as “elements of LAO logic” (North et 
al., 2010, p. 13). The four commonalities detected are: 
1. The centrality of violence, its management and prevention, in the history 
of these countries; 
2. The central place of organizations in structuring relationships within and 
between the polity, economy, and wider society. In every case, powerful 
groups enjoy the explicit and privileged support for their organizations; 
3. The pervasive use of rents to organize political and economic coalitions. 
Indeed the source of rents is often the privileges provided by the 
dominant coalitions of powerful interests; 
4. None of these societies have been static. All of them have gone through 
significant changes, with some falling into violence. Nonetheless, all of 
them (except perhaps South Korea) remain limited access orders. 
Despite the above commonalities, there are wide differences, including the level 
of per capita income (by a factor of 20), in LAO countries which North and 
others believe to reflect the differences in the quality of their institutions. To 
incorporate these differences within LAO a continuous spectrum of societies is 
designed and the place of each country on this spectrum defines its status as a 
Fragile, Basic or Mature LAO. The spectrum is divided or differentiated by the 
structure of organizations and each society, depending on the nature of the 
organizations it can sustain, is placed on that spectrum. “Whereas the 
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LAO/OAO distinction reflects a fundamental difference in the dynamics of 
social orders, the different types of LAOs are shorthand terms for ranges that are 
not clearly distinct”(North et al., 2010, p. 14). Therefore, the main differences 
between these types of LAO are more of degree and intensity of the same shared 
qualities. The features North and others assign to the three main types in the 
LAO range could be described as follows: 
A. Fragile LAO: dominant coalition can barely maintain itself in the 
face of internal and external violence; persistence of organizations 
over time is difficult; organizations are mostly identified with the 
personalities of their respective leaders and the leaders are closely 
associated with the dominant coalition; a distinct organization called 
the Government may exist, but it has no monopoly of violence. Elite 
organizations exist both in private and public sectors and provide 
goods and service, including coercion, in a fluid and constantly 
changing environment. Prominent contemporary examples include 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, and some sub Saharan countries; 
B. Basic LAO: well established Government compared to Fragile type; 
the more durable organization in these societies is a formal 
government; elite privileges and organizations are closely associated 
and identified with the coalition and the Government; many Arab 
and former Soviet countries, Cuba, North Korea, Burma, and Mexico 
are representative countries considered to be in this range; 
C. Mature LAO: support of organizations both inside and outside of 
dominant coalition; still limiting access to private organizations 
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allowed or supported by the dominant coalition to limit competition 
and maintain rents to support the coalition; a body of Law defining 
Government offices and functions, relationships and methods of 
conflict resolution within and beyond the coalition; the law should 
be represented by some Government bodies like courts and 
bureaucracy capable of articulating and enforcing it; private 
organizations capable to punish Government in case of its deviation 
from its commitments, thus both sources of economic development 
and support for the maturity and sophistication of other institutions 
and organization within Government; most of Latin American 
countries, South Africa, China and India are regarded as prominent 
examples of Mature LAO. 
A more classified definition and distinctive features of different types of LAO 
range is presented in Table 1. It is important to remember that there is no 
sequential progress of a society from one type to another (i.e. societies may 
regress and fluctuate within and between different types), that one part of a 
society may be closer to one type and another part to another (i.e. the 
classification of type is an overall designation and does not necessarily applies 
to all its constituent parts individually), and that a society may be member of 
one range type at one (short or long) period and a representative of another 
range in another period, e.g. Mexico in 1940s-80s is in Basic range but since 





Table 1     Types of Limited and Open Access Orders 








Congo, Haiti)  
 
EOs and POs are not clearly 
distinguishable, except perhaps for multi-
national firms present in fragile LAOs.  
All surviving 
organizations 
have VC. Civilian 
and military not 
clearly 
distinguished.  





All Eos - public or   
private - are linked 
with the coalition; 
some are also linked 
with multi-nationals.  
Most POs are 
controlled by the 
state, e.g. One-party 
state or dictatorship. 
Opposition parties 








possess VC.  




India, China)  










if present, cannot 
challenge major 
economic powers.  
State controls 





Most are private. 
Non-discriminatory 
rules for any citizen 
to start an EO and 
get state legal 
support. 
Non-discriminatory 
entry rules for any 
citizens to start or 
join a PO.  
No non-state 
organizations 
have VC.  
Source: (North et al., 2010) 
Now the question is why LAO societies have developed so slowly (or from the 
long run historical perspective their growth has been close to zero and at most 
some have moved from one range of LAO type to another without necessarily 
progressing) and remained LAO and only very few (25 or so) have made the 
transition to OAO status?  
Obviously the general answer would be because the OAOs have managed to 
change their organization of violence and LAOs have not. That would raise 
further questions of why and how OAOs managed to change that organization. 
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Answering those questions would be almost impossible without looking into 
details of how LAOs sustain themselves, progress or regress and why and what 
exactly happened in those 25 or so societies that qualitatively changed their 
major organizations and institutions. The very fact of their display of different 
features in different time periods indicate that LAOs are not static and 
considering that their movement from a Fragile state to an state of Maturity 
increases the generation of rents for the dominant coalition, it could be 
reasonably argued that their general tendency should be one of maturation. 
However, due to the changes in the environment (e.g. due to changes resulting 
from internal and external shocks like changes in prices, technology, power 
shift) the process of maturation is not guaranteed. Hence, some LAO in fact 
regress at certain periods. Obviously members of the coalition or other groups 
initially removed from the coalition, who due to some environmental changes 
find themselves in a more powerful position than before, would demand a 
greater share of the rents. The shared perception of other members of the 
coalition with the demanding group’s assessment of its relative power would 
lead to a peaceful settlement of the claim and a change in distribution of rents. If 
members of the coalition do not agree with the relative power assessment of the 
claimant, then the outcome most probably would be outbreak of violence. One 
can conclude that in those 25 or so OA societies, the dominant coalitions have 
been able to accommodate the new claiming groups, or alternatively, it could at 
least theoretically be assumed that there was no new power claims in those 
societies from late 18
th
 or early 19
th
 century. Historical events, to say the least, 
do not support the latter. Then the question to answer is how and why new 
power and (rent) claims in those societies were and are accommodated in a 
54 
 
manner to avoid violence? The OAOs should be closely examined to understand 
what has happened. 
OAO’s are sustained by institutions which support open access. Political 
competition is maintained to support open access to economic organization and 
economic competition supports open access to politics. The use of force is 
monopolized in two Government organizations of military and police and no 
other organization is authorized to use force. The political system controls both 
organizations (North et al., 2010, p. 21). Access to political, economic, social, 
religious and educational activities and organizations are open to all citizens 
which in turn means the Government should have the capabilities to support 
organizations beyond the dominant coalition. This in turn requires an impartial 
and impersonal application of law to all citizens and organizations. The 
monopoly of potential and actual legitimate use of force by the Government 
combined with the impartial and impersonal rule of law in OAOs make them 
representative types of Weberian government. Now considering that OAOs used 
to be LAOs, it could be reasonably concluded that the transition from a LAO 
institutional arrangement to an OAO institutional set up is, at least theoretically, 
possible. It does not however imply that the transition is made automatically or 
even desirable.  
The second conclusion that could be drawn from the comparison is that, if the 
transition was not automatic, then the dominant coalition must at some point of 
time have found the extension of their citizens access to various activities and 
organizations and increasing the impersonal exchanges in their overall interest, 
assuming that the transition was neither externally imposed nor the unintended 
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outcome of their actions. The continuity and the lasting durability of the 
arrangement reject the possibility of the latter assumptions. Considering that the 
existing institutional arrangement must be the outcome of a transition process, it 
would be logical to assume that the recognition of desirability of such transition 
is the beginning of the transition process. It is at this point that “the system 
changes from the logic of limited access rent creation, to open access entry” 
(North et al., 2010, p. 22). Certainly such a process does not start in an all-
inclusive universal manner. It should be safe to assume that the process of 
extending the access to different activities and organizations at least in its initial 
stage should start with granting those rights to members of the dominant elites. 
North and others state that “historically, societies that developed sustainable 
property rights and rule of law began by making credible commitments to 
sustain those rights for elites” (North et al., 2010, p. 22). Greater access means 
proliferation of different organizations (i.e. turning into Mature LAO), which in 
turn means greater degree of impersonality in defining and enforcing their rights 
and relationships. Therefore, to make the transition to an OAO, the society must 
necessarily pass through the Maturity stage of the extension of impersonal 
exchange as the precursor to OAO. North and others have identified three 
conditions which make impersonal relationship among elites possible. Named 
as doorstep conditions, they are as follows: 
1. Rule of Law for elites; 
2. Support for perpetually lived elite organizations both public and private 
(including the state);  




Even though the three above conditions are identified as the conditions which 
the LAO societies making the transition to OAO type developed and displayed, 
their sequence or historical development is neither clear nor necessary. Despite 
this, the existence of the conditions building one on another is necessary for the 
transition. The Rule of Law for elites, which creates the possibility of 
regularizing behavior in the dominant coalition elite interactions, requires 
establishing credible adjudicating procedures to settle disputes amongst the 
elites. These developments in LAO, is believed to be the origin of property 
rights and the legal system in the OAOs. The continuity and stability of an 
organization, private or public, depends on its existence and functioning beyond 
the life of its members. Organizations without an independent identity from 
their leaders or founders, stops functioning and even living after the departure of 
those leaders and founders. An organization can become a perpetual 
organization when formed as a corporation with its own identity independent 
from its members. Such organizations, considering their dependence on state 
support, would not have perpetual life without a perpetual government.  
Mortal governments are unable to support perpetually lived organizations for a 
successor government is not bound to honor the commitments and organizations 
created by another. This means creating perpetual government (state), as the 
most important elite organization, is the requisite for the second doorstep 
condition. Now considering that the whole LAO/OAO classification is based on 
how societies organize violence, the third doorstep condition becomes a critical 
factor. As in this conceptual framework, LAOs have not achieved the status of a 
Weberian Government (i.e. they do not have a monopoly of potential and actual 
legitimate use of force), access to the means of violence is dispersed throughout 
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the elite coalition. Consolidated control of the military requires an organization 
in which all the military resources are assigned to and a set of rules or 
conventions defining their when and where use against individuals and 
organization.  
The monopoly of such control, however, by a single faction within the dominant 
coalition or the lack of clearly defined rules and conventions for their use would 
reduce the credibility of commitments made to other members of the coalition, 
thus forcing them to arm themselves (overtly or covertly) against any surprises. 
Therefore the monopoly of such control would not be long term. In the LAOs 
where these three conditions (i.e. Rule of Law for elites, Perpetual 
organizations, and Consolidation of violence control) are established, 
enforcement of impersonal relationships among members of the dominant 
coalition or elites, and hence transition to OAO, becomes possible. However, in 
contrast to the gradual distinction of various range types within LAOs, the 
distinction between LAO and OAO is a matter of nature. From their case studies 
of some LAO countries and comparing these countries with each other and 
OAO, North and others conclude that compared to the historical back and forth 
movement of LAO societies, the transition to OAO has happened rather quickly 
and perhaps in the past fifty years (second half of the 20
th
 C). In answering the 
critical question of correspondence of their findings from such comparative 
study of the selected countries with economic and political development, they 






Limitations of NWW Framework and Critiques  
Perhaps the best place to start with the limitations of NWW framework is the 
reminder that it is only a conceptual framework and not a theory. “We develop a 
conceptual framework, not a formal or analytical theory”  (North et al., 2009, p. 
xii). The lack of supporting economic and political theories and a theory that 
explains social behavior limits the capacity of the framework for prediction and 
therefore empirical tests. Instead of testing detailed hypotheses “historical 
examples have been used” to illustrate the conceptual framework and statistical 
analyses have not been attempted “because no straightforward measures of our 
concepts exist” (North et al., 2009, p. 263).5 The framework is not a “formal 
model” for generating empirical tests and prediction but a framework that 
“incorporates explicitly endogenous patterns of social, economic, political, 
military, religious, and educational behavior” for a “dynamic explanation of 
social change and not of social progress”(North et al., 2009, p. xii).  
Viewing the framework as incorporating “explicitly endogenous” pattern of 
behavior means ignoring all external constrains and impositions which 
inevitably leads to treating the two social orders as two completely independent 
orders reacting to a single “exogenous” environment. This would ignore the 
long term unequal interaction, later defined as “colonization” that started to 
                                                          
5
 Building empirical measures of access and social orders, Kishtainy (2011) tested for 
an association between social orders and “growth fragility”, an important performance 
characteristic given that low income levels may be the result of countries’ failure to 
sustain growth rather than to achieve it at all.  Using dynamic panel estimation 
techniques they find some evidence that over the 19th and 20th centuries, countries that 
made the transition to the open access social order tended to achieve more stable, 
modern patterns of growth. 
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change the “exogenous environment” of one social order (the LAO) from the 
start of European “Age of Discovery”6 (Ekeh, 1975). Ignoring the influence and 
shaping of the present by the past through institutional heritage claimed by the 
framework as the crucial manifestation of history which explains why “history 
matters” (North, 1990, Preface), is a major deficiency. In other words the 
challenge of explaining “how durable and predictable social institutions deal 
with an ever-changing, unpredictable, and novel world within a framework 
consistent with the dynamic forces of social change” (North et al., 2009, p. xii) 
that the framework is set to explain, would be methodologically sound only if 
the two societies are assumed to be operating under similar, if not the same, 
“exogenous environment”.  A graphic presentation of a valid comparison of two 
different societies A and B (each having different sets of endogenous 
institutions) under a single external environment, X, for the same period of time 
(t) to see how each reacts should look like Figure 2. In that case and ignoring all 
minor external environmental differences (if possible at all) one can assign the 





                                                          
6 Probably from June 1494: when Pope Alexander VI stepped in as the negotiator for 
peaceful division of the World between Portugal and Spain.  
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                                                             t 
 This would be a relatively sound and simple comparison of putting two 
different entities under similar condition and then explaining the different 
reactions in terms of their different constituents. If it could be shown that the 
“exogenous environment” for the two orders differed, then the conclusion 
drawn would be defective. The way out of such deficiency is to say there is no 
comparison made: only a historical development is described. In that case the 
question that would naturally arise is the cause or causes of such a change. Not 
much explicit attempt is made to investigate the cause and causes (due to lack of 
various theoretical supports required, e.g. lack of an acceptable theory of state, 
lack of an integrated theory of politics and economics or political economy), a 
task left for further research.  
The inevitable outcome of this view is over emphasis of the cultural specificity 
of development and underestimation of the role of institutions established as a 
result of external forces. The idea of “returning to Islam” or to one’s roots in 
Iran was clearly the result of the idea of achieving “independence” from foreign 
 X = External Environment 
         A           
 
   B 
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powers as the only means of breaking the deadlock created in the country’s 
progress (development) by repeated violent foreign interventions. 
Furthermore, historical events of the past 500 years (at least as part of recorded 
human history) show that the external environment for the two different 
categories of societies or social orders has not been the same due to 
“colonization” and big power rivalry for sphere of influence in bilateral and 
multilateral relations. Graphically the real situation would be more like Figures 
3 and 4 respectively for “colonized” and “semi colonized” (Leys, 1996b, p. 5) or 
“semi-independent” societies. 
 
Figure 3: External environment of A and B throughout colonization 



















Figure 4: External environment of A and B throughout colonization 











What the above three Figures show is that while the external environment or 
“the world” for group A remain equal to X, for group B, it changes to A + X = 
Y. That means the study would change into comparing two different societies 
under two different conditions of external environment for which there is no 
common criteria for comparison.  
The difference for ‘colonized” and “semi-independent”7 societies was that with 
the status of “dominated actor” they had to deal with the group A as part of their 
external environment, while the group A or the “colonizers” with the status of 
“dominating actor” treated group B as part of their internal environment. 
                                                          
7
 “Semi Independent” is preferred to “Semi Colonized” due to the fact that these 
societies had formal independence that imposed certain responsibilities on their 
“endogenous” formal institutions, but it does not mean that the severity of the 
conditions and constraints they faced in their relations with the dominant foreign 
powers were necessarily less intense than those of the “colonized” societies. 
 X = External Environment 
A= Big Powers (Colonizers) 
 
B= Semi colonized 





Obviously different “worlds” create different “world views” both creating 
different beliefs and institutions: one (group A) creating beliefs and institutions 
for perpetuation and maximization of its dominating status (encouraging and 
emphasizing discovery of new lands, wealth generation, market expansion, new 
technologies, new means of transportation, etc. and above all organizations to 
sustain and improve the efficiency of the system); the other (group B) for 
changing its dominated status either by breaking away (revolts, revolutions, 
wars) or getting integrated and upgraded (by assimilation, education, political 
and economic connections, etc.) in the system. The “cultural heritage” produced 
in the hindsight, would be inherently and substantially different. Therefore, the 
two groups face two different, and in some cases, conflicting problems and 
therefore should resort to different solution: one for continuity, the other for 
change. The major difference between the two groups, as displayed in the three 
Figures above, is a deficit in de facto sovereignty while maintaining de jure 
independence. Comparing the two groups with the same criteria before the point 
of recovery of that deficit is methodologically flawed. The NWW recognition of 
the difference in the problem to be studied in the two groups (North et al., 2009, 
pp. 263-265) (Weingast, 2009, pp. 36-38) is a positive step in the right 
direction. All single fit all models are doomed to fail. 
The question that would be raised is that if institutions are produced by the 
belief system or “cultural heritage”, how is it possible for two different (or even 
in some sense opposing) “cultural heritage” to produce the same or at least 
similar institutions and organizations at a later stage in time? Perhaps the 
question could even be further complicated if the problem of path dependency 
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of past choices is also added. The NWW does not offer any answers to these 
questions (due to lack of a supporting social theory explaining human behavior).  
Now let’s assume that the elites (and following them, ordinary people) 
somehow accept and decide to implement the path to development suggested in 
NWW framework. If organizations and institutions are product of beliefs, does 
that mean those elites and their citizens should substitute the “Western” 
worldview and belief system (cultural heritage) for their own? If the answer is 
positive, wouldn’t that be tantamount to a global cultural unification and 
“cultural cleansing”? And doesn’t that involve self-denial and self-destruction 
(in the sense of destroying one’s identity defined either socially or culturally), 
unless it is done in such a gradual and incremental manner that the change is not 
felt and remains embedded. Then in this case it means the time period for 
developing countries even to reach the doorstep conditions would be something 
of the order of many decades or even centuries.  
It seems the grim tone of the framework in emphasizing the forward and 
backward movement of natural states and lack of guarantee for making the 
transition to OAO state is the reflection of the uncertainty involved in all long 
term processes without the human ability to foresee the future, world and its 
events. This in turn would question both the wisdom of such recommendation, 
its practicality and the urgency with which it is followed by international 
organizations and experts. Obviously the answer should be sought in the 
negative impact of underdevelopment on developed countries, the most 
prominent of which is the internal and external threat of violence. The former 
would disturb the internal order and the latter would be a threat to all lines of 
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supplies (inward and outward), markets, financial institutions and the free 
global movement of capital, the critical structural veins of the international 
economy. That means if the developed countries have developed because of 
their ability to reduce the occurrence of violence, then the increasing rate of 
violence (both internally and globally) would be a direct threat to the long term 
development of the developed countries and needs to be stopped sooner, rather 
than later. That explains the significance, importance and urgency of 
investigating development related problems and above all understanding its 
underlying mechanism. The question is then how? 
Certainly the above question cannot be answered without understanding the 
cause of the violence. NWW framework is an attempt in this direction. The 
argument is simple: development is the outcome of organizations and the 
underlying institutions that encourage maximum cooperation, competition, and 
participation of people in society and those institutions are generated and 
supported by the belief systems (culture) people hold in each society. If 
developing countries want to develop, they have to change their belief system 
(culture) (Figure 5). 




















Portraying the dynamism of social change as above NWW needs to provide 
supporting arguments (theories) explaining how the belief system is generated 
and that it is all endogenous, and that all institutions upheld in a society are 
directly produced by the belief system (a causal relationship between beliefs or 
culture and the institutions). Then it would need a theory to show that the state 
(as organization of organizations) is either a reflection (an aggregate) of those 
institutions or at least a “true” representation (sample) of those institutions.  
If the system is self-sustaining it would need a feedback system both for internal 
(process) improvement and an interface for input improvement in its interaction 
with the external environment. Do all the system constituents directly interface 
with the external environment, or the belief system (culture) is the interface 
through which the changes in external environment are fed into the system? If 
the former is accepted, it would mean there is no necessary one way causal 
relationship from culture (belief system) to institutions and organizations and 
they can be influenced by external causes (e.g. socio economic conditions), and 
in the case of accepting the latter the indigenousness of the belief system would 
be breached. At most the culture operates as catalysis through which the 
changes in external environment are received and communicated in locally 
meaningful messages and symbols to members of the culture.     
As most of those questions are unanswered in the NWW framework and are left 
for further research, the present research is designed to explore some of those 
questions. Since “Iran’s recent past presents a rare, ‘laboratory- like’ case for 
the study of growth and development in a broad context” (Hakimian, 2008, p. 
v), and because Iran possesses, wholly or partially, many features generally 
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considered features of a modern state (e.g. a sovereign political authority, an 
electoral system, division of state power, popular political participation, 
provision of public goods like education and healthcare, etc.), I shall use post-
revolutionary Iran as a case study to explore some of the relationships assumed 
or expressed in NWW conceptual framework. This research would also situate 
itself within the ongoing debate of Iran area experts if the policies of Iranian 
state after the revolution are driven ideologically and/or culturally or otherwise.  
Research Design and Methodology 
This research is organized as a case study of development dynamics in Iran and 
the origins and causes of the persistence and change of the main violence-
generating formal and informal institutions as the main impediment to 
development in Iran in the light of the conceptual framework developed by 
(North et al., 2009) referred to as NWW Conceptual Framework. Therefore, the 
main concepts addressed in this research are violence, beliefs, institutions, 
organizations, culture and state and their relationship in producing development. 
As most Iran experts agree that Iran is growing economically with rates neither 
corresponding to its own material and human resources (Bjorvatn and Selvik, 
2008, Hakimian, 2008, Pesaran, 1999)  nor comparable to other economies of 
the same size and characteristics (Alizadeh, 2002, p. 268, Alizadeh et al., 2000), 
different economic, political or cultural explanations have been offered as the 
cause or causes of her underdevelopment. Though a structural economic 
adjustment of the Iranian economy, if implemented successfully, may lead to an 
increase in her growth rate, it is doubtful that it would automatically translate 
68 
 
into sustainable economic development without the required reforms or 
adjustment in its political institutions.  
To begin with, one needs to bear in mind that even the success and 
sustainability of IMF recommended current economic (energy subsidy) reform 
in Iran is subject to further reforms in Iranian policies (economic, fiscal and 
trade) and corporations which implies political and legal reforms (Guillaume.D, 
2011, p. 22). The outcome of such reforms, if realized at all, would at best put 
the state in a position to make the best use of its revenues from oil, but it does 
not solve the structural problem of the dependency of Iranian economy on oil 
revenues, and therefore a major cause of its fluctuating economic performance 
and political instability.  Conflict between “religious” institutions and values to 
which the state claims to be adhering to and the “institutional requirements” for 
a sustainable development, are also identified as the major cause of its 
underperformance (Pesaran, 1999, Esfahani and Pesaran, 2009, Rahimi, 2007). 
Though non-economic factors identified as the direct or indirect causes of the 
contradictions and tensions extremely vary, a large number of them could be 
grouped into causes directly originating from the belief systems (e.g. all 
religious beliefs supporting establishment of a religious state), and indirectly 
from cultural dynamics (e.g. the identity formation conflict between pre and 
post Islamic beliefs, practices, symbols, institutions, and traditions) of the 
inevitable conflict between pursuit of “ideological”, “cultural”, or “traditional” 
policies of the Iranian state and the requirements for development in an 
increasingly globalized modern or postmodern world (Bakhash, 1989, Farhi, 




In this research the Iranian state, as organization of organizations, and its major 
policies in the post-revolutionary period shall be analyzed first to find out if the 
state itself is established and organized by “cultural/religious institutions” and 
second the policies pursued are the “inevitable causal” outcome of those 
“cultural/religious institutions”. The research assuming NWW conclusion that 
the main cause of underdevelopment in natural state is the relative short periods 
of peace and stability rather than lower rates of economic growth compared to 
OAOs, is designed to show that not only Iran’s post revolution history has been 
extremely violent, but her history in the course of 20
th
 century has been 
frequently shaped by wars, violent military operations, revolutions, coups and 
social unrest. The repeated occurrence of open violence combined with the 
continued threat of violence in the form of foreign interventions, authoritarian 
repressive regimes or social unrest has deeply affected the key development 
institutions like tax and public administration, rule of law, investment, etc. 
However, by further analyzing the sources and origins of the prevailing violence 
an attempt shall be made to display that the violence is neither endogenous nor 
stemming from its religious ideas or broader ensemble of its culture. Instead, the 
violence is mainly imposed on the country externally for political influence and 
economic advantages leading to certain institutional arrangements that 
combined with the violence itself have perpetually fed political and economic 
instability causing underdevelopment. Attempts by the Iranian state or nation to 
change the impeding institutional arrangements after the revolution has met 
further violence or continued threat of violence as had before the revolution. 
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This research is motivated and designed on the basis of recommendation of 
NWW for “new research that entails an in-depth understanding of violence, 
institutions, organizations, and beliefs in the natural state that we do not 
currently possess” and on the shared assumption with NWW that “every society 
evolves in unique ways, so that a deep understanding of change must go beyond 
broad generalizations to a specific understanding of the cultural heritage of that 
particular society” (North et al., 2009, p. 271).  
To achieve it aims the research is designed as a qualitative crucial case study, 
both to arrive at a deeper understanding of the social dynamics in Iran, 
contributing to overall existing Iran area expert knowledge, and to provide a 
detailed research to support some but challenge other propositions in NWW 
Conceptual Framework. Obviously the first questions that may be raised as to 
the justification and importance of the research are the selection of the case 
study methodology and Iran as the subject of the study. To answer these 
possible questions two main reasons were taken into account for the selection of 
the methodology and the “case”: one is related to the nature and methodology of 
the NWW framework and the other concerns the present and past conditions of 
development in Iran which makes it “the most likely fit” case that could serve as 
a “crucial case” for NWW conceptual framework.   
The NWW framework is presented as a conceptual framework not susceptible 
to empirical tests. “We do not present a formal model that generates explicit 
empirical tests or deterministic predictions about social change”. This in effect 
means there is no theory or hypotheses to be tested, but instead it proposes “a 
conceptual framework that incorporates explicitly endogenous patterns of 
71 
 
social, economic, political, military, religious, and educational behavior” (North 
et al., 2009, p. xii). The methodology used to provide supporting evidence both 
for its assumptions and conclusions are case studies of “nine countries”(North et 
al., 2010, p. 13). “We interlace historical illustrations with the conceptual 
discussion to provide enough evidence that these patterns actually exist in the 
world” (North et al., 2009, p. xii). The case studies are specifically conducted to 
support the arguments for the general pattern of development in natural states, 
that is, the problem of development in LAOs. That naturally means studying the 
problem of development in developing (LA) countries within this framework 
should take into account the evidences provided by the nine case studies 
undertaken. Therefore, presenting a study of a “case” that may qualify as “the 
most likely case to fit the framework” and yet does not support (at least some 
of) the assumptions and conclusions of the framework (i.e. a counterfactual case 
study), even if may not necessarily disconfirm the proposed framework, it 
should lead to revision of some basic assumptions and conclusions and probably 
a reformulation of the proposed conceptual framework. For at least it would 
mean that if the framework is not applicable to its most likely fit case, its 
application to least likely and even typical cases would come under serious 
doubts and questions.  
But, would a single case have the potential to challenge the extension and 
generalization of the conclusions drawn from NWW framework “supporting” 
case studies? Perhaps an exploration of some methodological concerns on the 
nature and role of “case study” research would shed some light on its potentials. 
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“Case studies enable researchers to focus on a single individual, group, 
community, event, policy area or institution and study it in depth, perhaps over 
an extended period of time”. This approach is “closely associated with historical 
study” and while both quantitative and qualitative data can be generated by case 
study, “the approach has more of a qualitative feel to it”(Burnham et al., 2008, 
pp. 63-4). As the case study relates to a “single case” some doubt the utility of 
case study in generating data that could be generalized. In order to avoid the 
criticism of being just an account of a unique case, “a strong theoretical 
dimension is often incorporated into case study design” of which the critical 
case study is a good example. In critical case study the researcher has “a clearly 
defined hypothesis or theory to test and the case study is designed so that the 
wider generalization can be drawn”(Burnham et al., 2008, p. 64). Others 
however disagree with many parts of the above propositions. To focus on the 
current research, a review of the debate on “case study” here is limited only to 
those relevant to political science. 
A review of the literature on “case study” reveals that even at the most 
fundamental level, that of the meaning of the term “case study”, there is no 
widely accepted definitions in political science (Yanow et al., 2008, p. 1). In the 
first place there are disagreements in considering case study as research 
“strategy” or ‘methodology”. “The case study is a research strategy which 
focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 534) . 
“A case study is a research strategy that can be qualified as 
holistic in nature . . . looking at only a few strategically selected 
cases, observed in their natural context in an open-ended way . . 
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. making use of analytical comparison of cases or sub-cases, and 
aimed at description and explanation of complex and entangled 
group attributes, patterns, structure or process”(Verschuren, 
2003, p. 137).  
The divide and disagreement seems to be more of the result of a general 
tendency influenced by the methodology in natural science and the attempt to 
produce results of similar vigor and validity in social science.  
“What began in the 1950s as the investigation of unique 
practices in socio-political life . . . has increasingly . . . been 
expected to change that approach . . . that takes one 
understanding of natural science methods and techniques as the 
requirement for studies of the political to be seen as scientific” 
(Yanow et al., 2008, p. 3). 
Despite the wide disagreements on the meaning or definitions of “case study” 
and varied degrees and periods of acceptance between the proponents of its 
earlier form and “those trying to bring it closer to quantitative modes” it remains 
a “central method of analysis in contemporary political science research” 
(Yanow et al., 2008, p. 11). It is under such conditions that the validity, 
reliability and theory relation of the case study and in other words “the very 
status of the case study as a scientific method” is at issue (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 
221). In explaining common misunderstandings about case study Flyvbjerg 
(2006) recounts context dependent knowledge necessary for development of 
“virtuoso experts” from rule-based beginners and the only type of knowledge 
that appears to exist in the study of human affairs, which, thus, presently rules 
out the possibility of epistemic theoretical construction. “Context-dependent 
knowledge and experience are at the very heart of expert activity” he says, 
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adding “it is only because of experience with cases that one can at all move 
from being a beginner to being an expert”.  
If researchers wish to develop their own skills to a high level, 
then concrete, context-dependent experience is just as central for 
them as to professionals learning any other specific skills. 
Concrete experiences can be achieved via continued proximity 
to the studied reality and via feedback from those under study. 
Great distance to the object of study and lack of feedback easily 
lead to a stultified learning process, which in research can lead 
to ritual academic blind alleys, where the effect and usefulness 
of research becomes unclear and untested. (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 
223) 
The absence of predictive theories in social science is what makes context 
dependent knowledge the only source of knowledge available to study human 
affairs.  
The second main point in connection with the learning process 
is that there does not and probably cannot exist predictive theory 
in social science. Social science has not succeeded in producing 
general, context-independent theory and, thus, has in the final 
instance nothing else to offer than concrete, context-dependent 
knowledge. And the case study is especially well suited to 
produce this knowledge. (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 223) 
These conclusions are important in the sense that at least two influential 
critiques of case study, Campbell (1966) and Eysenk (1976) who in their earlier 
works had seriously questioned the value of case study research that became the 
origins of many subsequent attacks on the value of case study due to its inability 
to produce “scientific” knowledge and even various defensive attempts and 
approaches to turn case study into a “scientific” methodology, revised their 
positions and came to conclusions more or less similar to that expressed by 
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Flyvbjerg. In introducing the NWW conceptual framework and its basic 
assumptions and implications, it seems North also takes a similar approach, 
though with an added ontological explanation: “Economic advice so often is 
wrong because it says generalizations can be applied anywhere and they work. 
That is just simply not true”. 
My last point here is that it is a non-ergodic world. An ergodic 
world would be one in which the fundamental underlying 
structure is uniform and exists everywhere. In such a world, if 
you understand that fundamental underlying structure and you 
want to solve a new problem, you go back to fundamentals and 
then build your theory based on the structure. Now that is what 
is done in the physical sciences and the natural sciences. The 
social sciences, however, have no such tools; and, what is much 
more difficult—the world just keeps changing. (North, 2009, p. 
25)  
Regardless of all skepticism expressed as to the value and validity of case study, 
it has even become popular among scholars of communities (e.g. political 
economists and quantitatively inclined political scientists) not traditionally 
associated with this type of research. (Acemoglu et al., 2002), (Bates et al., 
1998),  (Rodrik, 2003), and (North et al., 2011) are some prominent examples. 
Observing the trend earlier (Gerring, 2004) stated that “by the standard of 
praxis, therefore, it would appear that the method of the case study is solidly 
ensconced and, perhaps, even thriving” (p.341). 
 Based on such an understanding of social science, the present research takes 
case study as a justified type of study as a way of defining cases not analyzing 
or modeling causal relations with the broad definition proposed by (Gerring, 
2004) as  
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an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units. A unit connotes 
a spatially bounded phenomenon—e.g., a nation-state, 
revolution, political party, election, or person—observed at a 
single point in time or over some delimited period of time. (p. 
342)  
In this sense the present research is an intensive study of Iran as “a natural state” 
to understand economic development in “natural states” as described and 
classified by NWW. Based on this definition a single unit could be studied 
either temporally over a period of time between A and B or it could be broken 
down to some subunits which could then be studied either synchronically or 
diachronically.  
Therefore, there are three research designs conceivable for case study with 
different methodologies of analyzing covariational evidences. A unit might be a 
nation-state studied before and after an event (e.g. a revolution) or it might be 
broken down to its subunits (e.g. smaller geographical, institutional or 
organizational components) studied at a single point of time synchronically or 
their development over a period of time diachronically. The current research 
intended to explore the relations between economic underdevelopment or 
underperformance, violence, institutions, organizations and the belief system (or 
more broadly culture) shall employ all three methodologies to achieve its aim. It 
is generally designed to identify the current rent distribution mechanism in Iran, 
identify the sources of violence and explore if they are related to culturally 
established institutions or otherwise. To achieve its aims the research is thus 
designed to answer the following main questions: 
4. What are the sources of rents and how are they distributed? 
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5. What are the rent-related violence generating/promoting institutions in 
Islamic Republic of Iran? 
6. Are there causal relations between country specific belief system or 
culture and rent-related violence generating/promoting institutions in 
Iran? 
Answering the first question requires an analysis of sources of state revenue and 
their distribution mechanism by the state. This could be achieved by a 
descriptive analysis of the state organization, the ruling coalition, sources of 
revenue and the mechanism through which the ruling coalition manipulates the 
economic system to distribute the rents. Oil export and revenue is the key in this 
process that from its first commercial operation in the first decade of 20
th
 
century by the concession granted to a British subject (and then company) until 
the present day has affected all corners of economic, political and social life in 
Iran.  
The division of revenue between the foreign operator (s) and the Iranian state, 
the security of the wells and oil installations, measures to keep the oil flowing 
from Iran at cheap prices, creating a monopoly of continued exploitation of the 
reserves by foreign beneficiaries, increasing reliance of the Iranian state on 
increasing revenues from oil exports, relaxing tax extraction both as a kind of 
rent for powerful economic agents and a means of avoiding widespread social 
and popular demand for greater political representation and power distribution, 
the distribution of the oil revenues earned, development of oil export related 
economic infrastructures, industries and services at the expense of basic 
economic necessities and sectors, economic and financial booms and busts and 
the accompanying or consequent persistent inflationary pressures and budget 
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deficits, etc., have all been and still are sources of rents, internal tensions, 
violence, corruption and external aggression, all in turn affecting the whole 
social interactions and organization and institutional arrangements. This would 
be an analysis in line with NWW conceptual framework of the state operation in 
“natural state”. “The simplest genre of descriptive case study asserts that the 
unit under study (A) is like, or unlike, other similar units (B and C). . . 
descriptive case study propositions are implicitly comparative and these 
comparisons must have a cross-unit reference point”(Gerring, 2004, p. 347). 
The cross-unit reference point for the current research is obviously all “natural 
states’ or LAOs defined in the NWW framework that currently constitute all 
developing countries and all now developed countries before their transition to 
become OAOs. 
The answer to the second question ordinarily means identifying all violence 
generating institutions and then separating those related to rent distribution. This 
would involve an extensive research of all violence generating institutions of 
which a great number would certainly be irrelevant to the research purpose. To 
limit the research it would be appropriate to define rent related institutions in 
terms of its main source as defined by NWW framework, i.e. the political 
system. “Economic institutions—property rights and other social rules that we 
talk about in economics—are derivative of political institutions. The political 
system defines the kind of economic rules of the game and the judicial system 
you have” (North, 2009, p. 27). In this sense, therefore, all formal economic and 
social institutions are derived from the political institutions. That would 
logically mean that all public or social violence generated within a state 
ultimately originates from political institutions. This, in other words, means 
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assuming the state as sovereign authority. If natural state manipulates the 
economic system for rent generation by definition, and rents are generated by 
the state, then it means all political institutions could be potentially rent related 
and those political institutions subject of dispute or disagreement naturally 
could be regarded as potentially rent-related violence generating institutions. By 
this argument the number of “within the unit cases” to be studied is greatly 
reduced to those political institutions subject to dispute or disagreement. An 
analysis of such institutions and their operations and overall impact on other 
institutions should reveal how they cause, generate or promote violence and 
consequently cause or contribute to underdevelopment. 
The last question to be addressed is the origin of such institutions. NWW 
despite avoiding making explicit causal relationship between belief system and 
such institutions, through dispersed interpretations and examples implies that 
violence generating or promoting institutions are endogenous of the belief 
system (culture) in LAOs
8
 (North, 2009, pp. 25-26) (Weingast, 2009, p. 46)  and 
because culture keeps changing, though at very slow rate of pace, different 
intensity of violence prevalence is a reflection of such cultural changes and 
                                                          
8
 e.g. “Now, before you despair with that, note that culture here plays a crucial role. 
Culture connects the past with the present. Much of our belief system, therefore, has 
evolved, and so we can have a culture that has some degree of coherence to it”; or “ 
What we have first is belief systems, which then translate into creating institutions, but 
even that is complicated because institutions are rules, norms, social order, and 
enforcement characteristics”; or “With different experiences in the Islamic society, to 
take the classic modern illustration, from Western society, we produce differences of 
views, conflict, disorder, and warfare. We have not solved any of those problems”. 
NORTH, D. C. 2008. Violence and Social Orders. In: CHAMLEE-WRIGHT, E. (ed.) 




hence changes in different institutions that increase or decrease violence. It is 
the persistence or changes in such institutions that determines the forward and 
backward movement of natural states on the continuum of violence generation 
or promotion that makes them Fragile, Basic, or Mature, and determines their 
progress to or regress from the doorstep conditions.  
The argument advanced by NWW framework is that as all these institutions are 
endogenously produced and established by the belief system in any given 
society, therefore, the particular belief system (or the culture) is the source of 
generating or promoting violence. This means supporting such argument either 
requires establishing a direct one way causal relationship from belief system to 
institutions or denying that no (at least with some acceptable statistical degree 
of certainty) political institutions has ever been generated exogenously which in 
turn requires providing sufficient evidence for the argument. Under such 
condition then if the causal relation between belief system and institutions is 
regarded as a necessary deterministic condition, then even a single contradictory 
case would falsify the argument. If not, and the relation is regarded as some 
kind of an association or correlation, then NWW needs to explain the relation, 
i.e. the argument turns to be a case or a proposition stated but not substantiated. 
However, the important issue here is that if the relationship between belief 
system and institutions is considered a one way causal relation, it would mean 
either the belief system is given (something permanent and static) or there are 
non-institutional channels of belief generation and or modifications. NWW 
framework lacks any theory for belief creation. In the absence of any explicit 
explanation for this relationship I shall take the development of the idea of 
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“independence” in pre-revolutionary Iran and then its institutionalization (and 
the dominant state and national narrative) in post-revolutionary Iran that became 
the main driving force behind the Iranian foreign policy and economic and 
military self-sufficiency (autarky) was an idea or a belief developed out of 
constraints violently imposed on the country in the course of the 20
th
 century. 
 Case selection, data collection and analysis 
In applying the NWW framework to a case, the main concepts and independent 
variables to work with are violence, institutions and belief system. As the 
framework is presented as a conceptual framework based on “recorded human 
history”, it is closely associated with historical approach. However, in 
designating the endogenously generated institutions as the main cause of 
generating development, the main emphasis is on “culture” and history. Based 
on this approach, selecting a state with a violent history, highly charged 
“cultural orientation” in organizing the affairs of the society and extensive 
institutional changes could present a “crucial” or “most fit” case to test the 
hypotheses presented in the framework. Obviously the “most fit’ case as a case 
study may not present a strong case to support a theory, but “where the 
researcher is attempting to disconfirm a deterministic proposition the question 
of representativeness is perhaps more appropriately understood as a question of 
classification: Is the chosen case appropriately classified as a member of the 
designated population? If so, then it is a fodder for disconfirming case study” 
(Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2008, p. 676). In this sense perhaps Iran is amongst 
the few highly qualified “most fit” cases on the one hand, but more importantly 
treating the relationship between belief system (culture) and 
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development/underdevelopment generating institutions as a deterministic case, 
Iran would present a “disconfirming case”. Then the conclusion could be drawn 
that even the “most fit” case selected on the basis of “independent variables”, 
i.e. violence, institutions, culture does not support the proposition of the 
NWWW framework. And if the claim to deterministic causal relations between 
culture and institutions is withdrawn, then it becomes nothing more than an 
academic gesture, neither confirmable nor falsifiable.  
As regards data collection and analysis, since the framework does not lend itself 
to statistical or quantitative data analysis the present case study is based on a 
historical approach utilizing publicly available secondary and tertiary sources 
both in English and in Persian. The Iranian current and past constitutions, laws, 
religious sources, and published research and written sources are used for data 
collection. Textual and descriptive analyses are employed to analyze the data. 
The basic primary data are collected through face to face open end interviews 
with a sample of 7-10 current and ex officials of Iranian development related 
agencies and organizations.  
Conclusion 
The failure of developed countries to transplant the assumed economic 
development generating or promoting institutions recommended by the so called 
“Washington Consensus” in developing countries through peaceful means of 
international advice, development aid, and pressure of international 
organizations or by direct violent interventions in some of them to establish the 
“democratic” market friendly institutions (economic liberalization, rule of law, 
transparency, privatization, etc.) has led some institutionalists, to develop the 
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idea that culturally generated institutions are the main cause of rejecting 
development generating or promoting institutions. This conflict is viewed both 
as the main cause of violence and economic underdevelopment or 
underperformance due to rent seeking nature of ruling coalition in these 
countries, being natural states. Even though the idea is presented only as a 
conceptual framework, lacking the necessary components of a theory and 
theoretical groundwork to explain the relationships between beliefs, institutions, 
behavior and organizations, it is of wide reaching implications both for 
developing and developed countries.  
Such implications could include further financial, trade and international 
limitations for developing countries, greater conflict and violence in developing 
countries for establishment of such presumably development friendly 
institutions, and greater oppression for their citizens. The final result would be 
even further extremism (right or left) with an escalation of violence on 
international scale. It is this possible outcome of such an approach that calls for 
serious and immediate investigation of the proposed conceptual framework. 
The biggest problem of the NWW Framework is its implicit assumption of a 
Homo Economicus actor. The idea that the powerful organization would choose 
peace if the payoff from peace is greater than violence, requires the actors to act 
purely on the basis of economic rationality as their motivation, have complete 
information of the outcomes of the two alternatives and have the capacity for 
calculation. This runs counter to their arguments for bounded rationality, limited 
information and limited capacity of the actors. It also fails to take account of the 
cases when actors find greater payoffs in fighting. Despite all preventive 
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institutional arrangements at least one side will resort to violence. In this case 
the only alternative for prevention of fighting is a third force, with greater 
authority and physical force to prevent violence when one side finds it its own 
(economic) interest to the detriment of collective good.  
What NWW describes is the reality of human interaction and the ubiquitous 
problem of violence. The state as the coalition of powerful individuals and 
organizations has to establish an authority, that is, the ruler or the government, 
with a violence capacity at least greater than each individual member and 
greater than the nominal majority of the coalition. The relative violence capacity 
and balance of power of the members of the coalition determines the ability of 
the government or ruler to overwhelm each member and any subset of the 
coalition. The existence of such authority at least with support of the most 
powerful member of the coalition then is a necessity both for provision of any 
internal order and external defense. The relative power of the members of the 
coalition shapes the configuration of this authority and influences the degree of 
its autonomy, rule-making and enforcing capacity. While the existence of such 
authority at national or social level, greatly reduces violence, the monopoly of 
violence could be realized when the violence capacity of this authority, ruler or 
government, exceeds the combined capacity of the members of the coalition, 
otherwise, it remains a claim on actual level but exercised at legal and judicial 
levels. The absence of such authority in international relations, a situation 
generally referred to as anarchy, is the most fundamental problem of 
international relations. This is the external environment for the actors, where, 
violence and invasion is an eternal threat (a permanent uncertainty) and the state 
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has to live either at the mercy of the powerful and the military-political 
coalitions in which it enters or embeds itself, or must be sufficiently powerful to 
deter violence and defend itself when happened.  
With NWW Framework basic assumption that long term economic growth is a 
function of reduced period of violence, political and economic development, 
then to a large extent is geared to how the state and government solves the 
problem of living in an acephalous society of states. This process is where 
change and stability come into play. Presenting a historical overview of post-
revolutionary and contemporary Iranian political and economic developments, 
the role of violence and externally imposed institutions in shaping Iran’s 
political economy is explored in next chapter. It demonstrates that economic 
policy making has been heavily influenced by increased level of external 
violence and coercive security threats, increasing the country’s transaction costs 
in international relations and influencing extensive changes in domestic political 











How Institutions Affect Development: A Case Study 
of Iran  
Introduction 
“Her [Skocpol] statement that "legitimate authority in the Shi'a 
community has long been shared between political and religious 
leaders" is misleading, as it suggests a rather static "traditional" 
state of affairs, rather than a dynamically changing series of 
relationships between Shi'ism and the state”.(Keddie, 1982) 
“Iranian domestic institutions are not studied fully or adequately 
by scholars in the West. Linguistic skills, the need for special 
knowledge of the working of these institutions, and the serious 
problems of access have prevented thorough and systematic 
study of many key Iranian institutions. This is particularly 
disturbing in light of these institutions' profound impact on 
Iran's domestic politics and foreign policy behaviour. The 
problem is exacerbated by the changing dynamic nature of these 
institutions. There has been significant modification and 
evolution in every one of these organizations as well as 
important changes in the composition of their top leadership. 
For a better understanding of Iranian politics, these 
transformations all need to be studied and analysed.” (Kazemi, 
1993) 
The establishment of a religious state after a popular non-violent revolution in 
Iran in the second half of 20
th
 C. came as a shock to many Iran, Middle East, 
and development studies experts (Ajami, 1988) (Kurzman, 2009) (Misagh, 
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2009) (Skocpol, 1982) (Parsons, 1989). Even more surprising was that it came 
after five decades of consistent centralization of the state power, intensive 
industrialization program based on the recommendations of international 
development experts and organizations. The revolution happened when the 
country was experiencing the highest rate of economic growth in its history and 
the Shah (King) of Iran had started to talk of Iran becoming Japan of the Middle 
East in very near future. He boasted of being at the doorstep of the great 
Civilization, the ideal development status.  
Over five decades of political, military, and technological support of the Iranian 
state by the British, the oldest foreign benefactor in Iran, and other European 
countries and the USA, coupled with the quadrupling of the oil prices in the 
course of 1960s and early 70s, had put the country on the full course of 
industrialization and modernization program. The fall of the Shah’s regime and 
the establishment of a religious state dealt a real blow not only to modernization 
theory, but also to other mainstream development theories.  
The multiclass nature of the popular participation in the revolution seriously put 
the world system theory and the dependency theory in question, because the 
religious or cultural element involved in the revolution indicated that the Iranian 
revolution, at least, was not about class struggle or replacement of the capitalist 
system with a socialist regime. Considering the importance of the Iranian 
regime in promoting the Western interests in its political, economic and military 
aspects in the Middle East, the gradual movement of peripheries, to semi 
peripheries and finally to core was also invalidated. Considering the huge oil 
revenues received by the country and its rich human resources, one could 
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reasonably conclude that it must have been the political and economic 
institutions which caused the regime’s downfall. 
The state of the Islamic Republic of Iran was established with sweeping 
political and economic institutional changes (Hakimian, 2008, p. 1) as reflected 
in its Constitution. However, despite those extensive changes in its institutional 
arrangements, not only much improvement is not observed in the area of 
economic growth, but also the political repression and violence that had ridden 
the Shah’s regime continued and even intensified in certain areas and at some 
points of time. Except the first few years, initially political centralization and 
then economic rent distribution under the political centralization resumed and 
was justified due to the foreign aggression. Those processes continued and 
intensified after the end of the war with Iraq (1989). The last internal political 
dispute involving the most senior political figures of the state was displayed in 
the course of the last Presidential election in 2009, followed by the continued 
dispute between the President and his associates and the supreme leader and his 
supporters. Both factions agreement to suppress political opposition is displayed 
in their treatment of the opposition after the Presidential election of 2009. 
In its foreign relations the nuclear standoff with Western countries has also put 
the country under severe international political, economic, and military 
sanctions and embargo. It is this prevalence of violence, both in its internal and 
external aspects that make the conceptual framework developed by North et al. 
(2009) which treats the problem of underdevelopment as the outcome of long 
periods of violence due to political institutional arrangements in natural states, 
i.e. developing countries, suitable for analyzing the Iran case. The role of 
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violence in political arrangement, the rentier nature of all natural states in which 
the political system manipulates economic system for rents, the centrality of 
politics in development outcome and the central role played by institutions in 
such an arrangement developed in NWW conceptual framework all are concepts 
that are capable of explaining development process in pre and post revolution 
Iran. However, considering institutions as endogenous products of culture on 
the basis of which it explains the development process in developed countries 
and builds an impenetrable cultural wall between developed countries (what it 
calls Open Access Order) and the natural states (termed Limited Access Order) 
and thereby completely ignores the cultural interactions between these societies 
and even more importantly eliminates the colonial relationship and process from 
development process,  is its major deficiency. 
This chapter is designed to show that the prevailing violence in Iran before the 
revolution was mainly imposed on the country externally and they did not have 
cultural origins. The same process, related to the role of oil in international 
economic structure creating political and economic path dependencies (Nye and 
Keohane, 1971) (Cooley, 2001) (Yetiv, 2015, pp. 1-33)  also partly explains the 
current violence in Iran (Kinzer, 2003). It is also designed to show that the 
Islamic Republic of Iran is the product of the idea of ‘independence” understood 
as a state free from foreign influences and intervention which was developed as 
a result of repeated foreign (mainly Western) intervention in the internal affairs 
of Iran manipulating the political system for economic rents (Gourevitch, 1978). 
The repeated interventions, the climax of which was the joint US-British coup 
against the democratically elected government of Iran in 1953, killed all 
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democratic politics in Iran, leaving no resource to turn to except religion as the 
only remaining means of reforming or replacing the political system (Dabashi, 
2011, pp. 1-4) (Rahnema, 2012) (Nye and Keohane, 1971, p. 342)  . That was 
not an institutional “choice”, but the only “option” available due to constraints. 
The fact that almost all subsequent prominent figures of the subsequent 
“religious” movement were members, associates and sympathizers of the 
Iranian National Front under Mosaddeq is a strong testimony to political nature 
of this “choice”. This of course does not mean to deny that many of them were 
religious individuals and even members of the clergy. 
It was in no way a cultural product: part of the post revolution political disputes 
relates to disagreements amongst different factions in the religious 
establishment on the nature of Islamic Government and Economics. This 
disagreement was explicitly highlighted during President Khatami’s terms and 
intensified during President Ahmadinejad’s terms. It is in the absence of such 
ideological and cultural agreement that the Islamic Government implements 
“the new right” Washington Consensus of liberalization and privatization, 
unless one assumes a compatibility between Islamic Economics and Liberal free 
market Economics (Hosseini, 1988). Most of the privatized state owned firms 
and companies were distributed amongst the regimes key supporters, the 
military, paramilitary, religious establishment, security and intelligence 
authorities and other associates. The one critical change, however, that could be 
treated as a specifically culture generated change, is the role of the clergy and 
the religious establishment from a state legitimizer to that of the ruling coalition 
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or the state itself. This has become a new source of violence that could be 
considered a culturally generated violence. 
In this chapter the post-revolutionary development in Iran is reviewed to show 
that while the concepts developed in NWW framework are capable of 
explaining the political, economic and social developments in Iran, also aims to 
show that part of the problem faced by the country stems from institutions 
created by external pressures developed as the result of historical developments, 
international economic structure, deliberate prevention of development of the 
country, path dependencies created as a result of such external pressures, and 
forcing institutional changes that have become new sources of  violence. This 
chapter would serve as the basis of my critique of NWW conceptual framework 
and the contribution of this research to further develop and revise the NWW 
framework accordingly. 
Review of Post Revolution developments in Iran 
Three decades after one of the most spectacular popular revolutions in human 
history, Iran today is still besieged by military, political and economic tensions. 
With a population of 78 million and Gross Domestic Products (GDP) of about 
US$ 400 billion, Iran is the second largest nation (after Egypt) and economy 
(after Saudi Arabia) in the Middle East and North Africa. “Iran ranks second in 
the world in natural gas reserves and third in oil reserves. It is the second largest 
OPEC oil producer; output averaged about 4 million barrels per day in recent 
years.  Iran's chief source of foreign exchange is oil and to a much lesser extent 
natural gas. Thus, aggregate Gross Domestics Product (GDP) and government 
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revenues are intrinsically volatile, fluctuating with international prices of these 
commodities. 
So far, macroeconomic policies have typically not counteracted these boom and 
bust cycles in economic performance which increase the uncertainty faced by 
the private sector, impeding investment and job creation” (WorldBank, 2012). 
“Having been the 22nd largest economy in the world in 1980, it fell to 39th 
largest (in 1994 and 2000), and rose again to 29th largest in 2007 . . . . By 2014 
the IMF is forecasting Iran to have the 25th largest economy” (Jones, 2009, p. 
61). In 2010 it was still the 29
th
 largest world economy just after Argentina and 
South Africa and higher than Greece, Denmark and Thailand, while Saudi 
Arabia (the largest oil producer of OPEC) and Turkey (a neighboring country 





(WorldBank, 2011).  
Despite some improvements in recent years, Iran’s dependence on oil revenues 
is still very high (some experts even argue that it has increased compared to pre 
revolution era), economic growth is unstable and fluctuating as a of function of 
international oil prices, unemployment and inflation are still very high (IMF, 
2011, pp. 6-7). Economic inequality (both in terms of income and opportunities) 
has increasingly deepened in the post war period and would certainly increase 
still further with the recent energy subsidies reform resulting in increasing the 
prices of gasoline and some other basic products (including wheat and bread) to 
as high as “20 times” (Guillaume.D, 2011, abstract) further pushing a great 
number of people below the poverty line. International economic sanction 
imposed on the country is probably one of the most severe in recent world 
politics, creating great political, economic and financial opportunities for a 
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small number of individuals and institutions (Hen-Tov and Gonzalez, 2011, p. 
56) both in Iran and abroad and increasing the cost of legal transactions 
especially in foreign trade (IMF, 2011, p. 4). A very important note of caution at 
this stage is to keep in mind that there is usually a considerable gap between 
observable realities in many areas of economic activities and statistics published 
by the state and international organizations and institutions, a fact boldly 
reflected in live televised joint Presidential debates of 2009 election during 
which the incumbent President and the opposition candidates disagreed almost 
on all figures and numbers presented by the other side. The deficiency of 
statistics and data collection and reporting systems in some areas is reflected in 
the latest IMF report (IMF, 2011, pp. 16, 31 and 5-6 App. III).  
On the political scene the picture is not much different. Political disputes and 
strife among various state institutions and the ruling elite have intensified 
(Yong, 2011), internal active public opposition has grown to an unprecedented 
level in post revolution period to the extent that in the aftermath of Presidential 
election in 2009, described as a “de facto coup” (Hen-Tov and Gonzalez, 2011, 
p. 45), a “Masquerade Coup” (Safshekan and Sabet, 2010, p. 544), a large 
number of people accusing the government of rigging the election, in a move 
reminiscent of the street demonstrations of 1978-79, poured on the streets of 
Tehran in many occasions. The protests which started by the two presidential 
hopefuls (Mir Hossein Mussavi, former Prime Minister and Member of the 
Expediency Council and Mehdi Karrubi, Former Parliament (Majlis) Speaker 
and a Member of the Expediency Council) later turned into a current political 
opposition movement known as the “Green Movement”. In addition to internal 
opposition, international pressures and sanctions against the country have 
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increased, threat of foreign military intervention looms large, and a military 
security environment dominates the country. This great penetration of political 
scene by the military and security forces have progressed to the extent that Iran 
today is described by some as a “praetorian” state (Hen-Tov and Gonzalez, 
2011, Safshekan and Sabet, 2010). 
Socially, the situation is of a more mixed nature. In education and health Iran 
has been doing very well in the past three decades. “With a value of 0.72, Iran 
appears to be within reach of the level of high human development countries 
(starting at 0.8). Yet despite recent gains in life expectancy, literacy and 
educational attainment, current trends in income growth has resulted in small 
incremental increases in the HDI. Strengthening the economy remains an 
important challenge” (UN., 2003, p. 5). While the rate of female literacy and 
share in higher education has increased, the pressure on female “codes of 
behavior and dressing” in public has also increased. “Women continue to face 
widespread discrimination in law and practice . . . . Gender inequality is 
widespread and sustained by Iranian law” (Jones, 2009, p. 58).  
Social crimes like fraud, rape, theft, burglary, and murder have been 
increasingly on the rise to the extent that for almost every five Iranians there is 
legal case in the justice administration (certainly cases which never reach the 
Judiciary either due to informal settlement of the cases or the unwillingness of 
either parties to report or register their complaint with the justice administration, 
are as high as the formal figure, if not more) (interview). The age of marriage 
(both for male and female) has risen to unprecedented levels, while the rate of 
divorce has also risen. Organized crimes, particularly in urban areas and cities, 
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both in terms of the severity and complexity of their nature and their instances, 
are also on the rise. Civil liberties, freedom of speech and press are limited only 
to those closely connected with different centers of power. A general sense of 
social tensions and insecurity prevails. As a result and perhaps not surprisingly, 
the fatalities resulting from road accident and the rate of brain drain (BBC, 
2007) in Iran are amongst the highest in the world. But the most striking 
development in recent years has been Iran’s involvement in development of her 
nuclear capability, space exploration, and a buildup of her military capability 
and industry, leading to accusations mainly from the US and its European allies 
of pursuing a secret clandestine plan for nuclear weapons and imposition of 
severe economic sanctions against the country.   
The other side of this grim picture is the improvements made in the country’s 
conditions during and after an 8 year destructive war with Iraq. “Despite all the 
financial difficulties, Iran's achievements have been impressive in education, 
health, and poverty reduction. Poverty has fallen from an estimated 40 percent 
before the revolution to close to 20 percent now”(WB., 2003, p. iii). Vast 
number of small towns, villages and remote rural areas during the past three 
decades joined the national grid, piped water and gas networks, and telephone 
communications. Thousands of kilometers of rural roads, irrigation networks, 
schools, and medical centers were built, now in use. There is hardly any 
residential area with a population of over 20 household without provision of 
these basic services of modern life. A large number of people living in rural 
areas and small towns are now enjoying little luxuries of the modern life they 
ever envied. Describing contemporary Iran while strongly rejecting the idea of 
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classifying Iran as a “failed state”, one expert writes: “Thanks mainly to oil 
revenues, it has brought citizens a respectable standard of living: low infant 
mortality, reasonable longevity, high literacy, impressive college enrollment – 
including for women – and for many of its citizens access not only to electricity, 
piped water, and modern transportation, but also to such consumer goods as 
refrigerators, telephones, radios, televisions, and cars. It now contains a large 
salaried middle class and an educated working class as well as a traditional 
entrepreneurial middle class. In many ways, the country is no longer part of the 
Third World” (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 194). 
These same “citizens” are the bulk of people who supplied the never ending 
“human wave” (Keddie, 2006, p. 251) to prevent the highly equipped Iraqi 
professional army and internationally well supported Iraqi regime of Saddam 
Hussein from perpetuating her occupation of the Iranian land and particularly 
the oil rich province of Khuzestan in south western part of the country bordering 
Iraq. For the first time over a century, Iran did not lose any ground to “enemy” 
at the end of a war (Farhi, 2005, p. 11) . For a nation who in the course of her 
recent history had lost vast geographical areas which now form countries like 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Bahrain, parts of 
Iraq and Turkey, it was a historic achievement, though at a very high human and 
financial cost. Despite destruction of many economic centers and activities of 
the country down the line from the most north western corner of the country to 
most south western parts covering the Western half of the country including the 
capital city (Tehran) and dislocation of a large number of people from their 
homeland, the sense of pride and honor of the nation was restored and preserved 
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(Hen-Tov and Gonzalez, 2011, p. 56).  In the face of the de facto political and 
military sanctions of Iran by all major world powers and their support of Iraq 
along with major regional rich oil producing countries during the war years and 
direct involvement of the USA in the last years of the war (Keddie, 2006, p. 
259), such an achievement made it even more valuable.  
However, the long war made certain groups incredibly wealthy (Mazarei Jr, 
1996, p.30), and others unprecedentedly politically powerful leaving the 
majority of the population to struggle with the economic, social and 
psychological impacts of a war torn country and the government to deal with 
huge chronic budget deficit, high inflation rate, multi rated foreign exchange, an 
army of new labor force seeking employment, the largest refugee population in 
the world (both from Iraq and Afghanistan of whom about 1 million still remain 
in Iran (UNHCR, 2010, p.12) and above all reconstruction of the country and 
resumption of normal life. Part of the post war politics is shaped by the struggle 
resulting from the wealthy elite groups (those who made great fortunes from 
price differences in a two sector free market and subsidized economy consisting 
of local traders, importers, manufacturers, foreign and multinational companies 
reps and agents, and their formal and informal partners in the political system 
and bureaucracy making economic decisions and/or issuing various permits and 
licenses for economic and commercial activities) seeking greater political power 
and the those who had gained political influence (due to their roles and positions 
in war efforts) in search of the economic rewards and privileges, e.g. the 
Revolutionary Guards or Pasdaran, estimated to control something between 25 
percent to 40 percent of the GDP (Hen-Tov and Gonzalez, 2011, pp. 49, 52). 
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The combined forces of these two groups (generally forming the dominant 
ruling elite) had managed to exclude all other active and potential political 
groups from the formal political processes and institutions based on what was 
regarded as the necessary “unity” required for a successful war effort. The 
personal charisma, power and authority of Ayatollah Khomeini the supreme 
leader up to the following year after the end of the war was also a key factor in 
addition to the war conditions in reducing political “disunity” (Hen-Tov and 
Gonzalez, 2011, p.47).  
The successful management of the war efforts by the state despite all political, 
economic and social difficulties associated with it and the relatively 
unconditional popular support in providing human and material support for its 
continuation and successful conduct pointed to the change in the popular 
perception of the nature of the newly established state of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. The initial pre-war distributive policies (more in the sense of confiscating 
the wealth and assets of the deposed Royal family and its top officials, and 
nationalizing major private industries, firms and financial institutions and 
bringing them under the state control with the assumption that their profits and 
benefits would be more equally distributed amongst the population, than in any 
positive practical sense of formulating and implementing specific economic 
policies) and discourse (Mazarei Jr, 1996, pp. 1, 5, 7, 27) (Pesaran, 1999)  was 
sufficient to confirm in the eye of the general population the pre revolution 
strategy of replacing an state seen as representing foreign interests with one 
more popularly and nationally representative and inclined towards national 
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interests on the one hand and reverse and reconstruct the long time distrust of 
the state by the nation.  
In a sense the newly established state of Islamic Republic of Iran initially was 
felt to have been the state established by the Iranian nation not any particular 
group or class of people. That change in the perception of the nation of the 
nature of the state, was a de facto practical reconfirmation of the legitimacy of 
the state legally established by a popular vote in 1979, filling the gap between 
the de jure and de facto legitimacy of the state that existed in most period of the 
20
th
 C. The Iraqi military aggression seen as representing the will of the then 
superpowers reinforced the perception of the independent and nationally 
inclined nature of the newly established state and helped to fully mobilize the 
whole nation in support of the state. This observation is supported by a survey 
of the Worldviews of Islamic Publics conducted in 2000-2001 in which the 
Iranians “despite living under a theocratic regime, placed less emphasis on 
religion and more emphasis on nationalism than did the Egyptians and the 
Jordanians” (Moaddel and Azadarmaki, 2002, p. 6). 
Therefore, it can reasonably be argued that the perception of the nature of state 
as the most important political institution through its discourse and policies 
helped to sustain and bring close to reality the hope and the expectation based 
on which the people had participated in the revolution. In fact the newly 
established political institution through projection of its future economic 
policies managed to sustain the population’s hope and expectations for some 
time. The trust of the state by the population was so immense that those in high 
offices could do almost anything without being questioned. And so they did. 
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Building up on this popular trust the clerics, who had the upper hand in 
organizing the general population in support of the state, excluded almost all 
other political groups starting with very limited number of non-cleric moderate 
Islamic intellectuals who had formed the close advising circle of the Ayatollah 
Khomeini prior to the Revolution and occupied high offices after the revolution. 
The solution of the state-nation or state civil society trust problem could have 
been continued and sustained through institutionalization of national political 
and economic demands and aspirations, but failed to do so for different reasons. 
Only 22 percent of the Iranian in the above mentioned survey expressed “very 
great trust” in their government and the percentages of the population who 
expressed “very great trust” in the press and TV were only 10 and 16 
respectively (Moaddel and Azadarmaki, 2002, pp. 16-17).  
Two important reasons could be accounted for such a great decline of the 
popular trust in the state: the external pressures forcing the state towards greater 
political repression in the face of external security threats with less transparency 
in its economic and financial activities (and hence greater opportunities and 
instances of corruption and abuses) and the disagreement amongst the clerics 
themselves on the nature of Islamic politics and economics and hence 
intensification of ruthless unlimited internal competition for greater political 
power using the state as the vehicle for political and economic rent generation 
machine to consolidate group power for final domination. The first was 
highlighted in the Iraqi aggression causing the centralization of political power, 
literally eliminating all political opposition and directing all economic resources 
towards war efforts, pushing much of the state economic activities underground. 
101 
 
The second cause of the decreasing popular trust of the state was the deep 
political and religious disagreement and disputes amongst the very high ranking 
religious leaders on almost all basic substantial political and economic issues. 
The most prominent of such disputes were the accusation of Ayatollah 
Mohammad Kazim Shariatmadari the most senior grand religious leader of 
involvement in a plot against the regime in 1982 (Fischer, 1993, p. 178)  and his 
subsequent trial and house arrest till his death in 1986 and the dismissal and 
later house arrest of Ayatollah Montazeri, the designated successor of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, in 1989 for opposing many political and economic policies of the 
Iranian state (Akhavi, 2008). The problem of succession as one of the most 
recurrent problems in the Iranian political system and culture (Katouzian, 
2003c, pp. 240-245) (Hagigi, 2012) represents itself at this very early stage.  
This period is marked by appearance of a super-rich group of merchants 
profiting from huge price differentials of heavily subsidized goods and services 
supplied by the state and those supplied by the open or free (and in fact black) 
market and a politically powerful group linked to political and military 
operation decision making centers. The two groups while managed to exclude 
all rival groups were divided amongst themselves. One group associated with 
the state and egalitarian state sponsored economic tendencies and the belief in 
the need for internal adjustment to accommodate the external pressures, and the 
other advocates of free market, limited state interventions in economy, 
aggressive foreign policy to force the external forces to adapt themselves and 
accommodate Iran with its new conditions. 
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The first group was mainly composed of state officials, bureaucrats, 
professionals, and technocrats associated with the war period governments. It is 
more representative of a “modern interpretation of Islam” linked with an elite 
orientation and tradition with connections and ties to a like-minded 
corresponding part of the religious establishment and figures. The second group 
consisted mainly of traditional merchants (bazari)
9
, powerful religious charities 
and foundations (with vast economic operations and interest), and the on the 
ground war veterans was more representative of a “traditional interpretation of 
Islam” linked to the more powerful and traditionalist part of the religious and 
cleric establishment and figures. In the formal religious and cleric 
establishment, the former represented the minority and generally (with some 
exceptions) the junior levels and the latter represented the majority and the more 
senior levels. In the pre revolution period, the former advocated and actively 
participated in (and some of them were in fact amongst pioneers of) the 
revolution, while the latter actively opposed the idea of revolution (and an 
Islamic government) and a new interpretation of Islam, or just kept silent and 
joined the revolution at the last minute when its victory was almost certain. The 
former group is now known as “the reformers or reformists” and the latter as 
“the traditionalists”.  
At the end of this period, roughly coinciding with the end of Iran-Iraq war in 
1988, considering the decline of the de facto legitimacy of the state due to 
contentious and exclusionary political processes and legal amendments to the 
                                                          
9
 Literally meaning “of” or “related to” bazar which means the traditional wholesale 
markets mostly in Muslim countries.  
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Constitution and other related documents by both groups and the question of 
succession open and unresolved, the two groups were set for a power struggle to 
get control of the state and (re) define its basic features and institutions. 
Amongst the most important issues discussed and contested were security of the 
state from foreign threats, the basis of its legitimacy and the question of 
succession, i.e. its operational institutions and procedures, or generally the 
state’s governance structure.  
In post war era six administrations led by three presidents have taken charge of 
the country. The first two administrations led by Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1993, 1993-1997) the moderate cleric and one of the 
top key players in Iran’s leadership focusing on economic reconstruction and 
Iran’s reintegration into the international economy (Rakel, 2007, p. 160) 
initiated the reconstruction program and implementation of the IMF 
recommended economic reform of structural adjustment which included, among 
others, unification of multi exchange rate system, privatization of State Owned 
Enterprises, and reforming the tax system and administration. Welcome by the 
international community his first administration succeeded in partial 
implementation of the reform program along with acceleration of the 
reconstruction program partially financed by short term credits supplied by 
almost all trading countries, obviously the USA being the main exception. 
Suffering from historically low oil prices his second term was marked by the 
problem of the country’s inability in repayment of her debts and as a result 
negotiating for rescheduling debt servicing on international level and the 





 parliament with his political agenda and the radical factions (left) with 
his economic agenda. As a result some components of the economic reform 
stopped and others were reversed, leading to arrest and subsequent 
imprisonment and other forms of punishment of some of the high officials or 
key players of his administrations and political allies by the judiciary dominated 
by traditional conservatives. Thus his successor, Mohammad Khatami (1997-
2005), elected with a high rate of electoral turn out and active support of 
Rafsanjani and his allies, focused on reforming the political system, with 
political development high in his agenda. “Khatami, as a protagonist of the 
Reformist faction, was first elected in 1997 because he focused on domestic 
issues (the popular longings for changes in Iran’s social and political 
landscapes) instead of foreign policy propaganda” (Rakel, 2007, p. 178). 
While at the beginning of his term Iran witnessed a relaxation of state imposed 
social pressures, civil liberties, speech and press freedom, normalization of 
foreign and international relations of the country, the later part of his 
administration marked an open opposition from the conservative factions 
dominating the military, especially the Revolutionary Guards, Law Enforcement 
Force, the security services and the Judiciary. Many of his officials were 
arrested and imprisoned, almost all press and media allied to him or supporting 
him were closed downed and social pressures especially on women, university 
students, journalists and political activists were intensified. “With the organs of 
power in the hands of these hardline conservatives and the potent force of public 
opinion solidly behind the reformers, Iranian politics in the Khatami era became 
mired in stalemate and intermittent unrest” (Maloney, 2000, p. 60). The first 
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signs of active military interventions and active presence in the political affairs 
of the country were displayed in the brutal suppression of student 
demonstrations and in organizing secret (illegal or informal) parallel 
intelligence, law enforcement and foreign policy agencies. The extent of these 
illegal and/or informal activities by the traditional conservative factions forming 
an alliance in the military, paramilitary and Judiciary and Khatami’s efforts to 
resolve the problems through nonviolent and “democratic” processes led to 
alienation and radicalization of a majority of his supporters, including Islamic 
Iran Participation Front (Jebheh Mosharekat Iran Islami), the party formed in 
1998 and led by his brother for his political and logistic support. Internal 
political disputes, lack of effective progress in negotiations on the issue of 
nuclear program, and the slowing down of economic reforms and activities 
created an environment of general pessimism, uncertainty, and insecurity that 
marked the two administrations of Khatami whose legacy became “Dialogue of 
Civilizations” and “Religious Democracy”.  
While some call it “Praetorian” (Safshekan and Sabet, 2010), others regard it 
ideological (Abedin, 2011) or a “Theocratic” state (Rakel, 2007, p. 161) 
(Ashraf, 1990) (Wright, 2000). However, the trend in the past three decades 
reveals the lack of a widely agreed agenda on basic definition and elements of 
politics, economy and society, a fact reflected in repeated amendments to the 
Constitution, creation and dissolution of various ruling institutions, repeated 
changes in rules and regulations, repeated dismissal and replacements of various 
political officials and economic managers and repeated sometimes totally 
contradicting changes even in general policy guidelines and formulation as 
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 Plans, the former pointing towards a developmental 
state and the latter moving towards the agenda of a neo conservative market 
economy). This lack of clarity and stability of defined ideal political, economic 
and social systems (other than general characterizations of a system in which the 
security, prosperity, salvation and welfare of all the Iranian nation is 
guaranteed!) amongst the ruling elite (or even amongst the larger population for 
that matter) together with a lack of general consensus on the basic “rules of the 
game” or a broad nationally accepted “codes of behavior” in politics is both the 
major cause of “trial and error” approach taken in the past three decades and the 
oscillating one step forward one step backward trend observed in Iran’s major 
political, economic and social policies, features that some regard as 
characteristics of a “short society”(Katouzian, 2008, p. 279).  
This could even be the major reason for the very mobility and instability of the 
political position of the ruling elite themselves, who in the absence of a clear 
road map to follow and move, have to act on and react to numerous political and 
economic events and developments in national and global scenes on the basis of 
their on the spot analysis and interpretation of each particular event or 
phenomenon. “One of the attributes of Iranian elite dynamics is the fact that the 
rules of the game are constantly in flux and are nowhere codified. Although 
participants certainly know the rules, for outside observers to understand them 
is naturally difficult” (Thaler, 2010, p. iii). Due to the variety and complexities 
of events they are sometimes forced to take conflicting and contradictory 
positions. The whole political and economic arenas are floating structures. “. . . . 
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Iran’s political system appears to be in a state of flux” (Thaler, 2010, p. iv). But, 
to avoid running into such an unfavorable and undesirable situations and losing 
their credibility, the dominant approach of politicians and policy makers is 
“wait and see” passive approach formally and influencing informally, causing 
long frustrating “decision making processes”, forced temporary alliances and re-
alliances and sometimes completely opposing and conflicting positions, both 
individually and collectively. “As there are no legal political parties in Iran, the 
political factions represent different ideas on politics, economics, socio-cultural 
issues, and foreign relations. Rivalry among different political factions has a 
great impact on the process of political decision-making and is an obstacle to 
the formulation of coherent domestic and foreign policies” (Rakel, 2007, p. 
165).  
Prominent examples of this trend are the deep disagreements amongst the top 
leadership on the very basic questions of conducting election, treatment of the 
opposition and the fact that at a good number of the leaders of the current 
“opposition”, “reformers” or the “reform movement” (demanding civil liberties, 
open market economy, integration into international economy, relaxation of 
dictated social behavior, etc. …) are the same people who had played prominent 
roles in creating the conditions that they condemn today. State controlled 
economy, US embassy seizure, exclusion of almost all political opposition 
including those with a long Islamic ideological political stance before the 
Revolution, among others, are only part of their past (in the first 10-15 post-
Revolutionary years) political actions and policies. “Ahmadinejad’s election 
brought to power a marginalized minority branch of the Conservative faction, 
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which had become radicalized after the Iran-Iraq war when it was excluded 
from policy-making by the then dominant factions of the Iranian political elite” 
(Rakel, 2007, p. 181).  
In other words, changes in the political stance and policies of various 
individuals, political groups or factions in power or in opposition within the 
current political settings of Iran is more a reflection of their struggle for 
preserving or gaining of power within the concerned time and political frame 
rather than a basic well defined long term position for structural “reform” or 
“revision” of long term policy or orientation leading to the basic sociopolitical 
stability required for the country’s development in proportional magnitude to its 
material and human resources. For this reason classification of leading 
politicians, political groups and factions (with some exceptions albeit) under 
common names and titles such as “moderate”, “pragmatist”, “reformist”, “left’ , 
“right”, etc. should both be treated as meaningful proxies or proximities only 
within the current general political framework of Iran and temporary. This is a 
system in which “the informal trumps the formal, power and influence derive as 
much (if not more) from personality as from position, and domestic factional 
dynamics drive policy debates and policymaking. The system is much more 
than just the institutions authorized in the country’s constitution” (Thaler, 2010, 
p. xiii).  
The conclusion drawn by Rakel (2007) about Iranian foreign policy that 
“changes in foreign policy are not a reflection of reforming the IRI’s basic 
structure, but of meeting domestic, regional, and international challenges” could 
be reasonably extended to the country’s development as a whole. “Fundamental 
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foreign policy reorientation” she argues “requires the reform of Iran’s entire 
political system” but until now “the prime objective of both foreign and 
domestic policy has been regime survival” (Rakel, 2007, p. 187). This implies 
the existing economic, sociopolitical situation in Iran is the joint product of the 
ruling elite who from a joint common position, due to various justified and 
unjustified reasons and causes (security concerns and considerations, war effort, 
distrust of foreign countries especially the USA and Western Europe, etc.), and 
their political and economic “partners” in some other major “beneficiary” 
countries, initially blocked reforming of the existing institutions (excluding all 
political factions demanding basic reforms) and subsequently reinforcing the 
same old “imperial” institutions of the “ancient regime” with a mix of 
revolutionary and Islamic flavor. “Iran’s revolutionary mission, often invoked 
and never defined, developed into an instrument that over time was manipulated 
by ruling elements to serve their own purposes. Those who differed, or sought a 
more settled policy, could be easily intimidated” (Chubin, 2010, p. 165). 
However, the major distinctive feature of the current system is its greater 
number of “centers of power”, the outcome of which is further loss of “state 
autonomy”. While the old regime had to some extent the assurances of the USA 
and Western Europe for its oil revenues and external security, and only needed 
the support of cleric establishment for some “legitimacy make up”, the State of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran deprived from any external security and financial 
assurances had to entirely rely on the internal politics. In the absence of any pre-
defined generally agreed upon “model of Islamic State”, it needed the approval 
and sanction of the cleric establishment for its formal legitimacy and authority 
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and for its informal popular support it needed to rely on various factions 
(schools) within the cleric establishment who had the ear of the majority of the 
population. Therefore, in the course of the two years leading to the revolution of 
1979 and the next 18 months after that, State in Iran underwent a major 
transformation from a powerful authoritarian state mainly relying on foreign 
and international recognition and support for its power, authority and legitimacy 
(the Shah was reinstalled in power by a joint British-American coup against 
democratically elected government of Dr. Mosaddeq in 1953) to one totally  
powerless and dependent on clerical establishment, internal institutions and 
popular support (Mokhtari, 2005). Mehdi Bazargan, the Prime Minister in 
Transitional Government installed immediately after the revolution used to say 
metaphorically that “my government is like a knife without the handle” 
(Abrahamian, 2008, p. 163).  
While “politics in the Islamic Republic remains almost entirely the province of 
the clerical authorities who assumed control of the state after the ouster of 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979” (Maloney, 2000, p. 59) and the 
government has been reduced to a full subservient of the cleric establishment 
whose different factions are represented by different political factions and 
individuals, it is under extreme external pressure for preservation and 
perpetuation of current economic structure of an “oil exporting” country. “The 
Islamic Republic has been haunted by internal power struggles since its creation 
in 1979. In this environment, entrepreneurs are typically allies of one political 
faction or the other. In fact, without political connections, it is highly difficult to 
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operate a business above a certain scale in the Islamic Republic” (Bjorvatn and 
Selvik, 2008, p. 2322). 
The current (and in fact the whole post revolution) complex political situation in 
Iran and her oscillating “development” trend, more than anything else, is a 
reflection of various cross conflicts and struggles among different factions of 
the cleric establishment (the traditionalist and the modernist), the Islamic 
intelligentsia and the whole cleric establishment, and various foreign “interest 
groups” and the Iranian ruling elite over the control of the state and its 
economic resources. However, due to various reasons which I shall attempt to 
explain in this research, none of the concerned factions had the will and 
resources to attempt the total control of the state. The recent increase in oil 
revenues (2004-2011), “economic structural adjustment reform” and 
development of nuclear capability created major incentives for some political 
factions for a serious attempt of the total control of the state. The serious 
divisions within the ruling elite mirrors the strengths and weaknesses of that 
attempt, but the major problem is that in the event of the domination of any one 
political faction, there is no guarantee for improvement in economic 
performance as experienced in some periods of the past three decades, 
especially in the immediate post war years. As (Bjorvatn and Selvik, 2008) 
suggest, in both cases of balanced and unbalanced power structure under current 
situation the economy will be performing well below potential. “To improve the 
economic performance of Iran, there needs to be a move toward a more 
autonomous state” (Bjorvatn and Selvik, 2008, p. 2322).   
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In this research I shall attempt, basically using a combination of different 
institutional approaches, to analyze and explain the cause (s) of this focus of 
domestic and foreign policy on regime survival (and its possible implications) 
by identifying a number of competing and conflicting (formal and informal) 
institutions directly or indirectly contributing to the creation and perpetuation of 
the situation in which a highly rich society in human and material resources is 
unable to develop in proportion to its potential. 
Conclusion 
The inability of the Iranian state to diversify its economic structure and its 
greater reliance on oil revenues as the result of war with Iraq and the subsequent 
reconstruction program of the country displays the fact that external factors play 
a crucial role on development process through creating and sustaining 
institutions and organizations that are beyond the control of the Iranian state. As 
the government attempts to gain greater control of that market through changes 
in supply, that in itself becomes a source of violence both in the external 
relations of the Iranian state and in its role as the distributing organization of 
those revenues amongst the members of the ruling coalition.  
The actual use or threat of using military force against the state, which directly 
relates to the question of the state sovereignty and property rights of a nation 
over its territory and natural resources, gradually increased the role and 
influence of security and military related organization in Iran. In that sense the 
government is providing the basic public goods of protecting persons and 
property. In other words, it demonstrates the very close link between security 
and military organization on the one hand and economic organization and 
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performance on the other. In economic terms, it also demonstrates increased 
allocation of resources to protecting the resources which considering budgetary 
constraints leads to decreased allocation of resources to actual productive 
processes. The result is both a decrease in production of goods and services and 
hence a decrease in the living standard of population on the one hand, and 
greater influence and penetration of Iranian politics by its military, security and 
intelligence organizations and further centralization of political power on the 
other.  
The increased power and influence of one group changes the balance of power 
in the composition of the dominant coalition vis-à-vis others. It creates greater 
opportunity for them to claim greater share of the rents from oil revenues. The 
greater share of the rents could be reinvested in further perpetuation of hostile 
political and military environment and thus increasing the rate of returns. It is 
important to understand that the same logic applies to both sides of the divide, 
internally and externally. In other words there exists an undeclared and informal 
coalition of formal enemies. The more the armed peace (or even war) situation 
continues the greater would be for them the opportunity to become politically 
influential and economically thriving. That means a situation in which there is 
the greater need for increased production and export of oil has at least two 
groups of beneficiaries domestically and internationally who benefit from the 
oil rents. But this does not disqualify the basic government policy of protecting 
persons and property. The only possible way to change or stop this process is a 
change in the composition of the dominant coalition, by peaceful means or 
violence. Therefore, if a revolution, a coup or a change of government by 
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democratic processes could succeed in changing or stopping the targeted 
process in itself could be the source of change. Whether it succeeds to achieve 
its other aims is a different matter.  
 The same is true of the network of powerful Western “multinational”10 
corporations which have an interest in keeping sufficient volume of oil supplied 
into the international market to be consumed by massive vital industries of the 
industrialized countries which heavily depend on fossil energy for its operation. 
Here lies one critical issue both for a theory of social change and a theory of 
international relations. Could those countries that industrialized on the basis of a 
commercial system providing for the free flow of the input from other countries 
and territories no more under their control, to let that commercial system and 
the required input for their industrial economies go? Perhaps we need to 
redefine the meaning and nature of “dependence” both in international relations 
and development theories. Is an industrial country dependent on natural 
products of an agricultural economy a “dependent” country or an agricultural 
economy exporting its products for centuries and still remaining an 
“underdeveloped” agricultural economy?  
The emphasis on the issue of “property rights” as a critical institution in 
promotion of economic growth and development is only meaningful in this 
context. An economic system that in all it varieties divides the economic surplus 
                                                          
10
 The term “multinational” is misleading. Despite having shareholders from and 
operations in different countries, they are and have to be linked to specific countries for 
legal, political, diplomatic, military and financial protections. Some of them are very 
old organizations with colonial lineages and connections, but under different names. 
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between rent (land), profit (capital) and wage (labour) designating oil exporting 
countries “rentier” because of renting their land for productive activities is 
meaningless, unless for “rent seeking” pressures or changing the terms of trade. 
Thus an undeclared alliance of economic vested interest between some local 
political and economic groups and international oil industry and business 
networks is created by which the supply of oil into international market is 
ensured. To ensure the continued profitable supply of oil by the second largest 
supplier of the international market, the foreign network, a coalition of different 
national and international financial, industrial and trading firms and groups and 
sometimes governments (as in British government controlling share in the 
Anglo Iranian Oil Company, now British Petroleum, BP), either should become 
(directly or indirectly) a member of the local and in this case the Iranian ruling 
coalition (the pre-revolution situation) or should resort (directly or indirectly) to 
other means including the use or threat of the use of force and military 
aggression to force the Iranian state to sell more oil to finance its war efforts or 
its military/security buildup (the post revolution situation).  
Prevention of development of an alternative source of energy and revenue for 
the Iranian government allowing it to diversify its oil dependent economy and 
invest in more efficient and productive industries for a genuine process of 
industrialization, thus, becomes a policy priority and objective of the whole 
powerful non-oil producing Western business industrial networks. The nuclear 
stand-off between Iran and the West must be viewed in this context. A little 
manipulation of the international oil market by sending a fraction of the US 
strategic oil reserves into the market and/or asking or forcing Saudi Arabia (the 
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major producer and exporter of oil supplier of the Western oil market) to 
increase its oil export to glut the market to reduce the international prices would 
always help. Under such conflictual and threatening conditions, security 
concerns increases and makes greater political repression and militarization or 
securitization of the state justified. In turn, the foreign network having a large 
network of mass media at its disposal at global level, can put pressure on the 
state for lack of various types of freedoms and encourage, support and even 
organize local opposition and , hence, further increasing the extent and intensity 
of violence at local level. That is the process experienced by the Iranian state 
after the revolution by which the country was deprived of the opportunity to 
diversify its oil dependent economic structure.  
The problem of nuclear energy could also be interpreted as part of that relation. 
The possibility of supplying local energy needs from sources other than oil 
would give the Iranian state a stronger hand in influencing the volume of oil 
supply to international market and hence the international prices reducing its 
risks of the cyclical boom and bust of international oil markets. The greater part 
of Iranian 20
th
 century political economy has been shaped by this process. In 
this sense oil and gas production and export is both a source of conflict, 
violence and rent, not only for some Iranian groups, but also a large network of 
global business and industrial coalition who are depend on Iranian oil for their 
existence and survival. Therefore, one major conclusion is the need to revise our 
definition of dependency.  
Conventionally, developing countries have been defined as depending on 
developed countries for their economic growth, but in the case of oil and gas as 
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a strategic commodity of military, industrial and business significance on which 
the whole structure of Western industrial power is based, the story of 
dependence is reversed. The industrial power of the West, and particularly 
Western Europe, is a mighty edifice historically built on someone else’s 
property. To ensure the continued flow of the goods that property has been 
repeatedly trespassed, its property rights repeatedly breached and questioned, 
and its owners and their rights have been for a long time overtly and covertly 
violated, coerced, deposed, murdered, defamed and humiliated. That trespassed 
property is someone’s mother or father land and the property right is the 
sovereignty of a state and a nation. The six special session of the United Nations 
in 1974 following the first oil shock in 1973 after the United States of 
America’s unilateral unpegging of the value of US dollar from fixed price of 
gold in 1971 and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) coup in Chile was held 
to consider the demand of developing countries for establishment of a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) for recognition of their sovereignty over 
their natural resources (United Nations General Assembly, 1974).  
Therefore, to understand the political economy of post-revolutionary Iran and its 
outcome, it is necessary to analyze the institutions and organizations of Iranian 
politics and economy. But as they have their roots in historical events and 
processes their development and impact on economic growth needs to be 
understood, for it is only in that context that the current institutional 






The State of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Origin  
Introduction 
Institutions are defined differently with different implications. They could be 
viewed as structures shaping and regulating human behaviour in social 
interactions or as the intended or unintended product of human decisions and 
actions to serve a purpose or interest (Hodgson, 2006) (Lal and Myint, 1998) 
(Chaney, 1994) (Greif, 2006, pp. 3-28, 379-405) (Greif, 1998) (North, 1991) 
(North, 1990). This very basic problem of the social science, the structure- 
agency dichotomy, is what distinguishes Old Institutional Economics (OIE) 
from the New Institutional Economics (NIE) and its more recent version that 
some have called New New Institutional Economics (NNIE) (Spiegler and 
Milberg, 2009).  
In analysing social phenomena one could assume them as product of human 
action (individually or collectively) or other forces and structures external to 
human action and behaviour. Liberal and particularly its individualist version 
belong to the former while theories considering non-human force as the source 
or origin of social phenomena fall in the latter category. But even in theories 
where human action and behaviour is considered as the source of social 
phenomena human being could be treated as totally autonomous (with complete 
free will not subject to social forces) or a product of social forces (subject to 
social forces). In other words these theories despite their opposing approaches, 
share the assumption (explicit or implicit) that all social phenomena are the 
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product of human interactions, what they differ in is whether the human actor is 
the source of social phenomena or the social structure within which the 
interaction occurs. In this broad division of approaches Hegel and Marx share a 
structural approach that forces beyond individual human beings are the origin of 
social phenomena but a transcendental origin for the former and a human social 
origin for the latter. In the same vein Marx and Adam Smith share the same 
assumption that social phenomena, good or bad, are the product of human 
interaction, however, social structures, power relations as the cause for the 
former and human individual action and behaviour for the latter. They both 
assume a direct causal relation between the two sides but running in opposite 
directions.  
Those who start social analysis from a fully autonomous individual, have to 
explain the cause of human action and behaviour from a source internal to 
human individual (social forces are exogenous, but individual interest, 
psychology, mental models, rationality is endogenous) on the one hand and 
explain the mechanism (s) through which individual actions get aggregated into 
social phenomena. For the structuralists, the problem is to explain the origin of 
those social structures and the channels through which they are disaggregated 
into individual human action and behaviour (social forces are endogenous and 
internal individual features are exogenous). While individualists cannot resort to 
any social phenomena to explain the cause of human action and behaviour, 
social institutions (e.g. family, private property, market) is the channel through 
which individuals actions are aggregated. But for the social structuralists, social 
institutions (e.g. family, private property, market) are both the origin of social 
forces and the channel through which those social forces disaggregate 
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themselves into human action and behaviour. In this sense not only Karl Marx 
and Adam Smith, but also Xenophon (1876) was an institutionalist Therefore, 
what is new about New Institutionalism? 
The newness of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) was the response from 
within neoclassical economics to the application of its Homo Economicus, i.e. 
rational utility maximizing individual assumption to non-economic disciplines 
and social interactions referred to as Rational Choice theory which some regard 
as the imperialism and colonialism by Economics. The NIE is thus the rejection 
of that fundamental assumption of neoclassic economics from different starting 
positions with the basic claim that institutions are formed and complied with 
individuals in response to market imperfections. The imperfections are the 
outcome of imperfect human knowledge and limited computational capacity of 
human mind for which the market does not offer any remedies. Institutions are 
entities that fill the gap between the human perception of the reality and the real 
world and compensate human limitations by regularizing human behaviour to 
make them more predictable for all social actors and hence reduce uncertainty. 
A “non-rational” or “non-autonomous” individual cannot be the “uncaused 
cause” (Simon, 1993, p. 50), independent of social structures, the most 
fundamental assumption of liberal philosophy. It throws the whole foundation 
of liberal social science in chaos. This is why the NWW framework asserts there 
is no integrated theory of economics and politics i.e. political economy (North 
et al., 2009, p. xi). In other words with elimination of the basic assumption in 
liberal theory, a complete overhaul of liberal social science, including a theory 
of political economy and social development. The NWW Framework is 
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designed to provide the conceptual framework for such a task, that its central 
explanatory concept is institution.  
In real political economy terms this theoretical changes have been associated 
with a turn from a state sponsored economic organization or the so called 
“welfare state” (Maddison, 2013) starting from late 1920s Great Depression, to 
a rolled back non-intervening decentralized state in economic organization of 
the 1980s and 90s and then a return to a more strong but minimal 
(constitutional) state regulating the economy in the first decades of twenty first 
century (Pierson, 1995). 
In the New Institutional approach of the NWW framework, institutions shape 
and influence political and economic development. Economic development is 
the sustained economic growth over long run. This is achieved by reducing 
incidence of negative growth resulting from violence. This reduction is achieved 
through introduction of institutions that motivate powerful individuals and 
organizations which form the dominant coalition to refrain from fighting. In the 
Open Access societies this achieved by institutions which encourage 
cooperation through open access to organizations and third party enforcement. 
In Limited Access societies the aim of violence reduction is achieved by rent in 
classical political economy sense. Rent in this context is the difference between 
the current revenue and the next best use from an economic asset. The two 
different orders develop different institutional framework which determine 
economic development. The variation in economic performance of societies is 
explained by its institutional framework which links the past, present and 
possibly future.  
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To understand why an economy is stagnating or growing, the evolution of that 
institutional framework, the “cultural heritage”, its origin and changes, has to be 
studied. “History is not simply a chronicle but an interpretation, encompassing 
suspected causes and values” (North, 2005).  This is why “history matters” 
(North, 1990). Present performance is constrained by the historical past due to 
path dependence of institutional change. This is the context in which a historical 
review of the evolution of the Iranian polity and dominant coalition up to the 
time of its revolution of 1979 is presented in this chapter to attempt to 
understand why Iranian economy has not developed in post revolution. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part the historical review is 
presented to understand the nature of political institutional framework and how 
it has influenced political development after the revolution. In part two the post 
revolution development of political Institutions is explained.  
PART I 
The State in Iran: A Historical Overview of Institutional 
Origin and Change 
The state in Iran and its evolution as a social institution is one of the oldest, if 
not the oldest, in the world. There is hardly any old text on world history and 
politics free from mentioning Persia or Persians. However, there is an eight 
century gap in its existence as an independent state in the period between 651 
AD when the Persian Empire was conquered and partitioned by the rising 
Muslim Caliphate (Empire) and its reappearance in its modern form of a 
“national state” in 1501 AD. Its reappearance was in direct response to the 
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economic and political changes of the world at the time, namely the military 














 C) in west Asia and eastern Europe, conquering 
Constantinople (1453) and dismantling the Eastern Roman Empire and hence 
reconfiguring the East West trade in terms of players, routes and costs. This 
imposed extensive adaptations, adjustments, and changes on other players, 
routes and process. Persians and the different partitioned Persian territories 
constituting parts of the Muslim Caliphate until the fall of Baghdad (1258), its 
capital, were a major constituent of the east west trade, both as producer of silk 
a major export item, and as middleman importing and re-exporting spices and 
other items from China and East Asia and controlling large parts of overland 
transport routes of the trade. Thus the latest changes in 15
th
 century affected 
them extensively.  
The establishment of Safavid state (1501-1736), with the double claim of its 
founder to the divine right of kings (of ancient Persia) and as the head of a 
Shi’ite Sufi (mystique) order descending from the seventh Shi’ite Imam 
(leader), was the effect of changes in the political and economic networks and 
conditions of the world of the day. The newly established state in turn and 
subsequently, caused extensive changes in the same political and economic 
orders. These developments displayed the continuous interactions, albeit of 
various degrees of rate and fluctuations in different historical periods, between 
internal and external factors in shaping and influencing political and economic 
development through changes in internal and external institutional frameworks 
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leading to (re) distribution and/or (re) configuration of power, authority and 
wealth of different organizations, groups and individuals and the country as a 
whole. This dynamic is periodized and presented schematically under separate 
headings for different periods the beginning and/or the end of which is marked 
with a turning point, idea or event, a “critical juncture” (Capoccia and Kelemen, 
2007) (Collier and Collier, 1991, Overview, Chapter 1) (Hogan and Doyle, 
2007) (Pierson, 2000). For ease of visual comparison of the changes in different 
periods they are also presented graphically in Figures 6 to 13 at the end of this 
part (part I) of the current chapter. 
The External/Internal Institutional Dynamics of Survival 
and Development of the Persian (Iranian) State (1501-1979) 





The fall of Baghdad by Mongol invasion through Persia in 1258 AD completed 
destruction of the eastern flank of Islamic Empire and initiated disintegration of 
its western flank from south west Europe (Spain & Portugal or as it was called 
Andalusia), North Africa and the Middle East; the fall of Constantinople (1453 
AD) and demise of Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire and the rise of mighty 
(Sunni/orthodox) Muslim Ottoman Empire (1299-1923 AD) gradually 
monopolizing major East West trade routes encouraged the Western Traders 
(particularly Venice and Genoa, the dominant European beneficiary of the East 
West Trade) searching for alternative trade routes and Popes and the Church for 





Changes in internal institutional framework of Persia (1501-1905) 
The establishment and rise of the Shi’ite (Muslim minority branch of Islam) 
state in Iran by Safavid (1501 AD) offering alternative trade routes and military 
alliance to Western traders and powers was a response to changes in external 
environment. The Safavid state (kingdom) was established eight and a half 
centuries after conquest of Persian (Sassanid) Empire by Muslims (651 AD) was 
the first Persian (Iranian) modern (national absolutist) state (Woods, 1999, p. 9). 
Shi’ism as official state religion was realized for the first time in history of Islam 
with migration of some senior Shi’ite clergy from different parts of the Middle 
East, particularly from areas in contemporary Lebanon, Syria and eastern parts 
of Arabian peninsula, supporting and legitimizing the newly established Safavid 
rulers claim of (ancient Persian) kingly and (Islamic Shi’ite) religious divine 
rights (Abisaab, 1994) (Keddie, 1969) (Hourani, 1986) (Newman, 1993). 
Conversion of Persians (with Sunni majority at the time) to Shi’ism made Iran 
the first and only Muslim country in the world with a predominantly Shi’ite 
population in which Shi’ism became the state religion and has remained so up to 
the present (a unique feature of Iran in the Muslim world). The establishment of 
the Safavid state transformed the intra-state Muslim elite religious differences 
(mainly on the issue of political succession and who should rule the Muslim 
community) into inter-state conflict of Safavid Persian state vs. Ottoman 
Empire, Shi’ites vs. Sunnis forcing the Ottoman Empire to divide its military 
power between its Western (European) and Eastern (Asian) borders, thus 
changing the military and political balance in Europe, gradually removing the 
perceived military and security threat of Ottoman Empire to Europe (Brummet, 
1994, pp. 11-12,) which remained fundamental British (and European) security 
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policy arrangement right to the First World War (WWI 1914-18) and the 1917 
Communist Revolution in Russia;        
This state was, contrary to standard Eurocentric theory of the state, the first 
modern absolutist “national state” in the world with more or less defined 
borders, a standing army, a bureaucratic (administrative) organization, and a 
legal system of jurisprudence based on Shi’ite version of Islam. It was 
established by a coalition of military tribal forces (hard power) under the 
leadership of a mystique military order almost immediately joined by Shi’ite 
clergy as its legitimizing authority and provider of legal, administrative, and 
bureaucratic service along with the traditional Persian administrators (soft 
power) (Arjomand, 1985, pp. 175, 180, 185) (Keddie, 1983, p. 582), broadly 
referred to in Persian literature as “men of sword” and “men of pen” 
respectively. The structure of this state remained almost unchanged up to early 
twentieth century. The whole period was ruled by two major dynasties, the 
Safavid (1501-1736) and the Qajar (1789-1925), with a short disruption in 
between of Afshar and Zand reign (1736-1789) (Matthee, 1998). During the 
interruption the role of the clergy declined to some extent, but recovered and 
incorporated into the state during Qajar period (Algar, 1980, pp. 1-25). 
It was the establishment of the Safavid state and the subsequent fierce 
competition between the few existing Muslim powers that ruled a large 
geographical extent from North Africa to Central Asia and Indian subcontinent 
(e.g. Mughal 1526-1875 & Ottoman Empire 1299-1923) granting different 
trading and revenue concessions and privileges to competing European 
merchants, especially to the English East India Co (EIC, 1600-1874 AD) and 
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Dutch East India Co (VOC, 1602-1799 AD)
11
 (Newman, 2006, p. 61) (Standish, 
1998, pp. 78-80), as their trading partners and military allies (e.g. exemption 
from payment of import duties and collection of import duties from other 
importers to EIC in return for the company ships transporting Iranian soldiers to 
Hormoz Island in the entrance of Persian Gulf to fight and expel the Portuguese 
settled in the trading posts in the entrance of Persian Gulf in 1622). The 
establishment of this trade and business relations by the three major states of 
Ottoman Empire, Persia and India gradually in the long term facilitated EIC’s 
control and monopolization of the East West trade from production to 
transportation and marketing and total penetration and control of public revenue 
and financial systems. It was the extreme profit (corporate and individual) 
(Farrington, 2001)
12
 far above the interest rates in England (Europe) from the 
establishment of this trade monopoly (initially production of raw material on the 
Eastern side and consumption on the Western side, subsequently complemented 
with the start of manufacturing on Western side and consumption on the Eastern 
side through Industrialization) that led to subsequent military and political 
domination of the Europeans in Asia not the other way round.  
                                                          
11





 century, but as almost all these countries had an East India Company active 
on the Eastern side of the Eurasian continent, I have used this name to refer to a group 
of trading military companies  with similar missions, though different degrees of 
success.     
12
The net investor dividend paid for the first twelve voyages of the English East India 
Co is reported from %95 (p.144) to %334 (p.149). As a return voyage lasted roughly 24 
month, the rate of investment return was roughly between 4 to 15 percent per month, 




In other words, the political, military and economic competition of the Asian 




 C) and their 
successors, not the military, technological or institutional superiority of the 
Europeans, that turned the small financially unfit European trading merchants 
into balancing powers in Asia creating huge economic wealth and political 
influence for them which in turn were used to reinforce, expand and perpetuate 
this relationship encouraging new competitors.  
The sustenance of this relationship required reorganization of Western political, 
military and economic relationships which contributed to extensive ideological, 
political and economic reconfiguration in Europe. Almost all major European 
wars (both in Europe and all over the globe) from 16
th
 century on reflected their 
rivalry for dominating whole or parts of this East West trade relations that now 
included America on the one hand, and maintaining the resulting European 
dominant position relations as a whole on the other (List, 1856, pp. 483-486). 
These relations relies on the existence and operations of extensive networks of 
local, national and regional players, coalitions and processes subject to change 
in different times and places, i.e. contexts, as the intended and unintended 
consequences of decisions and actions are the outcomes or aggregates produced 
by all the players not only one side. 
Changes in external environment (1905 -1917) 
 The expansion of Russian Empire in the course of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century had alarmed the British of the possibility of Russian invasion of India, 
the jewel of British Crown and colonial empire and her major source of wealth 
and colonial military power. Thus in addition to various European and Asian 
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alliances the British forced cession of many parts of Asia from their 
motherlands to create buffer zones to protect this jewel. The competition 
between the two powers for territory and sphere of influence created the 
situation that was dubbed the Great Game in Asia. The Persian defeat in two 
wars with the expanding and modernizing Russian Empire in early and mid-
nineteenth century (1813 and 1826 leading to two treaties of Golestan and 
Turkmanchay respectively) with huge territorial losses (Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Georgia and Daghistan) made Iran increasingly dependent on Britain both 
financially and for its security, sovereignty and territorial integrity in turn 
further reducing the country to a de facto British buffer state against Russia 
causing further territorial losses to Britain (Afghanistan and many small and 
large islands in Persian Gulf), granting extensive trade concessions to British 
individuals and firms and the British control of a large number of Iranian public 
and state sources of revenue (e.g. Customs, Imperial Bank). Despite all these the 
Russian kept expanding and matched the British influence in Iran. The Russian 
defeat in Russo Japanese war (1904-05) with British help changing the balance 
of political and military power both in Asia and Europe, and the growing rise of 
the United States in international relation and the British liberals support of the 
Iranian modernizing reformist movement helped the success of Constitutional 
Revolution (1905-6) in Iran. Thus Iran became a Constitutional Monarchy with 
a Parliament.  
Changes in internal institutional framework of Persia (1905-1917) 
The new institutional arrangement after the Constitutional Revolution (1905-6) 
initiated a new foreign policy of bringing the rising America into Iranian politics 
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to counter balance the dominant Russian and British power and influence in Iran 
through reforming its public finance and tax administration. The appointment of 
American Morgan Shuster as the Treasurer General of the revolutionary 
government of Iran by the newly formed Iranian Majlis (Parliament) (May-Dec. 
1911) although ultimately failed under immense pressure and intrigues of Britain 
and Russia forcing his resignation and expulsion from Iran, never the less 
opened a new chapter both in Iran-US relations and the subsequent 
developments in Iran and the Middle East region and international politics. This 
was especially important after division of Iran into British and Russian sphere of 
influence in their 1907 Entente to contain and fight the rising power of 
Germany. The discovery of oil in Iran by a British citizen (subsequently Anglo-
Persian/Anglo-Iranian Co and later British Petroleum, BP) in 1908 and the 
subsequent secret purchase of over fifty percent controlling share of this 
company by British Government (Navy) without the knowledge of Iranian 
government, and the British Royal Navy switch from coal to oil just prior to 
WWI (1914) and constructing the largest world oil refinery in Iran (Abadan), 
transformed the status of Iran from just a mere buffer state to an essential 
element of British empire’s global security and military strategic component. 
This status became further reinforced and critical with the Communist 
Revolution of Oct. 1917 in Russia and the establishment of the Soviet Union 
(USSR).  
Changes in external environment (1917) 
The victory of the Communist Revolution in October 1917 with pronounced 
ideological hostility towards Capitalism, Colonialism and Imperialism with 
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subsequent and immediate renunciation (1918) of all Tsarist concessions forced 
on Iran (formalized in the Russo Persian Treaty of Friendship 1921), created an 
environment making British critically sensitive to political and economic 
situation in Iran and its possible consequences for preserving their access to the 
most valuable source of wealth and military supremacy, i.e. oil. This called for a 
“strong” buffer state to contain both possible ideological and military expansion 
of the Communist Soviets in Iran.  
Changes in internal institutional framework of Persia (1917-1925) 
To counter the new development in external environment the British initiated a 
military coup in Iran (1921); replaced the ruling Qajar dynasty (1789-1925) with 
Pahlavi (1925-1979) by promoting the agent of their coup to a king, Reza Shah 
(King Reza), with some passive and implicit support from the Iranian clergy as 
the main state legitimizing institution and the most powerful anti-Communist 
ideological local and regional ally; established a centralized power structure with 
reinforced military power to resist a possible Soviet invasion; encouraged and 
supported extensive social, administrative, political and economic “reform” 
programs to resist ideological Communist penetration of Iranian society. One 
important military and security imperative in the required changes, considering 
the military might and geographic extent of the Communist rule, was to remove 
local differences, including religious ones, to allow a geographically wide 
military, security and political Western led alliance around the Communist state. 
Ideological secularization and political and economic “modernization” in line 
with dominant liberal Western model of “development” was that integrating 
force to counter possible Soviet expansion. Thus an authoritarian state led 
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program of modernization with local coloring and imperatives, with top priority 
given to military organization, started not only in Iran, but in the whole Middle 
East states created after partitioning of Ottoman Empire and establishment of 
modern Turkey (parallel reform measures in Iran under Reza Shah and Turkey 
under Ata Turk). It is important to note that “modernization” of the so called 
“traditional” societies, later called the Third World, and their “development” had 
started, both theoretically and in practice by the British, long before the 
American President Truman’s “development” speech (1949). An important 
development in Iran’s external relations during the period was the Soviet Persian 
Treaty of Friendship of 1921 in which the Soviets formally denounced and 
relinquished all concessions of Tsarist Russia in Iran but preserved their right of 
intervention if Iran was used by a foreign power against the Soviets;  
Changes in external environment (1925-1945) 
The Paris Peace Conference (1919) saw the presence and leadership of the 
rising United States of America, but President Wilson’s failure to impose his 
Peace Fourteen Points on British and French delegations showed, on the one 
hand, Americans were still far away from leadership of Western alliance, and on 
the other, the different vision American leadership had from the dominant 
European powers. But never the less, American presence and to some degree 
insistence supporting widespread Iranian opposition, prevented British design of 
making Iran a British “protectorate”. The increasing failure of Britain to uphold 
its Western hegemony, “the Great Depression” (1930s), American protectionist 
and isolationist policies in the interwar period, the rising anti colonial 
movements in European colonies and “semi-independent” states, the ideological 
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expansion of the Soviets along with technological advances and the German and 
Japanese quest for resources to support their industrializing economy led to the 
WWII the outcome of which reduced Europe as a whole to an American 
dependent territory. The irony of the war was that the capitalist imperialist 
Britain had to accept the Soviet Communist as their ally in the war against 
newly industrialized Germany and Japan. To supply the Communist Soviets in 
the East with British and American arms and equipment, British and Soviet 
forces invaded neutral Iran (Aug. 1941) from South, West and North forcing the 
British made king, Reza Shah, accused of friendly relations with Germans to 
abdicate in favor of his young son who immediately signed an agreement to 
give all non-military support to Allied forces later joined by Americans 
occupying the country opening and operating the Persian Corridor supply line. 
In Tehran conference in Dec. 1943 Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill pledged their 
support for independence of Iran by withdrawing their forces within six months 
of the armistice. The Soviet continued occupation of North West Iran 
(Azerbaijan) province after the deadline was the start of what came to be known 
“the Cold War” further entrenching Iran into Western anti Soviet security 
arrangements and pacts.  
Changes in internal institutional framework of Iran (Persia) (1925-
1945) 
Many academic works define the period of Reza Shah’s rule (1921-41) the 
period of modernity and “modernization” of Iran. Extensive military, political, 
economic, legal and social changes implemented during the period are invoked 
as evidence. This period is certainly the one in which many “traditional” Iranian 
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institutions in almost all fields were replaced by “Western institutions”. This 
position ignores all previous successful and failed attempts of “reform” and 
“modernization” by Iranians starting from early nineteenth century especially 
after the military defeats from Russians. It also falls in line with the sociological 
view that places Western modernity after its industrialization in nineteenth 
century and derives Western modernity and institutions, including the “modern 
state” and its “assumed” associated social, political and economic institutions 
(e.g. social security, democracy and universal suffrage, modern financial 
instruments and intellectual property rights) as products of industrialization, that 
is, the basic explanation of Western economic development that was later 
formulated as the basis of “modernization theory”. In that sense, this period in 
Iran witnessed the start of deliberate and conscious dismantling of “traditional” 
institutions and powers. Political power was centralized to the point of personal 
dictatorship; modern cabinet system, new ministries and a professional 
relatively educated bureaucracy were established; European legal codes 
replaced religious Sharia laws and clergies were driven out of the judicial 
system; European education was adopted and modern universities established 
and some aspects of traditional cleric religious seminaries were placed under 
state control; compulsory military conscription including for clergy was 
introduced and a modern army with generous budget, handsome rewards for its 
commanders and officers and relatively modern equipment including air force 
was organized; European attire with tie and a special “hat” became standard 
clothing for public servants and unveiling of women first encouraged and then 
mandatory; oil revenues started to become a critical element of government 
revenue and budget mainly financing the military organization at this stage; 
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large and extensive infrastructure projects including a north-south transnational 
railway, consistently opposed by both British and Russians earlier, and roads 
networks were constructed, and perhaps paradoxically, to invoke “national” 
feeling and support for the process the official name of the country was changed 
from its Greek form of “Persia” to its ancient name of “Iran”. Iran in this period 
started to move in the direction of a Western ideal “modernizing” state: 
politically authoritarian; militarily and security wise dependent; economically 
industrializing; and socially promoting an enlightened liberal model. In sum, 
Iran was placed on the road to “economic development” through suppression 
and banishment of “traditional institutions” from public life and substitution of 
“modern European institutions”, thus heightening the conflicts between formal 
and informal institutions, powers and authorities. In practice the state that was 
established by eliminating the traditional military base of the Iranian state 
through the British coup, was put on a course of eliminating its only remaining 
social base: the Shi’ite clergy and its traditional followers, that is, the majority 
of Iranian population. Thus it became a state not based on any social class but 
relying on the newly created military organization with a very limited social 
base of modernizing intellectuals and the beneficiaries of the new regime. Two 
decades of military modernization managed to resist only four days when 
British and Russian forces occupied Iranian territories in 1941. The British 
made king had to abdicate by the order of the British served by Soviet 
ambassador, as the invaders were the “assumed supporters” of the state.       
Changes in external environment (1945-1953) 
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The most important external changes with extensive global implications, 
however, were the rise of Soviet Union to shared global leadership with 
extensive ideological and geographical advances in Europe on the one hand and 
change of leadership in Western Alliance from Britain and Europe to the United 
States of America on the other with both sides equipped with the unprecedented 
destructive nuclear power in human history threatening the very existence of 
human species. Establishment of new military, political, economic alliances and 
international organizations meant extensive rearrangements, renegotiations, re-
alignments, re-alliances and “adjustments” to the new international environment 
on global, regional and national scales. The monopoly of the technology on a 
bipolar line entailed a bipolar global military and security arrangement and 
division for many non-nuclear states.  
Establishment of the Bretton Woods international monetary system (BWS) for 
provision of long and short term financial assistance and support to member 
states for government centered economic “national planning” modeled after 
President Roosevelt’s successful “New Deal” experience (1930s) subsequently 
implemented through the American “Marshall Plan” in reconstruction of post 
war Europe and creation of the “welfare state” in line with Keynesian theory of 
“full employment” and “management of demand side” of the economy by 
government was both an ideological retreat of the Western Liberalism vis-à-vis 
Eastern Communism and Socialism and a partial theoretical and ideological 
defeat of liberal free market (laissez faire) economy within the liberal tradition. 
It was mainly these strands of economic literature that started attacking the new 
institutional and organizational arrangements and “the welfare state” and their 
associated ideologies, theories and policies from different organizational, 
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economic, political and ideological perspectives that led to the rise of various 
“neos” in political and economic theories, rise of the neoliberal and neo 
conservative ideologies, their capturing of the same institutions in the 70s and 
80s and turning them into instruments of “rolling back” and “hollowing out” the 
state as a “predatory”, “rentier” and “exploitative” institution and unleashing the 
and re-enthroning the “free market” policies.  
For Iran which under military occupation became a founding member of these 
newly established “international organizations” the good news was the 
continuation of government centered “modernization” project, the bad news was 
the entry of a new and more powerful external player with much greater military 
and industrial force and a more liberal individual centered ideology different 
from and at times opposing to the hitherto dominant conservative British 
policies. The first test for all parties concerned, including the newly established 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), came with the implicit diplomatic 
ultimatum of the USA to USSR in 1946 for withdrawal of its forces from Iran 
manifested in second, third and fifth UNSC resolutions
13
 with positive outcome. 
This was a formal declaration of the change in the political and military 
leadership of the Western world on the one hand and the beginning of the rise 
American influence in Iran replacing centuries old British domination of the 
Iranian politics. From this point on the competition and the conflict between the 
                                                          
13
  Resolutions  S/RES/2 (1946),  S/RES/3 (1946) and  S/RES/5 (1946) under the 
heading of “the Iranian Question” were adopted after the first UNSC resolution 




British and American interests on the one hand and their mutual cooperation to 
promote their common interests regardless or in tandem with the interests of 
Iranians is a major framework for extensive strategic, military, political and 
economic changes in Iran. 
Changes in internal institutional framework of Iran (1945-1953)  
The entry of the USA into Iranian politics required institutional changes in the 
Iranian state to accommodate their interest in return for their military and 
security protection against the Soviets. This naturally meant redefinition of 
division of labor and the associated distribution of resources and economic and 
political privileges within the ruling coalition. Fifteen prime ministers and 
cabinets were changed in the ten years from the occupation of the country by the 
Allied forces and enthroning the new Shah (1941) to the premiership of 
Mosaddeq (1951) and nationalization of Iran oil industry, which indicates the 
turbulent political environment in this period most of which was the reflection 
of the contentious interplay of the wants, interests and power of members of the 
occupying Allied forces and the Shah’s and Iranian statesmen’s attempts for 
their accommodation. Security of Iranian oil fields and installations, under 
British monopoly in the interwar period, and the possible entry of the 
newcomers into production activity became the major post war issue in Iran 
after the Soviet withdrawal.  
Encouraged by the new 50/50 oil agreements offered by the Americans to 
Saudis and Venezuela in the light of Iranian modernizers’ optimistic view of 
American liberalism as a liberating force (considering their positive earlier 
experience of Shuster’s employment, the post WWI Paris peace conference and 
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the most recent issue of Soviet troops withdrawal) and the rising competition 
between the British and Americans and pressured by the Soviets for oil 
concession in Northern Iran, a process of renegotiation of oil agreement with 
British started that finally led to the passing of nationalization of Iranian oil 
industry bill in the Majlis (parliament) (1951) and Mosaddeq’s premiership as a 
symbol of Iran’s exercise of its national sovereignty over her natural resources. 
This was a major overarching change of principle in Iran’s foreign relations, 
both political and economic, from “positive” to “negative” balance of power, 
that is from granting political privilege and economic concessions equally to 
every great power to balance them against each other to that of denying such 
privileges and concessions to them equally. This is the very basic principle of 
state “sovereignty”, “self-determination” and “autonomy” that probably 
motivated the idea of a “non-aligned movement” in the then bi polar world. The 
outcome of this event was the Shah leaving the country, the British boycotting 
Iran completely and blocking her sale of oil militarily (supported and reinforced 
by her allies) despite Iran’s agreement to pay compensation to the Anglo Iranian 
Company for nationalization of Iranian oil industry, British filing a complaint 
against the government of Iran with the UNSC and International Court of 
Justice the former rejecting consideration of the case as a dispute between a 
company and a government and the latter voting in favor of Iran as an exercise 
of her sovereignty. Although a specific case between the government of Iran 
and a foreign company, but it was a test of the newly established “international 
organizations” in supporting and upholding the “sovereignty” of its member 
states watched by the whole world. This was a victory both for Iran and for 
those organizations. Despite the  judgments of all international bodies in favor 
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of Iran, the joint Anglo – America coup of Aug 1953 and reinstatement of the 
Shah forced the Iranian to arrive at a new understanding that regardless of 
Western liberal slogans their first principle of action is “economic self-interest” 
for the realization of which they’ll kill even democrats and democracy. The 
reinstatement of an illegitimate ruler through an unlawful covert operation of 
CIA/MI6 not only closed the file of reforming the Iranian political system on 
the basis of Western liberal democracy for foreseeable future, but also opened a 
new file for reform: that “covenants without the sword are but words and of no 
strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes, 2003, p. 117). The coup of 1953 
against the democratically elected government in Iran was a public display of 
the high transaction cost in International Relations of trading national security 
for economic development. The only options left for reducing that cost was a 
total overhaul of the system and reconfiguring the dominant coalition and 
institutional arrangements. The available alternatives theoretically for such a 
reform at the time were either religion or Marxism. In a predominantly Muslim 
(Shi’ite) country with its religious leaders, the clergy, part of the dominant 
coalition, and the majority of population “locked in” that culture and 
institutional heritage, there was no chance for Communism. The wave of 
movement towards religion, both ideologically and politically as the more 
viable available option, for social, political and economic reform started. The 
Iranian revolution of 1979 was the outcome of that move in an increasingly 
favorable academic and ideological international environment created by the 
rise of neoliberal/neoconservative alliance to dismantle state led development.  
In part II the three themes of violence, rent and their sources as the main factors 
influencing the reduction of negative growth periods up to the revolution of 
141 
 
1979 are investigated in order to set the context in which the revolution 
occurred. But before that we need to have an analysis of the elite coalition in 
order to find out the configuration of the state and their relationship. Figures 6-
13 in the following pages visually demonstrate periods of major changes in the 
political and economic development of Iran from 1500-1979. The end or 
beginning of these periods could reasonably be identified as “critical junctures” 
in Iranian history and its cultural heritage. Some of the conclusions drawn from 
the analysis may not be immediately relevant in the following analysis but 
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PART II 
Violence, Rent and their sources in Political Economy of Iran:  
The institutional Heritage of Iran 
A catalogue of institutional and organizational changes in Iran extracted from the 
above figures can include the following points: 
1. The establishment of the Safavid state was a historical event of global scale 
both politically and economically. It was the first national sovereignty 
claiming state based on the divine rights of kings a century and half before 
the Peace of Westphalia (1648) as the origin of the European system of states 
and more than a decade before Machiavelli introduced the concept of the 
state to Europe (Savory, 1974). It established the first Shi’ite state in history 
in the sense of formally declaring Shi’ism as state religion. This was a new 
development in the Muslim world with regional and global security, 
economic and political consequences. Iran still is the only country in the 
world with Shi’ism as its religion and the majority of its population Shiite. In 
this sense the Iranian Revolution of 1979 is a continuity of its belief system 
(Newman, 2006) (Abisaab, 2004) (Algar, 1974) (Amoretti, 1986) (Roemer, 
1986) (Statins, 2000); 
2. The state was established from above. The majority of Iranians at the time 
were non Shiite, although earlier attempts to build up links with Shiite Imams 
(religious leaders) were made but had failed. The religious leaders required to 
rationalize and legitimize the state and provide the required public services 
were imported from other areas in the Middle East. This was clearly an 
institutional innovation, but the over two centuries of Safavid rule indicates 
its successful embedding of the state both in the society and in the external 
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environment. The acceptance of the new coalition by at least the majority of 
the population thus supported their claim of legitimacy and sovereignty. The 
self-sustaining division of the Middle East in which the major powers acted 
like pulling back force for each other provided a free security arrangement 
for Europeans. This arrangement actively upheld by the British right to the 
end of the WWI, provided the British with full control of all waterways from 
Indian Ocean, to Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea and eastern shores 
of Mediterranean and secure  movement of goods and service between India 
and Europe; 
3. The trade, military and political importance of this event soon brought all 
major European delegates to Iran for trade or military alliance. Considering 
the hostile environment in which this state was established, and the larger 
part of the first century witnessed frequent wars, no major military alliance 
during this period is reported. The Ottoman Empire was the most militarily 
powerful state against whom Europeans were attempting to unite. No 
militarily powerful European existed at this time. But the country almost 
immediately entered in the network of international political and economic 
players.  
The English East India Company after a century joined the coalition of the 
Safavid military tribal element and Shiite clergy as a minor member 
collecting import taxes in the Persian Gulf. This tripartite coalition, obviously 
with changes in their weight and relative power and roles at different period 
remained the structure of the Iranian state right to the end of WWI. But a 
visual survey of figures 6-11 displays the gradual move of the European 
trading military network from a minor coalition partner to “capturing” almost 
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all “governance structure” of this state. To understand the reasons behind 
these changes the whole political and economic changes affecting their 
positions have to be studied. For example, the initial conflicts between the 
English East India Company and Dutch East India Company (VOC) over 
import tax duties (Standish, 1998, p. 80)  and the complete disappearance of 
VOC later (Rietbergen, 2014) cannot be understood unless the Glorious 
Revolution (1688) which was the invasion or the invitation of William of 
Orange of the Netherland (1650 – 1702) to become the king of England, 
Scotland and Orange (Netherland) to ensure a Protestant line of succession 
and its importance, especially for an economic theory of politics, is taken into 
account.  
A Catholic king could not support the legitimization of usury and all the 
institutions (e.g. insurance), the backbone financial institution of a joint stock 
company and “capital market development” which had allowed the 
establishment of the English East India Company in 1600 through raising the 
required capital to do business with eastern traders. Even Calvin did not dare 
to announce it publicly for some time (Van Baumer, 1978, pp. 231-33). 
Economic and political development in Iran (and the rest of the East at this 
time which consisted only of a few large states like India, China and the 
remaining Khanates of disintegrated Mongol and Timurid Empires) could not 
be understood unless it is studied within the “context” of this colossal 
underlying structural changes taking place in the structure of global 
economy. The sudden rise of the Scottish Enlightenment and their obsession 
with justification of “usury”, “scarcity”, and economic rationalization of 
human action either as self-interest or “utility maximization” is 
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understandable in the “context” of this political integration of economic 
interest (Hopfl, 1978) (Calder, 1987) (Maddison, 2006)  “coordinated” and 
directed by a “secret committee” (Philips, 1940b) (Philips, 1940a) . In other 
words, read in its historical context, the self-ordering “invisible hand” of 
Adam Smith’s “free market” advising minimal state intervention in economy 
(and in fact trade) would mean nothing more than advising the British 
government attempt to get control of the expanding network of the EIC’s 
unprecedented profit distributed as rent among the beneficiaries, including 
the economically backward Scotts (Farrington, 2001). The difference 
between the gains from this foreign adventure and the rate of domestic 
interest was “the rent” distributed among the beneficiaries including the 
Dutch and the Scotts. It is highly unlikely that the tribal military elements of 
the East, including Persians had the information which was not available 
even to the British Public at the time. The political integration of Western 
beneficiaries allowed their creation of a centrally coordinated trade structure 
linking the producers in East with consumers in West. Considering that all 
European East India Companies were state licensed chartered monopolies 
(rather than even imperfect competition) on the Western consumer market 
side (Irwin, 1991) , their control of Eastern producers (sellers) could create a 
single self-sustaining “free market” regulated only by the “invisible” secret 
committee. The creation of that single market, recently dubbed “globalized 
economy” or “globalization”, is the direction towards which the structure of 
international economy has been pushed to after the post WWII “interregnum” 
due to the rise of two new competitive superpowers changing the “global” 
rule of the game; 
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4. The changes in the configuration of the Iranian dominant coalition from a 
tripartite coalition of a military tribal element, the Shiite clergy and the 
foreign trading military element in early seventeenth century to that of 
complete elimination of the local tribal military element and limitation of the 
role of clergy to a “silent legitimizer” in the sense that the majority of 
population affiliated to this institution would consider the state legitimate 
unless an active public opposition from the clergy is displayed, corresponds 
to the global hegemonic rise of that trading military network  that managed to 
expand itself through creation of politically dependent states in strategic 
points (both geographically and economically) over the globe, trans/multi-
national companies to control resource markets, transportation and shipping 
routes, and consumption markets.  
One should remember that after all the American Revolution started from the 
dispute over the tax imposed on EIC imported tea from India (Tilly, 1977, p. 
1). The statement that “by the eighteenth century, their military power 
allowed the British, French, and the Dutch to overwhelm every other state on 
the planet” (North et al., 2009, p. 181) is not supported by any historical 
evidence other than occupation of small, but commercially or strategically 
important, islands. The military power gradually developed by using the 
Eastern rents to support the economic structure gradually put in place. In Iran 
after the demise of the Safavid in 1722, the EIC was granted a trade 
representation by the Zand in 1763. It was this trade representation in 
Bushehr that became the “Uncrowned King of the Persian Gulf” (Wright, 
1987, p. 347). It was through the commercial links that “points of access” 
(Risse-Kappen, 1994) were established, local interest groups formed, 
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political institutions shaped and influenced and ultimately captured (when 
necessary by military force or coercion), new institutions introduced or local 
institutions manipulated to reinforce, perpetuate and expand the huge rents 
originating from abundant resources of the East (generally referred to as non-
European societies) and flowing to West. In Iran as in India the story started 
with trade and tax exemption and collection granted to the EIC by the Shah in 
1622. The immediate impact was the diversion of transportation of trade 
between India and Iran to EIC ships because they could be declared as EIC 
goods and exempted from import duties.  
This penetration of the political system for preservation and expansion of 
economic interests of the network went to the extent that even the so called 
“Oriental Despot” or “pivot of the Earth” for nomination of his own heir had 
to seek the prior approval of the British (Hagigi, 2012). The domestic 
political structure and hence the policy making apparatus could only best 
serve the foreign network, when it was highly centralized and could quickly 
responds to their demands. Highest decision making authorities are the 
potential access points for foreign relations especially at initial stages. Thus 
every measure was taken to ensure the perpetuity of the installed political 
structure to support and expand the economic structure. This is the reason 
that the most politically stable period in recent Iranian history in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, coinciding with the Pax Britannica, is also the 
most politically and economically static period of the Iranian history. Every 
move for political and economic reform was blocked, unless it served the 
foreign network’s interest or was perceived as harmless (Bostock, 1989) 
(Galbraith, 1989) (McLean, 1979) (Ingram, 1973). Any explanation of 
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development and long term economic growth must integrate the domestic 
structure at particular point of time within the structure of this transnational 
network. The members of the coalition act as access point for each other to 
embed each other both in social structure and international network. The rent 
accrued from this division of labour correspondence to the degree of the 
sensitivity of the service provided and the relative power of each to bypass 
the other; 
5. Following the defeat of the last Safavid king by the Sunni Afghan tribes, that 
could be considered locally generated conflict all wars were conducted for 
reestablishment of the state (mainly by Afshar) (Axworthy, 2007) 
(Axworthy, 2011). By the beginning of the nineteenth century and the 
establishment of Qajar dynasty, the rising Russian Empire was added to the 
external threat. Three major wars of the nineteenth century involving Iran 
were all externally imposed, by Russians and British leading to huge 
territorial losses that are now independent state. Iran was not involved in any 
war for over a century till the Iran- Iraq war in 1980 ; 
6. The twentieth century development in the Iranian state is the completion of 
the control of the Iranian state by the foreign network. The key internal 
factors were the discovery of oil by British external factor and the communist 
revolution of 1917 in Russia. The British coup of 1921 and the change of 
dynasty completely removed the military tribal element from the coalition. 
The subsequent attempt to build a strong centralized state by modernizing its 
political and economic organization financed by the revenues from oil 
industry, introduction of “modern” European institutions and army promoted 
as “modernization of Iran” (Banani, 1961) (Arjomand, 2002) (Atabaki and 
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Zurcher, 2004) (Cronin, 1996) (Boroujerdi, 2003) (Katouzian, 2004b) 
(Ghani, 2000) (Halliday, 1978) was the reversal of more than two centuries 
of policies that had kept Iran a backward country. The fear of losing the huge 
revenue from the oil concession received under total submission of the 
Iranian statesmen was the cause and reason for speedy measures. Everything, 
from the king down to population cloth and hats were to change. This also 
limited the role of the member of the coalition, namely the clergy and drove 
them out of judiciary, education and government bureaucracy they had 
controlled after they were brought back in the coalition in nineteenth century 
following the two devastating wars with Russians. The second coup jointly 
by the British and American in 1953 deposing the democratically elected 
government of Dr. Mosaddeq removed all remaining social and political 
support from the regime making it a socially baseless hanging state totally 
dependent on the foreign support and domestic suppression of all opposition 
(Abrahamian, 2001) (Balaghi, 2013) (Etges, 2011) (Gasiorowski, 1987) 
(Kinzer, 2003). It worked until the changes in configuration of external 
environment opened the way for workings of domestic forces. The Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 was thus made; 
7. Figures 12 and 13 show the changes in post revolution dominant coalition. 
The revolution drove out the external network representative member of the 
coalition. Thus it claimed popular sovereignty based on the religious 
leadership which itself was based on a religious institution of Marjaiat Taqlid 
(the emulation authority). Charismatic leadership of Khomeini was an 
additional feature. Although Charisma is something individual, it more 
relates to what one does or says. While up to 1989 the state and its governing 
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apparatus, i.e. the government institutions and organizations were dominated 
by the reforming clergy, after 1989, the Constitution was amended to allow 
non Marjaiat Taqlid clergy to be appointed as leader. Coupled with the 
establishment of the “expediency council” consisting of the highest current 
and ex state and government officials, the two new institutions provided for 
what NWW calls “adaptive efficiency”  (North et al., 2009, pp. 133-36) 
(North, 2005, pp. 6, 154, 169) (North, 1990, pp. 80-82). It has tried to bring 
in a new military force grounded in society. This element is composed from 
the lowest social classes to highly educated groups of society. The clergy, 
both from reformer and the established traditional factions with their 
transnational networks are present in the dominant coalition. They have 
mobilized all their ideological and economic resources for popular 
mobilization and democratization in the sense of popular and mass 
participation in politics (Skocpol, 1988, p. 150). Based on the institutional 
and organizational changes in the configuration of the dominant coalition and 
provision of domestic laws and rules and exercise of state sovereignty it has 
succeeded to develop politically in the sense of an autonomous independent 
state in the very hostile environment. It has been a politically stable state over 
the last three decades with the power and capacity to whether massive 
internal and external shocks. Economically however, it has not been as 
successful, though it has experienced the usual boom and bust of economic 
growth. 
 Post Revolution State Building        
The struggle and contention between different political groups in post revolution Iran 
has been the most manifest feature of the post revolution Iran noted by many scholars 
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of politics and area experts. It has been attributed to different conflicting ideas and 
processes from disputed sovereignty, legitimacy, authority to struggle for control of 
resources. The contended sovereignty is noted by some experts but it is seen as a 
conflict between divine and popular sovereignties and therefore the contention is 
seen between the civil society and the state (Jahanbegloo, 2010, pp. 24, 26). This 
view of the contention has to assume either a unified civil society or a divided civil 
society with unified expression of political demand for “reform”, “Modernization”, 
“representative government and democracy”, on the one hand, and a unified state 
comprising of all Shi’ite elites and laymen, on the other. This becomes then an upside 
down picture of a modernizing state faced with a traditional civil society which is the 
standard version of modernization theory or explanation given for the Iranian 
revolution. Both become oversimplification of a complex process of interaction of 
external and internal institutions, presented as a contention between tradition and 
modernity depicting the clergy as the backward traditionalist opposing modernizing 
reformers (Ringer, 2004, p. 47) regardless of their being in power or in civil society. 
The problem with this explanation is that neither of them is able to explain the 
diversity and even conflicting fundamental views within the state and the civil 
society. It simply obscures the causes why a large section of the whole society 
opposing the “modernizing” regime of the Shah should not be considered 
“traditionalist” at the time and why that society has become “modernizer’ or 
“reformer” today. With such explanations one then should wonder where to place the 
reformers within the state, manifested in many instances through disputes and power 
rivalry amongst the leading clergy and the supporters of the clergy view in the civil 
society widely manifested in endless supply of human resource in the war against 
Iraq and public support through ballot boxes.     
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 It seems in analysing Iran state one has to start with the state itself. The Iranian state 
started with the institution of referendum. Therefore, its legitimacy that was 
recognized both within the Iranian society and internationally was based on active 
popular consent (at least simple majority consent). The constitution that 
institutionalized a dual sovereignty of both people and the clergy was again 
established through referendum; that is active popular consent. Therefore the state 
that was established was a state established with active consent of the population. 
This state started to operate with the expectation of the population to provide two 
basic functions of any state; order and security after a whole year of low economic 
activity. Internal order was provided mainly by local communities in each town and 
villages that demonstrated a state of affairs close to a stateless society managed and 
ruled by self-organized collectivities generally advised and directed by individuals 
with some professional experience in military and security services.  
Under such circumstances the population could be organized through social 
organizations and institutions. Those with such organization and institutions were the 
traditional clergy operating through their hierarchical social organization based on 
Marja Taqlid institution which granted them the possibility of directing and 
organizing different section of population. Their extensive access to wealth, land and 
economic privileges facilitated such organization. Therefore a large section of 
population following the Shi’ite religion was organized in different parallel 
organizations. Another section of the population who did not fall under such 
organizations was those of non-religious, secular, or followers of other religious 
creeds or political organizations. Considering that in the absence of any organized 
large scale military or police organization all social matters were settled by popular 
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organization, the latter groups either to lack of access to any organization, or their 
effectiveness, were quickly eliminated.  
The new rulers, the “reforming clergy” led by Ayatollah Khomeini, had to start by 
relying on three members of coalition: the traditional clergy, the foreign trading and 
military element, and the non-clergy religious intellectuals who had become part of 
his pre revolution coalition acting as his medium of communication with religious 
intellectuals and foreign states. This group were mainly organized under Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s political organization moving to the positions in the new government 
organization and agencies. The Provisional government in charge of preparing the 
formal establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran were made of this group. On 
social level though they had their following, but compared to widespread popular 
mobilization, they had no effective impact. The social space was occupied by the 
population organized by the clergy; the “traditional” and the “reforming”. The 
foreign element had lost its chains of command due to exit of its commanding 
leaders from Iran, but started to settle in different countries around Iran with their 
commanding centres in Europe and the USA. Therefore, right from the start of the 
new process of state building different centres of power and decision making existed 
(Bazargan, 1984 (1363), pp. 12, 123, 143, 192). The process became of building a 
new state by a new group of people with “no previous state rents” who had to 
interact with two established members of the ruling coalition. The non-clergy 
religious members of Ayatollah Khomeini’s political organization were soon 
removed from his organization either due to being suspected of collaborating with 
the other two members or left due to their disagreements. Nevertheless, despite 
removal of the non-clergy member of Ayatollah Khomeini’s organization, his 
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legitimacy was based on popular consent rather than religious. Many have argued 
that it was his “charismatic” leadership that led to the victory of the revolution and 
management of the affairs of the country, but it is important to note that this 
“charisma” was based on his open and public opposition to Shah and his regime that 
made him a “charismatic leader”. 
On the political dimension Ayatollah Khomeini and his associates had to conduct 
their Islamic state building process against a historic demand of independence from 
foreign domination. Nowhere, this domination had been obvious in the past than 
Iran’s relations with Britain and America. Therefore, he and his associate targeted 
that relationship both for political mobilization and to make such demands redundant 
from other groups. The animosities expressed by hardliners in Europe and the USA 
and unsuccessful attempts in supporting the ex-military senior officers in trying to 
attempt a military coup facilitated such attitudes. The war that Iraqi regime started 
covered up many internal problems, the most obvious of which was the lack of any 
specific political and economic program and plans. Whether intentional and 
encouraged by the USA and other European powers or not, it helped the new 
member of the coalition to consolidate its political power. 
For the established member of the dominant coalition, the war created an opportunity 
to increase its influence on the state’s policy through mobilizing their organizational 
resources, both human and material. An increased participation gave them the 
opportunity to further penetrate the government and start to exert pressure especially 
on the economic policies of the government. Their opposition towards the final years 
of the war against government policies of rationing basic necessities as communist 
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economy were increasingly voiced through their newspapers and leading members. 
Even opposition to the rule of senior clergy were voiced at some points 
For the foreign trading element, the network of international corporations, there were 
a few basic important points that were important. First was the question of the flow 
of oil into international economy. The other was to prevent the Soviets from getting 
their hands on Iran’s oil and gas. Third was to prevent Iran from extending its control 
over Iraq’s oil resources. And last but not the least, was to control or minimize as 
much as possible the impact of the Iranian revolution on other countries of the region 
(Cronin and Masalha, 2011, p. 7). Therefore, the obvious conclusion was preventing 
Iran from becoming a model for others. This could have detrimental effects both on 
international and regional balance of power, and the Western countries’ economies 
which were up to %60 of their oil consumption dependent on the Middle East. The 
war guaranteed the flow of oil both from Iran and Iraq while neither of them had any 
control of the international market. Through the war the multinational corporations 
were happy that oil flows and through the oil market they manipulated and to some 
extent controlled the revenue allocated to each side while they increased selling 
military equipment to many countries of the region to boost their defence systems 
against much publicised Iran’s military threat. 
The real changes started after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989. The first problem 
the Iranian state faced was the question of leadership. The Constitution had 
stipulated the position of Supreme Leadership for a Marja Taqlid with the majority 
of popular support. Having succeeded in eliminating Ayatollah Montazeri, 
Khomeini’s close disciple that had been appointed as his successor from his post 
prior to Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, none of his associates had such qualification. 
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To reach such point even if it was granted it needed some time for the individual to 
write a manual and start gathering followers to the extent of reaching a majority of 
followers. None of them enjoyed the popularity of Ayatollah Khomeini either. To 
keep his associates in power, the Constitution was amended and the condition of 
Marja Taqlid, that is seniority in clergy hierarchy, was dropped. This had to be done 
with the support of the established senior clergy who gained extensive political and 
economic concessions for this support. After the elimination of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s appointed successor from his post, the established traditional clergy had 
changed its strategy to support Velayat Faqih or the rule of Jurist in the hope that as 
there was no senior clergy amongst Ayatollah Khomeini’s associates or the reformer 
clergy, a leading traditionalist senior Ayatollah could take up that position, but the 
change in the Constitution delayed that plan. Nevertheless, with new concessions 
and support of the new Supreme Leader they found further influence in the state 
institutions. Having had gained a monopoly of control over the Judiciary and the 
Council of Guardians, they started changing election laws and the extent of the 
Council of Guardians powers from an initial passive monitoring or supervision 
institution to an active vetting agency deciding who can nominate for elected 
positions, excluding a section of society from political activity. This gave them an 
extensive power of decision making through unelected bodies attached to the office 
of the Supreme Leader. This was the period in which formal politics was dominated 
with economics, economic reform and formal drop of state sponsored economy, 
taking up the IMF economic reform package for structural economic reform to bring 
back Iran into global economy. The domination of the traditionalist clergy with full 
control of the Judiciary, majority control of the parliament in the second presidential 
term of Hashemi Rafsanjani, and new extended power for the Council of the 
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Guardians to pursue a policy of excluding non-traditionalist political players was a 
gradual move to transfer the executive branch, the government, into an executive 
arm of the office of the Supreme Leader, the Vali Faqih. This is what Ayatollah 
Khomeini had proposed in his Islamic Government (Hokoomat Islami) but he 
himself did not follow (Bazargan, 1984 (1363), pp. 85-86), for reasons that have not 
been researched at all. It was during this period that severe social restriction by the 
police and security service especially for women and various social activities were 
imposed on society. Physical elimination of opposition both inside and outside the 
country became an active policy of some security and intelligence groups and 
agencies under the control of the traditionalist clergy. It was one such an incident in 
Germany that led to collective protest from EU countries withdrawing their 
ambassadors.  
The foreign trading element during this period resumed their political and economic 
relations with extending credit facilities, loans, and short term deferred payment 
system to the extent that a downturn in oil prices created huge problems in Iran’s 
debt repayment service. During this period some degree of external cooperation 
between this group and British and American forces in Afghanistan were initiated. A 
secret meeting between a top Iranian foreign policy advisor and a British foreign 
office diplomat in London negotiating for the British support of their future 
Presidential candidate revealed efforts to reinvigorate the old cooperation between 
the two sides as members of the Iranian dominant coalition. 
The surprise election of President Khatami, a moderate reformer with some 
ministerial experience in 1997 above all revealed a few important facts. First was 
that despite all limitation imposed by the traditionalist group, the electoral system 
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still had the capacity of reflecting the majority will, for every attempt was made by 
the traditionalist clergy to ensure the election of their nominated candidate. It was 
first and foremost a confirmation of the soundness of the election system even with 
severe limitations imposed. The second was that the number of vote casted for 
Khatami was the highest that up to then had put a candidate onto presidential 
position, which indicated a growing popular discontent with the traditionalist 
policies despite some degree of economic improvement. Third was the fact that 
despite all traditionalists’ efforts they had not yet had the power or the will to rig the 
electoral system. This marked the appearance of new reforming political force from 
within the political system with an agenda of reforming the system from within, in 
the historical tradition of the Iranian chain of top down reformers starting from the 
Qajar period, but this time with greater emphasis on political development and 
institutions rather than economic development. The assumption was that political 
development is the prerequisite for economic development. Khatami’s public praise 
of the American people, their revolution and common ideals with the Iranians greatly 
improved his foreign policy and started a process of detente with Europeans and 
Americans. However, this improvement was successfully blocked both by the 
Traditionalist Clergy internally and the Foreign Business Network externally. While 
the Traditionalist Clergy affiliated and controlled formal and informal organizations 
made every effort to bock these reforms, the Bush Administration suddenly put Iran 
in the list of terrorism supporting Rogue States or “axis of evil” (Cronin and 
Masalha, 2011, p. 1), indirectly supporting a more hardliner policy against such 
accusation and throwing doubts on the utility of the reformist policies of external 
rapprochement. The outcome was the government of President Ahmadinejad 
supported by the most extreme factions of the Traditionalists who publicly and 
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openly denied any role for people in electing the political leadership, ultimate 
authority and sovereignty of the Shi’ite clergy, and pushing for an “Islamic 
Government” in the sense of Velayat-e- Faqih instead of an “Islamic Republic” that 
is elimination of the democratic elements and institutions of the state and formally 
turning the whole state apparatus into an executive arm of the Vali Faqih or the 
senior clergy selected or appointed by the clergy themselves.  
Ahmadinejad’s two terms of presidency brought a dismantling of many political and 
economic reforms. His second term triggered a widespread popular protest against 
the government accused of rigging the election in the sense of just ignoring the 
higher votes of other candidates and announcing Ahmadinejad as the winner. It 
caused widespread popular protest and a social movement internationally known as 
the Green Movement marked by brutal suppression of protestors not only by the 
state violence excising agencies, but also by Para-military and plain clothes armed 
groups believed to have been organized by the Traditionalist Clergy organizations. 
The two hopeful presidential candidates who believed the result of the election was 
changed and protested were the country’s 10 year Prime Minister of war period and 
three time Majlis (Parliament) Speaker, both closely associated with Khomeini and 
his policies. They are both under house arrest up to date.  
Ahmadinejad, however, succeeded in implementing two critical parts of the 
economic structural adjustment, privatization of large state owned companies and 
removing indirect energy subsidies given on products to direct cash subsidies paid to 
households, that both his predecessors in the previous two decade had failed to 
implement, either due to their risky political consequences or by practical blocking 
of the move by the Traditionalist Clergy affiliated agencies and organization. In the 
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absence of direct foreign competition and active opposition of security and 
intelligence agencies with transferring to private sector on security grounds, they 
were mainly bought by companies affiliated to security and intelligence agencies, 
including the Revolutionary Guards. The subsidy removal project that its first phase 
started in December 2010 ended in its second phase being formally called off by 
Majlis in November 2012 citing “rising inflation and unfavourable economic 
developments in the country” (IMF, 2013, p. 28). The policies he and his supporters 
promoted were matched by both the extension and intensification of sanctions which 
in practice now covers almost everything from oil to financial and banking 
transactions, and the sale of precious metals to Iran. The open and public threatening 
of Iran by military aggression and war on the one hand and the economic pressures 
on the other, more than ever before displays both the self-help nature of international 
relations and its double standards, the priority of the economic and strategic interest 
of the global business network that have further converged through multinational 
companies constituting the interests of the most powerful financial and industrial 
groups. That is the contradictions of the basic liberal ideas of self-determination and 
freedom with the institutionalized economic and security. It display the fact that 
while some societies have “national interests” covering every corner of the world 
(Voice of America, 27 August 2014), the “national interests” of majority of nations 
cannot extend even beyond their capitals.  
The post revolution state building in Iran up to now has been an experiment of 
building a nation state within an institutionalized network of global economic 
interests the preservation of which has created extensive vested interest within 
almost all societies of the world since the beginning of 16
th
 century which mutually 
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reinforce and support each other. Iran has built a semi regional powerful state with 
relatively capable military might on the back of a policy of popular mobilization 
based on the power of Shi’ite clergy vertical social organization utilizing formal 
democratic institutions of the state to ensure its survival in the self-help international 
system dominated by a global business network of multinationals. It has achieved 
this under severe punishment designed by that global network to ensure the flow of 
Iranian oil to ensure the survival of the network and preservation of its rents. Oil 
revenue has been used to pay for government’s expenses and distribution of rents for 
further internal support which has further reinforced challenge to state sovereignty 
leading to further inefficiency in raising non-oil export revenue and further 
dependence on oil and the vicious circle that could be broken either by alternative 
sources of energy, or alternative sources of revenue the realization of which without 
a serious reform in the state’s public finance and tax policy and administration, 
seems to be elusive. A withdrawal of clergy claim to the monopoly of rule and 
sovereignty could also relieve the Iranian state from its historical financial 
impotence. Such a move not only boosts the financial position of the Iranian state but 
also greatly changes the structure of the Iranian state to a more democratic and 
popularly based state. Whether the clergy would find this move in its long term 
interest remains to be seen.  
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to show that the modern state in Iran since its 
establishment in 1501 has been a coalition of powerful individuals and organizations 
distinct from the government, the organization through which laws and rules are 
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made and enforced. The analysis of the coalition shows that in has had three 
different configurations in the over five hundred years of its existence.  
The first period starting from its establishment to the downfall of the Safavid in third 
decade of the eighteenth century it was a strong state with a strong administrative 
government. In the first century where it consisted of two military and religious 
elements and the latter dominated by the former , despite half a century of frequent 
wars with Ottoman empire it rose to be a powerful state due to which it entered in 
the network of international political and military players. In this period it also 
experienced its golden age of economic growth unparalleled down to twentieth 
century.  
The second period from the end of Safavid reign to the last decade of the eighteenth 
century it became a single military tribal element state. During this period it achieved 
great military successes and territorial expansion even in its encounters with rising 
Russian Empire. The single dynastic rule came to a sudden termination with 
assassination of Nader Shah in 1747. The nineteenth century started with a new 
military tribal element establishing a single element state successfully, but having 
been defeated by the rising Russian Empire, it brought back the clergy into the state. 
The difference however was that the clergy had become an independent self-
sustaining adherent organization reluctant to accept state patronage. In this period 
for almost three quarter of century Iran experienced one of its most politically stable 
periods with devastating economic consequences. Contrary to the NWW the long 
term stability not only did not bring economic growth but reduced the country to the 
status of a buffer state granting unheard economic concession for survival. It was 
twice virtually partitioned between competing external powers. Discovery of oil and 
its geographical position turned it to the center of external attention again.  
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The third period started with a revolution for Constitution and rule of law, but was 
soon suppressed by the external powers. For over seven decades speedy 
“modernization” financed by oil revenue to encounter the ever rising power of the 
Communist Soviet Union and prevent a revolution from below instigated, 
encouraged or abused by the communists was the agenda. The WWII and the 
military occupation of the country in less than four days by the British and Soviet 
troops proved that what had been achieved was nothing more than “pseudo- 
modernization”. The deposing of the king by the British who had brought him to 
power, displayed the complete arbitrary nature of the foreign imposed kingdom. The 
coup of 1953 more than anything else, was a change in the perception of Iranian to 
end the process that had started with modernizing reform movement in the middle of 
nineteenth century. The declaration of “neither West, Nor East, Islam is the best” 
was an echo of that change in the perception.  
The Islamic Republic of Iran was the intentional outcome of a process starting with 
the change in belief leading to action for revolution, creating new institutions for 
political rule and forming the required organization (s) through a constitution for 
making policies of a process of state building. This supports the NWW Conceptual 
Framework that institutional change occurs in the framework of the existing 
institutional and belief system, the cultural heritage of society, whereby individual 
experiences are socially transmitted through formal and informal institutions turning 
incremental changes to qualitative fundamental changes in political and economic 
institutions and organizational changes. Based on what has been discussed up to 
now, it can be concluded that the new state of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a new 
experience in state building, this time using the untried religious establishment with 
the military element subordinated to the religious establishment to try to solve the 
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historic problem of the Iranian state’s contested sovereignty and dual state religion 


























Political Economy of Iran  
Introduction 
Iran has been politically rising to the status of a regional power despite three decades 
of external military, political and economic pressures. However, it has not been 
growing to in any proportion corresponding to its potentials, neighbouring countries 
or comparable economies. The very fundamental economic aspiration of the 
population, diversification of the oil dependent economy, not only has not been 
achieved, but there are reports that the dependence has even increased. Despite two 
decades of implementation of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) economic 
structural adjustment, privatization of major state owned companies, tax collection 
and administration system, the economy has not improved noticeably. The most 
recent IMF report states: 
The sharp decline in global oil prices, tight corporate and bank balance 
sheets, and postponed consumption and investment decisions ahead of 
the expected lifting of economic sanctions, have significantly slowed 
down economic activity since the fourth quarter of 2014/15. Real GDP 
growth is projected to decline from 3 per cent in 2014/152 to 
somewhere between 0.5 to -0.5 per cent in 2015/16. Twelve-month 
(point-to-point) inflation has declined to around 10 per cent in recent 
months, largely reflecting lower food and beverage inflation, and the 
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inflation rate is expected to remain close to 14 per cent by year-end. 
(Jones and Ville, 1996). 
That is after a contraction of over 9 per cent over the two previous years. In the 
NWW framework used here, economic development is the outcome of 
incremental changes accumulated over long term, although economic growth as 
the increase in per capita income is necessary. It is quite difficult to expect a 
country under the most severe external economic sanctions for well over two 
decades intensified in the past five years to the extent of depriving it from the 
most basic international financial transaction in a global economy in recession 
to grow ideally. However, in this chapter I have tried to analyse the economic 
condition of the country in terms of policies and strategies to make the country 
return to the international oil market but with much limited influencing power 
over the market and pricing compared to pre revolution. One could argue that it 
is the “transaction cost” of the politics of independence and sovereignty along 
with rents accrued to beneficiaries. It is analysed in terms of the power relations 
of the members of the dominant coalition and an economy embedded in the 
structure of the international economy where politics decides economics. 
The State, Politics, Economics and policies 
The state of the Islamic Republic of Iran is neither a theocracy nor a 
modernizing state. It is neither a rentier state nor a developmental state. It is a 
state in the process of rebuilding itself as a state, which is, reclaiming and 
exercising the most basic feature of what makes a sate: sovereignty. 
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Historically, it was established as a modern state in 1501. It first lost part of its 
sovereignty to the Shi’ite clergy in exchange for a distinct identity through the 
legitimation process. That led to a division of state authority, loyalty of its subject, 
division of its sources of revenue, and weakening of its military power. The granting 
of extensive trading privileges, tax exemptions and unhindered presence to European 
trading agents in its territories in the same century, in the hope of military support 
and alliance, led further to its loss of military power, loss of its sources of revenue in 
foreign trade, distortion in the composition of its national economy, and finally 
reduced to a state without reliable sources of revenue and military power, and hence 
total loss of sovereignty. From there it was reduced to a helpless buffer state and 
even a protectorate territory under British tutelage to sell its natural resources to 
finance its bare existence to defend the interests of the buyers of its natural resources 
in 19
th
 century. This loss of sovereignty was utilized to the full extent by the British 
through taking full control of all the key affairs of the country and its natural 
resources in exchange for external security depriving it from every possible 
reforming measure by actively kicking away the development ladder. Feel free 
military occupations and coups at any time not only added humiliation to total 
domination, but forced the country on a course of single product based, oil, 
economy.  
The revolution of 1979, notwithstanding the consequences of a fast dependent 
industrialization program, was, more than anything else, an attempt to remove the 
interface through which this historical domination and humiliation was exercised. 
Since then it has been struggling, through popular mobilization, to regain and 
reassert its lost sovereignty against the same two elements that contributed to this 
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loss in the first place. The most basic requisite for exercise of the state sovereignty is 
military power for the provision of security and order. That is what the state of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran has been doing in the past three decades with a high degree 
of success, although at too heavy a price imposed by the same two external and 
internal elements. In the self-help system of international relations and in the face of 
open and public threats of external aggression and regime change, nothing but 
survival is the top priority of the state. This priority is nowhere more reflected than 
in the creation of the Council of the State Expediency with a critical note that based 
on this priority even the most basic obligatory religious practices hitherto like saying 
prayers becomes second priority and could be indefinitely postponed. As long as it 
has not been able to reach some hard and soft powers of ensured survival, it shall 
remain an unsettled organization, in search of novel channels of perpetuating and 
exercising that sovereignty.  
It is not a theocracy, because it has not even attempted what its Leader regarded to 
be an “Islamic Government”, that is a system of one man rule of the most senior 
clergy with the state as its executive arm. There are political groups and one member 
of the dominant coalition which tries to push the government in that direction. 
Therefore elements of theocracy are observable in the state institutions and 
functions. But it is not a full theocratic state.  
It is not a “modernizing state”, for many of the state institutions actively discourage 
popular participation in the economic and political processes and “economic 
development”, except technological modernization and that mainly in military and 
related industries, is not the first priority of the state policy. The major development 
in this respect has been giving up the mere lip service to “Islamic economy” which 
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has never been developed or presented as an economic model. Despite expression of 
the necessity of modernization, either political or economic, by some groups, it never 
became active state policy either due to lack of collective willingness in the state 
actors or due to lack of a commonly acceptable model. State policy in this respect 
has been forward and backward move by successive governments pushing their 
preference without a broad based consensus even amongst state elites. What was 
promoted by one government was dismantled by the next.  
There are opposing tendencies in the state actors for modernization, but never 
realized. Military modernization is the most observable feature of the State of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Huge money has been spent on highly modern machine and 
equipment, but hardly incorporated efficiently in the system. Billions are spent 
though to control the access to internet and satellite broadcasting systems that should 
be classified as modernization of military and intelligence services. Online payment 
or international credit system though, is still a risky privilege of a few. Some facets 
of modern life could be seen in very limited spaces and closed communities, but they 
are the most privileged parts of the ruling coalition.  
It is not a “rentier state”, though “rent distribution” is a feature of all Limited Access 
Orders. It was exactly due to the logic of the “rentier state” approach that the Iranian 
state, especially in the first decade and during the war period supported by the 
sanctions imposed, followed an active industrial policy of “import substitution” 
trying to manufacture almost everything locally under an overarching policy of 
“economic self-sufficiency” close to “autarky”. This policy created huge “rents” for 
some groups of insiders who were granted licenses, huge down payments, subsidized 
land and facilities, foreign exchange at official rates and financial and administrative 
support to develop or import know how, transfer technology and manufacture locally 
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various input of different industries including oil and gas. Though it did succeed to 
some extent create a “local industry” but itself became the source of a new rents 
creating huge income and wealth gap, political and economic power and became a 
source political conflict. It turned many traders and industrialists into commercial 
“commissioners” of new state companies or projects for joining big foreign 
corporations with national decision makers. Reporting cases of local manufacturing 
or development of parts or equipment with “much lower price compared to its 
imported version and saving huge amount of foreign currency” is the legacy of that 
policy that has lingered.  
The inefficiency or inadequacy of that policy and its huge direct financial burden and 
the associated corruption, and indirect damage was and still is a source of criticism 
and dispute amongst the state policy makers of different persuasions. It is also 
important to note that export of unprocessed raw materials by developing countries 
was the policy of now developed countries to transfer the maximum added value of 
finished products and manufactured goods to their own economy to be exported to 
developing countries for further profit. In the case of strategic items like oil, as the 
Iranian case showed in its dispute with the Anglo-Iranian Company (now British 
Petroleum, BP) they monopolized its production, transport and marketing totally 
excluding local population from the process except for petit service and labour 
works. In that case it was a deliberate policy of kicking away the development ladder 
from the reach of the host society by the outsider rather than the feature of the host 
state. That was true for production of sugar, coffee and steel as much as it was for 
the oil.  
Furthermore, the argument that the “rentier state” due to huge foreign receipts does 
not pay attention to tax collection seems to be historically disputable. In the case of 
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Iran, the Qajar dynasty during the 19
th
 century already was suffering from structural 
inability to collect revenue through an efficient tax system or customs receipts. That 
certainly related to the structure of the state and its inability to build up a centralized 
administration system or its inability to revoke the control of its customs revenue 
from foreign domination. And it was due to this inability in tax collection that they 
found selling concessions as a considerable source of revenue. The fact that 
American Morgan Shuster was recruited as Treasurer General to reform the Iranian 
public finance and tax system by the post Constitutional Revolution parliament in 
the first decade of the 20
th
 C is itself an evidence that the state had long faced the 
problem of tax collection and unruly finance system (Shuster, 1912). Therefore the 
relationship between “rentier state” and tax collection efficiency seems to be the 
other way round. The inability to collect sufficient revenue led to the state to take 
active measures for reforming the system but active opposition of Britain and Russia 
in preventing the state from implementing such reforms, forced the state to embrace 
a policy of relying on oil as its main source of revenue a few years after the 
suppression of the reforms. Under such circumstances, oil revenue is not only a 
“windfall” for the state, but it acts as a source of hope for some degree of autonomy 
both from foreign and internal pressure. In some respects it became a source of 
autonomy, in others, an elusive aspiration.  
And finally it is not a developmental state, despite the fact that the state heavily 
controls almost every major economic activity. Neither privatization, nor economic 
structural adjustment has led to a substantial reduction of the state control on the 
economy. The main reason is security, distribution of rents for political support, and 
popular mobilization. In every profession dealing with people, from catering to cab 
service to internet and communication service provision the state is there to facilitate 
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or prevent depending on who the applicant is. Many of privatized companies ended 
up in the hand of public enterprises under the control of the state or the Supreme 
Leader, or foundations and charities controlled by senior clergy closely associated 
with the clergy establishment or private companies created by the state’s money and 
people for various purposes. Neither efficiency nor productivity is the purpose of the 
privatization, but first and foremost that it is under the control of the state and its 
affiliated agencies; and second it provides sources of political and economic interests 
and privileges for members of the dominant coalition.   
To conclude and sum up, from the arguments developed in this chapter, one may 
reasonably conclude that while elements of democracy, theocracy, and 
authoritarianism are observable in the state of the Islamic Republic of Iran, none of 
them is the predominant feature of this state (Takeyh, 2003) (Jones, 2007, Chapter 2, 
pp. 28-57). The recent Presidential election (22 June 2013) of a “non- conformist” 
clergy from a pool of six vetted candidates of whom four were supported by the 
Traditionalist clergy is itself an evidence of popular political participation in a sea of 
formally imposed constraints, and true or false perceptions and claims of domination 
of politics by the Supreme Leader and/or the Revolutionary Guards. While the 
outcome of the election in itself does not deny any of the above claims or 
perceptions, it however confirms that still the people in Iran believe that they have a 
say in politics and the outcome of this election seems to confirm that belief. One 
should not forget that the group mainly occupying state’s formal institutions have 
been placed in those positions from the political platform of popular social 
movement as an act of regaining and exercising the state’s sovereignty on their 
behalf. In the absence of any new political and economic model, the only function of 
this state for the time being is its own survival and exercising its sovereignty, i.e. a 
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process of state building through “destructive creation” of new institutions and 
organizations in the NWW model for moving towards the “doorstep conditions” for 
a transition (North et al., 2009, Chapter 5); or in the long period of preconditions for 
“take-off” in the Rostowian model (Rostow, 1956, p. 27). In a non-ergodic uncertain 
world that the survival of a state is not only dependent on what it does or does not 
politically and economically, but also on what others do, its success or failure is a 
function of its success or failure in building up its bargaining power. Whether Iran 























My aim in this research was to answer three questions on Iranian political economy 
on the basis of the NWW Conceptual Framework. The framework is based on the 
idea that problem of economic development is sustaining economic growth over the 
long run. Developed countries have achieved this aim by reducing the frequency of 
negative growth periods by reducing violence even though, their rate of growth has 
been less on average. For natural states to transform their economies to the status of 
a developed country they should find some ways to do this. The NWW framework 
recommendations for a society to move from the status of a “natural state” or 
Limited Access Order to that of an Open Access society is first to move from the 
state of fragility to that of a basic type, and then to the state of maturity to arrive at 
the doorstep conditions to become qualified for a transition.  
The increase in the number of organizations and their dependence on the support of 
the state mark and explain the move in the “natural state” period. For the transition, 
turning the elite rents to rights for elites; impersonal and equal law for all; and 
consolidated control of military by politics, are key measures to be taken. The model 
does not provide much clue as to how these should be done. “Elites” of the dominant 
coalition should, somehow at some point of time, find it in their interest to relinquish 
their rights and privileges and extend them first to other elites and then to wider 
population. Institutions explain the improvement for moving forward from one 
position to another, but there is no deterministic inevitable progress. The framework 
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is not a theory of progress but a theory of social change. There is always the risk of 
going back to earlier positions. Therefore the model is built on two explanations: one 
is the explanation of how very few societies made the transition to Open Access, 
and; the other for other societies if they want to make the transition. Therefore, the 
first component is the “Ideal Type”, or the “image” for aspiration.  
In this research I have tried to explain the post-revolutionary political economy of 
Iran by applying the NWW Framework. The three questions of my research were:  
1. What are the sources of rents, who are the beneficiaries, and how are they 
distributed? 
2. What are the rent-related violence generating/promoting institutions in 
Islamic Republic of Iran? 
3. Are there necessary causal relations between country specific belief 
system or culture and rent-related violence generating/promoting 
institutions in Iran? 
In attempting to answer the above questions I started to analyse the Iranian “ruling 
coalition” (state) for in the NWW framework in the group of Limited Access 
societies it is the political system that manipulates economic system for economic 
gains. I identified mainly the clergy establishment and its associated political and 
economic groups as the main domestic beneficiaries of such manipulation. But I was 
puzzled that in the post-revolutionary Iran hundreds of foreign trade and industrial 
contracts were signed and implemented at much higher prices when comparable 
goods and technologies at lower prices were available. Naturally, this meant the 
NWW Framework emphasising only domestic and endogenous variables would not 
suffice for analysis. This was also part of my field research interviewing a number of 
ex-officials. The explanations mainly were that they are paying the extra transaction 
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costs for getting a foreign political support in a major issue in an international 
organization or preventing a political or military coercion from a third party. In short 
I had to incorporate external variables into the model to work. This formed my 
critique of the model and incorporation of external variables into the framework in 
Chapter One.  
I also learned that some of these transactions relate to historical connections and 
issues. A theory of institutional change should have the capacity to answer the origin 
and development of the institutions and/or organization that is studied as the 
explanatory variable. For example the Iranian clergy’s claim to exclusive right to 
rule and their extensive present political and economic power could not be 
understood without going back to the history of their presence in Iran. Here again, 
one cannot understand the presence of a large number of decision makers from tribal 
areas close to the Iranian borders without finding out that they were part of the 
coalition that established the first Shi’ite state in Iran and play a critical role in 
military and security arrangements of the country after the revolution due to 
cancellation of pre-revolution security support from big powers. Therefore in 
Chapter Two my findings confirm the NWW proposition that in natural states there 
is logic of rent distribution. But it does not confirm the NWW claim that its 
recipients are solely local armed groups and it is only for reduction of violence. This 
could be correct if only external violence and coercion is incorporated into the 
framework which then means it is also instrument of increasing the domestic 
capacity for violence as deterrence to foreign aggression or invasion.  
Therefore, to define institutions only as violence reducing devices in human 
interaction is a reductionist definition. Some states even promote violence capacity 
of their citizens by making carrying gun legal and means of self-defence. This needs 
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to be addressed in the model. The change of political system in Iran also reveals the 
primacy of politics in political economy as it showed extensive institutional changes 
in some areas of social and labour relations and expropriation public properties 
(commons) by private individuals and organizations. It also revealed the arbitrary 
nature of property ownership in line with the NWW Framework, that political 
institutions define economic institutions through legal processes. Therefor any 
institution or organization powerful enough to grant such rights, is certainly 
powerful enough to revoke it. The externally imposed war a year after the revolution 
revealed the extreme vulnerability of the newly established states without security 
and military arrangements and alliances with neighbouring countries and big powers. 
It also displayed how war could be used and abused for political and economic 
purposes and the shifts it brings both in domestic and external coalitions and 
alliances thus leading to institutional changes.  
In Chapter Three the dominant coalition of the state in Iran is historically analysed to 
find out its origin and logic in order to understand its behaviour. The exclusion of 
almost all members of pre-revolution coalition from government by the clergy 
shortly after the revolution is a manifestation of the extreme importance of power 
relations in decision and policy making. The social policies of the clergy-led state in 
Iran seem to suggest a different conception of adherent and contractual organization 
that runs counter to the NWW framework. While the extensive legalization of the 
informal social institutions in Iran suggests that the government is attempting to turn 
certain desirable patterns of behaviour into routinized habits and thus reduce the risk 
of violence and cost of transaction just by its threat of force, the NWW Framework 
believes it is the other way round. An important finding in Chapter Three is that 
there is an event, idea or change at the beginning of these extensive institutional and 
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organizational change that challenges the NWW Frameworks belief in cumulative 
incremental change as source of institutional change and development. These abrupt 
changes, like the establishment of the Safavid state not only succeed in complete 
overhaul of a society’s institutional framework, but also lead to fundamental external 
change. This also challenges the NWW idea that revolutions, as sudden and abrupt 
change, cannot lead to long lasting changes or satisfy the aspirations of the 
revolutionaries. As the past forty years in Iran shows, revolution, like any other big 
social changes has its winners and losers both in political and economic terms. The 
chapter also reveals there is a correspondence between the composition of the 
dominant coalition and social and economic policy making, depending of course on 
the relative powers of the members of the coalition. 
In Chapter Four I have summed up my analysis of Iranian political economy. It does 
not have a rent-seeking nature in the sense of Directly Unproductive Activities. But 
as a natural state it is a rentier state in the sense defined by the NWW. It is not a 
developmental state, as in the past for decades the thrust of its policies is in line with 
the neoliberal market centred liberalization and privatization. But considering its 
extensive investments in particular economic sectors and technologies, it seems it is 
pursuing a policy of industrialization to act as the leading sector. Encouragement and 
investment in generating local knowledge signals perhaps some undefined and vague 
endogenous growth stimulation. 
The summary of this research findings is that following the coup of 1953 that 
deposed the democratically elected government of Iran the main political actors 
came to the belief that relying on foreign powers or a balance of power foreign 
policy as the main strategy for survival and progress under the changing international 
relations and the United States replacement of the British in Iranian politics will not 
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improve their position. The attempt of those groups that looked to a democratic 
model of politics in Iran for economic development that had started with the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905 also came to an end. For in 1953 they witnessed 
the destruction of their democratically elected by the same forces that promoted that 
model. That coup destroyed the credibility and legitimacy of those groups and their 
inability to sustain a democratic political system in the face of external violence. 
This represented a major change in Iranian belief system driving them towards local 
ideas and models, i.e. culture and existing national and religious institutions. From 
this a gradual move towards religion and religious ideas and even violence starts. 
The major change in the external environment of the country was the change of 
leadership in the West and replacement of the British with Americans. This meant a 
vast renegotiation and transfer of connections, contacts and rents from the former to 
the latter. The rise of new grass root political forces within these countries opened up 
new political opportunities for the forces demanding change. The older players had 
to some extent succumbed to the new forces. The new alliances paved the way for 
changes around the world. Many of them like the neoclassical political economists 
assumed a stationary world. The Iranian elite won the battle of changing the political 
system but lost its influence in the movement of events under the weight of religious 
leadership with mass popular support. The sweeping institutional and organizational 
changes were merely formalization of informal social institutions existing and 
regulating the interactions of Iranian for many centuries. A similar event also 
happened in the West. The old political forces have lost their role and influences to 
new forces who are new claimant in the distribution of rents in their own countries 
and from members of their broader regional and global networks creating an unstable 
external environment for everyone. A concrete outcome for all concerned is geared 
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to the success of the renegotiations processes first at global levels to create a stable 
environment. Iran at present, like the majority of countries in the world, even some 
big powers, is in a state of limbo. In the absence of an authority in international 
relations it has no other options but to allocate a large part of its economic resources 
for the provision of its physical security and survival while negotiating the rent 
distribution claims with active contenders. “Adaptive efficiency” is meaningful when 
there is a fixed point, pattern or order. In the absence of such state and under the 
conditions that the whole external environment is in motion, only trial and error 
works. The Islamic Republic of Iran is still an unfinished business, “a work in 
progress”.     
 
Challenges 
Despite having the name of a conceptual framework, it is quite similar to a grand 
theory as it is presented as a framework for interpreting recorded human history. 
That means it should have some ontological, epistemological and methodological 
foundations which are not clearly spelled out in the framework itself. At times 
different parts seem to be inconsistent. For example the Ideal Type development 
model is based on European Industrialization based on a different set of assumptions 
than the one in the Framework. The use of vague language through upward 
integration of more specific terms does not help to create a parsimonious theory. The 
word “violence” can cover World Wars to domestic violence between two 
individuals the nature of which is essentially different. 
But the biggest challenge is the methodological position of institution. If it does not 
resolve the agency/structure problem of the social science and stands in the middle 
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way it should have the capacity to represent the constitutive manifestation of both 
agency and structure which currently is lacking. Research on the nature and 
definition of institution will certainly be a breakthrough in creating a more consistent 
social science. But after all in the non-ergodic world of uncertainty, trial and error, 
and experimentation in the face of institutional traps is the one choice available as 
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